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Cristiana Benedetti Fasil and Miguel Sanchez-Martinez
The key role of innovation as a driver of economic development was first
described by Schumpeter (1934). In current times, there is widespread
consensus among academic economists and policymakers, that research
and development (R&D) activities play a decisive role in fostering growth
in productivity and, hence, in the standards of living, as innovation inten-
sive industries create highly skilled jobs, exhibit higher wages, are more
productive, are often export-led and enhance competitiveness during the
thick and thin of business cycles.1
The productivity growth slowdown in Europe and other advanced
economic blocs experienced since the 2008–2009 economic and finan-
cial crisis has further reinforced the interest of policymakers in promoting
innovation. Improving innovation performance is complex, not least
because of the numerous actors and pieces of the innovation system
1 See, among others, Kumar and Sundarraj (2018).
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involved. Thus, the intricacies surrounding the promotion of innovation,
and especially the best approaches to fostering it, play a central role in
the European Union’s policy landscape. Testament to this are profound
debates such as the ones reflected in the European Union’s Europe 2020
strategy, which emphasise R&D and innovation as essential means to
achieving the overarching goals of jobs, growth and sustainable develop-
ment. The emphasis of the Europe 2020 strategy is notably on ‘improving
the conditions for innovation, research and development’ (European
Council, 2010), with the specific objective of ‘increasing combined public
and private investment in R&D to 3% of GDP by 2020’ (European
Commission, 2014).
In the innovation policy debate, the following topics usually take centre
stage: (i) best policy practices to spur innovation by the private sector with
as large society-wide impacts as possible, (ii) technology diffusion (both
across countries and firms), (iii) the apprehension of disruptive innova-
tions, and ways to promote them, iv) the role of non-R&D innovation,
v) the role of public versus private R&D.2 For the specific case of the
EU, the most pressing innovation challenges identified include: increasing
knowledge-intensive industrial activities, improving access to finance in
high growth, highly innovative activities, strengthening the role of higher
education institutions in local innovation ecosystems and improving the
governance of research and innovation systems.3
The increased interest of policymakers in innovation has naturally been
accompanied by an increasing need to evaluate the impact of policy
measures. EU funding instruments such as the Framework Programme
(FP) for research and the regional Europe Structural Investment Funds
(ESIF) include legal requirements to collect data on implementation and
to undertake evaluations at certain stages of the implementation (mid-
term/ex-post, for example). Measuring the impact of innovation is an
intricate question compounded by the often relatively long lag between
policy initiatives and observed actual impacts. In addition to indicator-
based approaches, such as the European Innovation Scoreboard, there
has also been mounting interest in undertaking macroeconomic assess-
ments of the impacts on GDP, imports, exports, employment at the EU,
2 On this last point, see, among others, Mazzucato (2018).
3 For the most salient documentation on these issues, see European Commission
(2015), European Commission (2016), European Commission (2017) and European
Commission (2018).
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national and regional levels (European Council, 2010). This has provided
further momentum to conducting research on the modelling of R&D
and innovation policies as an additional way to quantifying the economic
impact of innovation policies.
This reader is aimed at bringing to the forefront the latest empirical
and theoretical insights stemming from the most recent literature related
to the modelling of the macroeconomic impact of R&D policies. The
content of this book is thus relevant both to academic and policy-related
audiences working in the fields of R&D and innovation. As such, it is a
wide-encompassing manuscript containing clear messages and results in
the area of R&D and innovation policy and their macroeconomic impact
and modelling.
Specifically, the purpose of this volume is threefold. First, to dissect
the most relevant empirical facts to date on innovation and growth, and
their consequences for policy. Second, to provide an overview of the
state-of-the-art of macroeconomic models featuring innovation channels,
the new elements of this narrative and their drawbacks. Third, to briefly
discuss the models that have been implemented to analyse some of the
most relevant innovation policies managed by the European Commission,
including succinct examples. Fourth, to bridge the technical discussions
offered with precise suggestions on fruitful ways forward, with a view to
tackling the most pressing policy demands.
These and other similar questions were the subject of a workshop
jointly organised by the International Economic Association and the
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre in March 2017. Distin-
guished academics and Commission officials participated and discussed
different modelling approaches and issues for modelling R&D and inno-
vation. This book is an off-spring of the discussions in this workshop, and
it includes its proceedings.
The book is divided into three parts. In line with the aforementioned
objectives, the first part is devoted to overviewing the latest theoretical
and empirical contributions in the field of the macroeconomic modelling
of R&D and innovation policies.4 In particular, Chapter 2 overviews the
most recent empirical literature and its implications for innovation policy.
4 Please note that since January 2020, the UK is no longer a member of the EU.
However, the contents of this book were written at a time when this status was still not
officially recognized. The authors and editors have thus decided to include the UK as
part of the EU in all the discussions contained in this reader
4 C. BENEDETTI FASIL ET AL.
Chapter 3 delineates where the literature on DSGE models with inno-
vation dynamics currently stands, the main ingredients of these models,
and the paths that the academic literature in this area is set to follow.
Chapter 4 presents a succinct summary of the Proceedings of the joint
IEA-JRC workshop on ‘Macroeconomic Modelling for R&D and Inno-
vation’, held in Brussels in March 2017. Part II of the book presents
concise overviews of the different macroeconomic models that have been
used for innovation policy evaluations by the European Commission in
the past. Some examples of such evaluations are also provided, together
with brief discussions on them. Finally, Part III presents the main conclu-
sions on the macroeconomic modelling of R&D and innovation policies,
and the potential ways forward.
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Innovation and technological progress are the key determinants of long-
run economic growth and welfare. For instance, in recent work, Akcigit
et al. (2017) (henceforth AGN) show that those states in the US that have
innovated more over the twentieth century grew much more rapidly than
those that innovated less (see Fig. 2.1). Relatedly, more research effort
has been devoted to understanding the social implications of innovation.
Does higher GDP per capita or GDP growth increase happiness? The
existing empirical literature on happiness and income looks at how various
measures of subjective well-being relate to income or income growth. For
instance, Aghion et al. (2016) analyze the relationship between creative
destruction and subjective well-being. They show that: (i) the effect of
creative destruction on expected individual welfare is unambiguously posi-
tive if the unemployment rate is controlled for, less so if it is not; (ii) job
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creation has a positive and job destruction a negative impact on well-
being; (iii) job destruction has a less negative impact in US Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSA) within states with more generous unemploy-
ment insurance policies; (iv) job creation has a more positive effect on
individuals that are more forward-looking.
Given the tight link between innovation, economic growth, and
well-being, designing the right public policies to achieve inclusive and
sustainable growth requires a good understanding of what lies behind
the innovation process. The mapping between innovation and economic
growth can be described broadly as
Firms → Inventors → Ideas → Aggregate Growth
where firms hire inventors to produce new ideas/technologies which lead
to economic growth. In line with this mapping, I will center my discus-
sion in this chapter around three categories: (i) firm studies, (ii) inventor
studies, and (iii) idea (patent) studies.
Fig. 2.1 100 Years of Innovation and Economic Growth (US States, 1900–
2000) (Source Akcigit, Grigsby, and Nicholas [2017])
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2.2 Firm Studies
Tax Credit and R&D Incentives of Firms Debates on public policy
and economic growth cannot ignore the fact that innovations do not
fall from the sky. They are created by firms and inventors who respond
to economic incentives and, importantly, incentives are shaped by public
policy. A large literature documents the important effects of tax incen-
tives for R&D, thus justifying the detailed study of their optimal design.1
A recent paper by Akcigit et al. (2017) (henceforth AAI) studies the
role of R&D Tax Credit for innovation. In the US, the 1970s was a
period of productivity slowdown that raised concerns about the declining
international competitiveness of the US. At the time, John McTague of
the Reagan White House said, “Foreign competition in the technology
intensive industries poses a serious threat to our country’s position in
the international marketplace than ever before in our history." There are
possible policies to deal with this “problem," the most discussed being
import tariffs. The result of these debates was the introduction of the
Federal R&D Tax Credit for the first time in 1981 (which has been in
effect ever since).
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of average firm-level R&D spending
(normalized by firm sales) and the total share of patents at the US Patent
Office filed by US firms. There are two facts worth mentioning. First,
there had been a massive loss of technology leadership as documented by
the rapid decline in the US patent share from 1975 to 1985. Second, US
firms showed a large response to policy change. Starting from 1981, firms
in the US increased their R&D spending which then translated into more
patented innovations and brought international technology catch-up to a
halt. How effective were these policies of the 1980s and how do tariffs
affect innovation incentives?
Akcigit et al. (2017) assess the effects of import tariffs and R&D subsi-
dies as possible policy responses to foreign technological competition in
a dynamic general equilibrium growth model. Their quantitative inves-
tigation illustrates that, statically, globalization (defined as reduced trade
barriers) has an ambiguous effect on welfare, while, dynamically, intensi-
fied globalization boosts domestic innovation through induced interna-
tional competition. Accounting for transitional dynamics, they compute
1 Among many others, see Goolsbee (1998), Bloom et al. (2002), Bloom and Griffith
(2001), Bloom et al. (2002), and Serrano-Velarde (2009).
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Fig. 2.2 Introduction of R&D Tax Credit, Firm R&D Spending and Innova-
tion in the US (Source Akcigit, Ates, and Impullitti [2017])
optimal policies over different time horizons. Their model suggests that
the introduction of the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit in
1981 was an effective policy response to foreign competition, generating
substantial welfare gains in the long run. A counterfactual exercise shows
that increasing trade barriers as an alternative policy response produces
gains only in the very short run, and only when introduced unilaterally,
while leading to large losses in the medium and long run. Protectionist
measures generate large dynamic losses from trade, distorting the impact
of openness on innovation incentives and productivity growth. Finally,
they show that less government intervention is needed in a globalized
world, thanks to intensified international competition as a result of lower
trade barriers.
Key takeaway: An important policy message from this example is that
tax policy, or specifically the R&D Tax Credit, could contribute to the
attractiveness of a country for R&D and be a powerful tool for making
firms more innovative and competitive.
Firm Selection and Public Policy The goal of R&D policies is to
incentivize firms to undertake greater R&D investment, produce more
innovations, increase productivity, and create more jobs. However, these
policies do not affect every firm in the economy in the same way. For
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instance, Criscuolo et al. (2012) have shown that large incumbents are
better at obtaining government subsidies. One can argue that R&D
subsidies to incumbents might be inefficiently preventing the entry of
new firms and therefore slowing down the replacement of inefficient
incumbents by more productive new entrants. The turnover and factor
reallocation between incumbents and entrants is an important source of
productivity growth. Foster et al. (2001, 2006) have shown empirically
that the reallocation of factors across firms accounts for more than 50%
of productivity growth in the US. Given the empirical importance of this
reallocation margin, it is necessary that R&D policy takes into account the
interaction between innovation and factor reallocation. This is the focus
in Acemoglu et al. (2018) (henceforth AAABK).
AAABK build a model with heterogeneous firm types where type
is determined by innovative productivity. For instance, high-type firms
produce more innovation for any given level of R&D input than low-
type firms. The authors estimate the model by matching various empirical
moments capturing key features of firm-level R&D behavior, ship-
ment growth, employment growth, and exit, and the variation of these
moments with size and age. They then use the estimated model as a lab to
run counterfactual experiments and test the impacts of various observed
R&D policies on economic growth and welfare. The policies that the
authors consider include a subsidy to new entrants, a subsidy to R&D by
incumbents, and a subsidy for the continued operation of incumbents.
The main findings are summarized as follows. Using 1% of the GDP to
subsidize new entrants, R&D or continued operations of incumbents have
small effects, and some of them even reduce welfare in the economy. This
result might suggest that the decentralized equilibrium is already efficient
and any subsidy in this environment is making the economy move away
from its efficient level. To the contrary, the decentralized equilibrium
may be highly inefficient due to the usual intertemporal R&D spillovers
and competition (Schumpeterian) effects. However, in this model there
is another important margin: firm selection.
In order to understand the role of selection, AAABK first solve for
the economy’s allocation from the viewpoint of a social planner who
internalizes all the externalities of R&D spending. What they find is that
the social planner forces low-type firms to exit the economy much more
frequently, so that all their production resources are reallocated to the
high-type firms. Then they turn to the optimal public policy experiments
in which they assume that the policymaker cannot observe firm types but
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has access to the usual policy tools such as an R&D subsidy, an entry
subsidy, and a subsidy/tax to firm operations. What they find is that
the optimal policy requires a substantial tax on the operation of incum-
bents combined with an R&D subsidy to incumbents. The reason for
this result is that taxing operations makes it harder for low-type firms to
survive and forces them to exit. The freed-up factors of production are
then reallocated to high-type firms, which make use of them much more
effectively.
Their general equilibrium analysis, which incorporates both reallo-
cation and selection effects, highlights the fact that the economy in
equilibrium might contain too many low-type firms and policies that
ignore the selection effect might help low-type firms survive. Another
point that is highlighted is the fact that intertemporal spillovers are sizable
and overall R&D investment is below the efficient level. Therefore a
combination of R&D subsidies and taxes on firm operations could be
an effective way of providing innovation incentives to firms, while also
leveraging the selection margin in the economy.
Key takeaway: The authors conclude that (i) governments often subsi-
dize industries, (ii) these subsidies typically go to all firms, regardless of
performance, (iii) focused subsidies could be more effective since they
could redistribute key resources by letting low-type firms exit, and hence
exploit the selection of firms in the economy.
2.3 Inventor Studies
Who Becomes an Inventor? Inequality of opportunities to get proper
education could prevent the citizens as well as society from realizing their
full innovative potential. The strong complementarity between innovation
and education is documented by AGN for the US and by Aghion et al.
(2017) for Finland.
In Figure 2.3, AGN show that increased education makes it more likely
for someone to become an inventor. Figure 2.4, on the other hand, shows
that kids with rich parents are also more likely to become inventors. If
parental income is the only resource to accessing education, Figures 2.3
and 2.4 suggest that financial constraints could be important impediments
to inclusive growth whereby a broader fraction of the society participates
in the innovation and growth process.
Key takeaway: An important takeaway from these findings is that public
policy needs to ensure access to education for potential future inventors
who could generate economic growth through their creative ideas.
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Taxation and Inventor Mobility When it comes to policy debates,
it is important to also take into account the disincentive effect of taxes
on individuals and inventors in particular. Many of the prolific inventors
around the world are international migrants and their location choice is
affected by country-specific policies. In their work, Akcigit et al. (2016)
(henceforth ABS) analyze the impact of top marginal income tax rates
on the international mobility of inventors. Among many other things,
they study the changes in tax codes in various countries, as illustrated in
Figures 2.5 and 2.6.
Figure 2.5 shows the 1986 Policy Reform that reduced the top
marginal tax rate in the US. The effect has been a rise in the number
of foreign superstar (highest-quality) inventors who migrate to the US.
Similarly, Figure 2.6 shows the policy change in Denmark in 1992 which
lowered the top tax rate for high-income foreign researchers. The result
of this change is again a significant rise in the number of foreign inventors
in the country.
Key takeaway: The analysis by ABS shows the (dis)incentive effects of
tax policies. Their findings suggest that some policies (top marginal tax
rates, in this case) could impose significant costs on the society through
their adverse effects on innovation incentives and economic growth.
Innovation, Inequality and Social Mobility Rising top-income
share has been at the center stage of the current policy debates and many
of the proposals to combat this trend focus on imposing heavy taxes
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innovation
the link between top-income inequality and innovation, which has been
studied by Aghion et al. (2018) (henceforth AABBH).
Innovation has important and nuanced implications for inequality
and social mobility. On the positive side, AABBH show that those US
regions (commuting zones) that produced more innovations have also
experienced greater social mobility (see Figure 2.7).2
Innovation, however, comes with an important trade-off. In
Figure 2.8, AABBH also show that the states which had an increase in
2 Social mobility here is the expected percentile or “rank" (from 0 to 100) for
someone aged 30 in 2011–2012 whose parents belonged to some percentile of the income
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patented innovations also experienced, on average, a rise in top-income
share between 1980 and 2005. These findings highlight the fact that
while innovation is associated with faster growth and social mobility, it
also comes with an increase in top-income inequality.
Key takeaway: Policies should take into account this tradeoff before
leaping to conclusions for or against heavy taxation. In particular, high
taxation may induce more equality but less social mobility.
2.4 Ideas
Market for Ideas New ideas are the seeds for economic growth. The
rise in living standards depends not only on the production of new ideas
(as it was discussed in Section 2.2), but also on the effectiveness of
transforming new ideas into consumer products or production processes.
Incarnating an idea into a product or a production process is by no means
immediate. What happens to ideas and patents once they are produced?
While a lot of the policy discussions center around increasing the number
of ideas/patents/technologies produced, very little attempt is made at
understanding how these new ideas are utilized after their invention.
Akcigit et al. (2016) fill this gap by studying the secondary market for
patents.
Ideas are not necessarily born to their best users and firms often
develop patents that are not close to their primary business activity. This
initial “mismatch" could potentially be mitigated in a secondary market
where firms can buy and sell patents through patent agents (intermedi-
aries). In Akcigit et al. (2016), the authors study the secondary market
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for ideas (patents) in the US. They build an endogenous growth model
where firms invest in R&D to produce new ideas. An idea increases a
firm’s productivity. By how much depends on the technological distance
between an idea and the firm’s line of business. Ideas can be bought and
sold on a market for patents. A firm can sell an idea that is not relevant to
its business or buy one if it fails to innovate. The model is matched to styl-
ized facts from the market for patents in the US. The analysis gauges how
efficiency in the patent market affects growth. They find that the contri-
bution of the secondary market for patents to the overall productivity is
quantitatively significant.
Key takeaway: The immediate policy implication of this study is that
strengthening the market for technologies could make economies use
their scarce innovations and ideas better by allocating them to better
users.
Patent Trolls The secondary market for patents suffers from various
frictions and so-called “patent trolls” or non-practicing entities (NPEs)
have emerged due to these frictions. Despite the attention on NPEs in the
media and in policy circles, there is almost no systematic evidence on their
business activities. How do NPEs impact innovation and technological
progress? The question has enormous importance for industrial policy,
with virtually no direct empirical evidence to start answering it.
A recent paper (Abrams et al., 2017) takes a major step in this direc-
tion by making use of some NPE-derived patent and financial data to
answer this question. In doing so the authors inform the debate that has
portrayed NPEs alternatively as benign middlemen that help to reallocate
IP to where it is most productive or stick-up artists that exploit the patent
system to extract rents, thereby hurting innovation. They find that NPEs
target patents coming from small firms that are more litigation-prone,
and patents from large firms that are not core to a company’s business.
When NPEs license patents, those that generate higher fees are closer
to the licensee’s business and more likely to be litigated. These findings
suggest that NPEs could serve as middlemen in the market for tech-
nologies when frictions like high search costs or informational asymmetry
between potential licensors and licensees are present.
Key takeaway: Taken together, the evidence in this paper is mixed
and does not solely support the benign middleman or the stick-up artist
theory. Rather it suggests that there are some aspects of NPEs that may
increase innovation and some that may not. Therefore a more nuanced
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perspective on NPEs as well as additional empirical work is necessary
before informed policy decisions can be made.
2.5 Conclusion
To sum up, innovation is good for society for at least three reasons: it
leads to economic growth, social mobility, and happiness.
On the firm side, industrial policies could encourage more innovation,
if we guide our innovation policy in an informed way, especially thinking
about how the competition will have differential effects in different indus-
tries. The analysis on trade and innovation also shows that protectionist
policies are detrimental for competition and growth, suggesting that the
single-market policies of EU that remove trade barriers would stimulate
more innovation and productivity growth. When it comes to individuals,
a strong education policy could be a very influential innovation policy.
High taxation could have significant disincentive effects for innovators,
which could also harm social mobility in the society. Finally, having a
well-functioning market for technologies could make economies utilize
their scarce innovative ideas much more effectively.
Even though some of these studies use data from the US, their findings
are much more general and relevant for all frontier countries that aim to
grow through innovations. These findings show that public policy, inno-
vation, market for ideas, and economic growth are tightly interlinked.
Therefore any discussion on public policy and growth cannot be pursued
in isolation from innovations and their effective use in practice, which are
the main sources of long-run economic growth and prosperity.
The main lessons from these studies for Europe can be summa-
rized as follows: First, international competition is healthy for innovation
incentives. Second, innovation policies, such as R&D subsidies, require
patience on the policymaker side, as these subsidies impact the economy
in the medium-to-long run. Third, industrial policy needs to take into
account the firm composition and factor reallocation in the economy.
Bailing-out unproductive firms could slowdown factor reallocation from
unproductive incumbents to more productive entrants. Fourth, education
policy could be a very effective innovation policy in Europe. Providing
as much equal opportunity for education as possible could improve the
quality of the inventor pool and the overall innovation capacity. Fifth, the
design of income tax policy has to take into account the fact that inven-
tors do respond to incentives. Therefore one policy direction could be
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to couple income tax with tax breaks or research grants to inventors in
order to undo the potential disincentive effects of taxes. Finally, the use
of new technologies is at least as important as their inventions. Hence,
Europe might also have to focus on its secondary market for technolo-
gies, in particular on technology sale and licensing, in order to improve
its overall productivity.
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CHAPTER 3
Innovation and Growth: Theory
Omar Licandro
3.1 Introduction
This chapter surveys the literature on innovation, endogenous growth
and firm dynamics, aiming to better understand the mechanisms through
which innovation policies affect the progress of technology, productivity
growth, output growth and welfare. When modeling the macroeconomy
with the objective of evaluating the effect of innovation policies, the
modeler has to fundamentally understand the different mechanisms
through which a policy is expected to affect the dynamics of the economy
through innovation. Since innovations fundamentally diffuse through a
complex process of firm, plant and product creation and destruction, it is
critical to understand the relation between innovation and the dynamics
of market selection.
In writing this survey, an effort has been made to keep notation
consistent across different models, imposing assumptions and interpreting
results under a common framework, making models as comparable as
possible. Section 3.2 gives a preliminary picture of these similarities by
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pointing out some fundamental issues that arise when modeling innova-
tion in a context of heterogeneous firms. It stresses the dynamic nature
of the innovation process, describes the usual assumptions about firm
heterogeneity in the context of innovation models of perfect, monop-
olistic and oligopolistic competition, uses aggregation theory to relate
models of heterogeneous firms with the one-final-good Neoclassical and
endogenous growth models, draws attention to the equivalence between
(sunk) entry costs and R&D irreversible investments, as well as the
embodied nature of technical progress.
Section 3.3 describes and analyzes firm heterogeneity in models of
exogenous growth, starting with the perfectly competitive model of
heterogeneous firms first developed by Hopenhayn, to then study a close
economy version of the monopolistic competitive model first suggested
by Melitz (2003) to finally refer to the close economy version of the
oligopolistic model developed by Impullitti and Licandro (2018).
Finally, Sect. 3.4 studies firm heterogeneity in models of endoge-
nous growth in order to understand the role of selection in shaping
innovation and productivity growth. This section relates the traditional
Romer (1990) and Schumpeterian (Aghion & Howitt, 1992) models
to the recent literature on endogenous growth with firm heterogeneity,
discussing the selection and imitation mechanism suggested by Luttmer
(2007) and Klette and Kortum (2004).
3.2 Preliminaries
Before surveying the literature on firm dynamics and innovation, this
section revises some critical concepts.
Time. Since the Industrial Revolution, modern economies live in a
permanent state of innovation and progress. In this sense, innovation
has to be understood as a dynamic process fueling technological develop-
ments. For this reason, the literature on economic growth belongs to the
family of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models where
time is a fundamental dimension of the economic system. Static models
are some times used as a shortcut, however, by construction they miss a
fundamental dimension of the innovation process: It takes a long time to
implement, adopt and diffuse new technologies.1
1 Different authors have measured the time it takes for innovation to diffuse. Comin
and Hobijn (2010) estimate that new technologies take around fifty years to be adopted
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Aggregate macroeconomic and microeconomic data are generally
collected monthly, quarterly or annually. As a consequence, models
designed to simulate and evaluate innovation policies often assume that
time is discrete. In this chapter instead, we choose to follow the main
tradition of economic growth theory and assume that time is continuous.
Moreover, we abstract from aggregate shocks, even when some of the
models reviewed originally embody aggregate stochastic processes.
Firm Heterogeneity. New technologies are fundamentally developed
and implemented by the private sector. In a decentralized world, technical
progress operates through the creation and destruction of products, plants
and firms. In this sense, understanding the innovation process requires a
minimum degree of firm heterogeneity and a good understanding of the
dynamics of firms and markets.
The recent literature on firm dynamics usually models firm hetero-
geneity by assuming that the productivity of a firm can be characterized
by some variable z. A firm entering the economy at time t draws its initial
z, let us denote it by zt , from some known entry (density) distribution
ψt (z). The entry distribution may be evolving over time. The support of
the entry distribution is usually assumed to be in the real line, with some
lower bound ζt ≥ 0.2 As time passes, the productivities of these firms
evolve following independent Markov processes. Equilibrium at time t
will be then characterized as an equilibrium productivity (density) distri-
bution that we denote by φt (z), for z ≥ z∗t , where z∗t is the productivity of
the least productive firm still surviving on the market. This is commonly
called the cut-off productivity level.
In this review, we mainly concentrate on the study of economies where
the productivity of a firm is time invariant, meaning that at entry firms
draw a productivity z from ψt (z), for z ≥ ζt , ζt ≥ 0, and keep this produc-
tivity constant all along their active life. In stationary economies, the entry
distribution ψ(z) and the lower bound of its support ζ are assumed to be
time invariant. Instead, in growing economies the entry distribution ψt (z)
worldwide after their invention. When compared to the US, Comin et al. (2008) estimate
that the lag in the use of new technologies by most countries is measured in decades.
Adams (1990) measures in roughly 20 years the time it takes academic knowledge to
contribute to productivity growth. Mansfield (1989) quantifies in 8 years the mean adop-
tion delay of twelve mayor 20th-century innovations. Jovanovic and Lach (1997) estimate
at 8.1% the annual diffusion rate of new products.
2 Some papers, like Melitz and Redding (2015), assume also that the support of entry
distribution has a finite upper bound.
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will move overtime guided by some form of spillover, as well as the lower
bound of its support ζt . Hence, a stationary entry distribution will not
result in growing average productivity.
A standard assumption in this literature is that a firm with produc-
tivity z employs some flexible production factor x to produce output y.
In the following, inputs and output of a firm with productivity z will be
denoted x(z) and y(z), respectively. In perfectly competitive economies,
this technology is assumed to have decreasing returns on x. However,
under monopolistic competition, including also other forms of imper-
fect competition, technology is frequently assumed to be linear on x.
Hopenhayn and Melitz, respectively assume y(z) = z x(z)α, α ∈ (0, 1) and
y(z) = z x(z). Following Collard and Licandro (2018), we will in some
sections assume that y(z) = F(z, x(z)), with F (.) being a Neoclassical
technology.
This literature often abstracts from capital accumulation by assuming
that labor  is the sole production factor, i.e. x = . Hopenhayn (2014)
generalizes it to a two production factor economy, with x = F(k, ); k
represents capital and F(k, ) is assumed to be a Neoclassical technology.
In line with the Neoclassical growth framework, we survey first models
where the productivity of firms is stationary or evolves exogenously, to
then study models where firm heterogeneity is guided by innovation and
technological developments.
Entry Cost, Innovation and Capital Reversibility. It is generally
assumed that firms have to pay some entry cost before they draw produc-
tivity z from ψt (z). On top of that, the entry cost is frequently assumed
to be sunk, i.e. the investment realized to create the firm is irreversible:
When a firm closes down, nothing is recovered from this investment.
Moreover, it is usual that net revenues of operative firms are strictly posi-
tive, implying that fixed production costs need to be assumed for the least
productive firms to exit.3
Interestingly, the sunk entry cost, even when fully irreversible, can be
interpreted as a form of intangible investment. Since operative firms make
positive profits at equilibrium, the value of the firm, namely the expected
3 In Hopenhayn (1992), net revenues are strictly concave due to decreasing returns
to labor; at equilibrium, low productivity firms optimally hire few workers making net
revenues strictly positive. In Melitz (2003), monopoly profits are strictly concave implying
that low productive firms also optimally hire few workers making net revenues strictly
positive.
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discounted flow of profits, is the value of the associated intangible invest-
ment. Firms close down and exit when the value of their intangible capital
is zero.
As an alternative and consistent with national accounts, Collard and
Licandro (2018) assume that the entry cost is a form of capital invest-
ment (tangible and intangible), with capital being partially reversible,
i.e. it has a market value smaller than the replacement cost. Under very
general assumptions about firms’technology, they show that aggregate
technology is Neoclassical on aggregate capital and labor. Moreover, since
capital is partially reversible, no fixed production cost is needed for the
least productive firms to exit: Firms exit when the value of being operative
is smaller than the market value of capital.
In the endogenous growth literature, when innovation is assumed to
be undertaken by new entrant firms, R&D investment is a form of entry
cost.4 Firms have to invest in R&D in order to innovate and then enter
the economy. In Romer (1990), new firms innovate by creating a new
variety. Since firms are never displaced in the Romer’s model, the R&D
investment can be seen as fully reversible. Patents can be transferred at no
cost. In the Schumpeterian model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) or in the
Grossman and Helpman (1991)’s quality-ladder model the entering firm
displaces an incumbent firm, which is known as business-stealing effect.
R&D investments are then fully irreversible in these two models.
One-Final-Good Economy. Macroeconomic models are designed to
understand the behavior of GDP as measured by national accounts.
Consistently, in the tradition of the Neoclassical growth theory, an
economy is modeled as producing a sole final good, directly associated to
GDP in the data. The final good is then allocated to different uses, such
as consumption or investment. Macroeconomic models of heterogeneous
firms belong to this tradition.
For example, in Hopenahyn (1992) the production side of an economy
is modeled as a mass of heterogeneous firms that produce the sole final
good under perfect competition. Hence, in these economies, firm’s tech-
nology has decreasing returns on labor, in line with the Lucas (1978)’s
span of control model.
4 In Sect. 4.4, some models of innovation by incumbents, where R&D does not play
the role of an entry cost, are also surveyed. Another example of such models can be
found in Akcigit and Kerr (2017).
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Alternatively, in the monopolistic competitive approach inspired in
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), a perfectly competitive, representative firm
produces the sole final good by the mean of a constant elasticity of
substitution technology defined on a continuum of heterogeneous inter-
mediary inputs, which are assumed to be gross substitutes. The market for
intermediary inputs is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Each
heterogeneous intermediary firm has monopoly power on the produc-
tion of a particular intermediary input and owns a constant return to
scale technology defined on a vector of production factors (usually labor
only).5 An alternative and isomorphic way of representing the same
economy is to assume that the monopolistically competitive firms produce
a continuum of final consumption goods that households order by the
mean of a constant elasticity of substitution utility function. Consumption
in national accounts is then interpreted as the aggregate of all the different
consumption goods, aggregated by the mean of household preferences.
Aggregation. As shown by Hopenhayn and Collard and Licandro
(2018), most of these economies share some simple aggregation prop-
erties that cause aggregate technology to be Neoclassical in exogenously
driven growth models. These aggregation properties are shared with most
endogenous growth models, where aggregate technology indeed belongs
to the family of AK production functions. The main implication is that
aggregate conditions are quite standard despite the complexity added by
firm heterogeneity.
Spillovers. In the Neoclassical growth model, technical progress is
a gift offered by Nature that instantaneously diffuses over the whole
economy without limit: All firms and countries may access the frontier
technology. In particular, the representative firm benefits from it without
paying any cost. In this sense, technical progress in the Neoclassical
growth model is nothing else than spillovers! Of course, since technical
progress is part of the environment, and Nature gives rise to it without
facing any trade-off, a perfectly competitive economy reacts to it opti-
mally. Hence, in the Neoclassical growth mode technical progress diffuses
through inconsequential spillovers.
However, when innovations are added to the picture endogenizing the
rate of technical progress, spillovers become consequential. For example,
5 This framework has been extended to alternative forms of imperfect competition, see
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Impullitti and Licandro (2018).
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endogenous growth in the learning-by-doing model is based on a partic-
ular form of spillover: the state of technology depends on past capital
production. Consequently, investors (i) do not internalize the effect of
their actions on technical progress, (ii) invest less than optimal and (iii)
the economy grows at a rate smaller than the optimal growth rate.
Similarly, in Romer (1990) expanding-product-variety model, innovators
increase the mass of intermediary inputs, which affect the productivity of
final producers through another form of spillover externality.
In the Schumpeterian and quality-ladder models, the technology of
innovators builds upon the pre-existing state of knowledge. This oper-
ates as a form of spillover, since the knowledge that innovators create,
indeed, flows back to the economy improving the innovation technology
of the following innovators. Hence, when innovators substitute Nature,
investing resources to make the technology progress, since they do not
internalize knowledge spillovers, spillovers become consequential.
Technological spillovers result from a fundamental property of knowl-
edge, the so-called non-rivalry: The use of some knowledge by an
individual or firm does not prevent another by using it simultaneously.
The fact that an engineer is using the Pythagoras theorem to calculate
some structures does not impede others from using it too. For this funda-
mental reason, a model designed to evaluate innovation policies has to
include knowledge spillovers, as well as the potential distortions generated
by the policies, in particular those addressed to protect intellectual prop-
erty rights. In this sense, it is important to understand that innovation
policies have to be analyzed in a second-best framework.
Embodied Technical Change. The evidence of a permanent decline in
the price of durable goods (including equipment investment, structures,
durable consumption and some forms of intangible capital), relative to
the price of non-durable consumption and services, gave raise to a large
literature stressing the importance of modeling the economy as a two-
sector model with durable and non-durable goods. The standard way of
modeling is in line with Greenwood et al. (1997).6
As aforementioned, in the Neoclassical growth model technical
progress is disembodied: new technologies diffuse all over the economy
at no cost. Instead, when technical progress is embodied in capital, it
requires investments to diffuse. The frontier of technology moves in
6 See also Felbermayr and Licandro (2005).
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the investment sector, but investments are needed to allow for technical
progress to diffuse to the consumption sector.
Finally, in the vintage capital literature the gift of Nature is only
addressed to new capital units.7 Investment is key for an economy that
wants to benefit from the progress of technology, since technical progress
does not spillover previously produced capital. For this reason, technical
progress in the vintage capital model, is said to be embodied in new
capital. Moreover, a perfectly competitive vintage capital economy opti-
mally reacts to technical change. The fact that the gift of Nature only
flows over the capital producing industry is also inconsequential (Solow,
1962).
3.3 Firm Dynamics and the Neoclassical Model
The seminal work of Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992), and
the subsequent application to international trade by Melitz (2003), gave
raise to an extensive literature on the macroeconomic implications of
firm dynamics pointing to the fundamental role of market selection on
economic performance and welfare. Even if Jovanovic (1982) stresses the
role of incomplete information and learning, in the Hopenhayn (1992)
framework heterogeneous firms operate in perfectly competitive markets,
making selection to be optimal by construction. In the Melitz (2003)
model of monopolistic competition, instead, selection interacts with
different types of market frictions, making welfare gains from selection
less obvious.
As mentioned, time is assumed to be continuous and denoted by t,
with t = 0 being the initial time. Population is assumed to be constant
and normalized to one, implying that aggregate variables are measured in
per capita terms. There is a sole final good which is adopted as numeraire,
even if in some sections of the chapter the implications of multiple final
goods (consumption and investment, for example) are discussed.
A representative household, with additively separable constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) preferences, inelastically
offers one unit flow of labor. Households face perfect financial markets
with riskless interest rate rt . The saving behavior of the representative
7 See Solow (1962) and Solow et al. (1966), and more recently, Boucekkine et al.
(1997, 2005) and Gilchrist and Williams (2000). Bambi et al. (2014) develop an
endogenous growth model of vintage technologies.
3 INNOVATION AND GROWTH: THEORY 31
household then reduces to the well-known Euler equation
ċt
ct
= σ(rt − ρ), (EE)
where ct is per capita consumption, σ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. When finan-
cial markets value time more than individuals subjectively do, i.e. when
rt > ρ, individuals optimally save and postpone consumption, making
ċt
ct
> 0. The intensity of consumption postponement depends on the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In the extreme case of intertem-
poral perfect substitutability, when σ goes to ∞, for a given difference
rt − ρ > 0, individuals postpone any consumption, making ċtct = ∞. In
the other extreme of perfect complementarity, when σ goes to 0, any
given difference rt − ρ > 0 has no effect on the consumption path that
will be in any case constant.
3.3.1 Ramsey-Hopenhayn Model
The Economy. A continuum of perfectly competitive heterogeneous
firms produces at time t a sole final good using capital as a fixed
production factor and labor as a flexible factor.8
A firm, when associated to a particular unit of capital, has a time
invariant productivity z, with φt (z) representing the equilibrium (density)
productivity distribution, for z in the support (z∗t ,∞); the so-called cut-
off productivity z∗t is endogenous. To fix ideas, let us see each unit of
capital as a plant. Firms may own different plants with different produc-
tivity. φt (z) is the distribution of productivity across plants. Buying one
unit of capital costs η units of the final good, η > 1. However, when
transformed back into the final good, the capital unit is worth just one
unit. In line with the misallocation literature, investment distortions are
measured by η − 1 > 0.9 In this sense, investment is partially sunk, since
firms cannot recover their investment fully when a plant closes down.
8 This section is inspired in Collard and Licandro (2018).
9 See Hsieh and Klenow (2009). For a survey on this literature, see Restuccia and
Rogerson (2017). Hopenhayn (2014) shows the intrinsic relation between the literature
on firm dynamics and the literature on misallocation.
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A plant with productivity z has access to technology10
yt (z) = At zαt (z)1−α, (3.1)
with α ∈ (0, 1).11 The state of technology At exogenously grows at the
rate (1−α)γ , γ > 0. Variables yt (z) and t (z) denote output and employ-
ment, respectively. It is easy to see that, for a given wage rate wt , the








Since operative plants produce all the same final good, per capita produc-





where kt represents the mass of operative plants, which by assumption is
equal to the stock of capital per capita.
Labor market clearing implies that the equilibrium wage rate, plant
profits and per capita output are, respectively,



















At equilibrium aggregate technology is Cobb-Douglas with total factor
productivity given by At z̄ αt .
12 Wages and profits are equal to the marginal
product of labor and capital, respectively. Selection raises the average
10 The argument below applies to any Neoclassical technology F(z, ).
11 This technology is in line with the span of control assumption in Lucas (1978).
12 Alternatively, Collard and Licandro (2018) interpret productivity z as being
embodied in capital, meaning that z̄ represents the average quality of the physical capital
k and z̄k measures capital in quality adjusted units.
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productivity of firms, increasing output yt , wages wt , and average profits
πt (z̄t ).
Selection. New plants buy one unit of capital and then draw produc-
tivity z from the entry distribution ψ(z), for z in the positive real line.
Let us assume ψ(z) is Pareto, with tail parameter κ > 1 and expected
productivity at entry equal to one (which implies that the lower bound
of the support of z is κ−1
κ
)
. As shown in Collard and Licandro (2018)
under some general conditions, for all time t ≥ 0, the equilibrium cut-off
productivity is z∗t = z∗ (time invariant) and the equilibrium productivity
distribution is the entry distribution truncated at z∗; i.e.,
φt (z) = ψ(z)
1 − (z∗) ,
for all t ≥ 0 and for z ∈ (z∗,∞), where (z) is the cumulative of ψ(z).13
Since profits are linear on z and the equilibrium z∗ is time invariant, the
value of any operative plant vt (z) is linear on z too. Notice that operative
plants at t = 0 will optimally like to be operative forever. At equilibrium,
then






where vt is the expected discounted flow of profits of a firm with produc-
tivity z = 1 and δ > 0 is an exogenous exit rate, equivalent to the physical
depreciation rate in the Neoclassical model. The path of vt depends on
the path of the aggregates.
The equilibrium cut-off productivity z∗ results then from combining
the exit and free entry conditions
13 There are two critical assumptions behind this result. Firstly, the economy is assumed
to be at steady state at the initial time t = 0. Secondly, a permanent and unanticipated
shock makes the economy become more selective. The first is a very usual assumption in
macro dynamics. The second restrict the analysis to policies that promote selection, which
in this framework, are welfare improving.
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From the exit condition (ECRH), the value of the marginal plant, vt z∗,
is equal to the value of capital (which is equal to one, since capital can
be transformed back into one unit of the final good). From the free
entry condition (FERH), the investment cost η has to be equal to the
expected value of entry. Notice that a new plant expects to get a produc-
tivity smaller than z∗ with probability (z∗), in which case immediately
exits and recovers one. Otherwise, with probability 1 − (z∗), the plant
will produce and get an expected value vt z̄.
The equilibrium cut-off productivity results from combining (ECRH)
and (FERH) to get rid of vt . Collard and Licandro (2018) show that
under very general conditions the solution exists and is unique, with z∗ >
1/η depending only on the entry distribution ψ(z) and the investment
distortion η − 1.14 Both, a reduction in investment distortions and an
increase in the variance of the entry distribution raise z∗ by reducing the
cost of entry and increasing the likelihood of reaping the benefits of a
high productivity draw, respectively.
Aggregate Economy. Since the capital of exiting plants (those with
productivity smaller than z∗) is fully recycled, the efficiency condition
reads
yt + (z∗)et = ct + ηet ,
where et represents entry, i.e., the mass of new plants created at time t.
Each new plant needs a unit of capital, which costs η. Moreover, a fraction
(z∗) of them close down and their capital reverts to the economy, being
consumed or invested.15
Capital per capita evolves following
k̇t =
(
1 − (z∗))et − δkt ,
14 This result generalizes the separation result in Melitz (2003), making selection to be
independent of the path of the aggregates.
15 It is implicitly assumed that the selection process at any time t repeats infinitely until
all firms get a productivity larger than z∗. Collard and Licandro (2018) use the alternative
assumption that the capital of plants closing down at t cannot be recycled until t + dt ,
in which case the dynamics of Ramsey-Hopenhayn economy is slightly different even if it
still shows standard (saddle-path) monotonic convergence properties.
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where δ > 0 is the physical rate of capital depreciation. The feasibility
condition results from combining the previous two equations









− δkt . (FC)
Notice that the rate at which the final good transforms into physical
capital is smaller than one, since investment distortions make the selection
process costly.
Combining the exit condition (EC_RH) and the Euler equation (EE),








)α−1 − ρ − δ
)
, (EE′)
where the marginal product of capital corresponds to the profits of the
marginal plant z∗.
Given an initial k0 > 0, the equilibrium cut-off z∗ and the associ-
ated average productivity z̄, an aggregate equilibrium of the Ramsey-
Hopenhyan model is a path {ct , kt }, for t ≥ 0, such that both (EE’)
and (FC) conditions hold (together with a transversality condition) It
is important to notice that (FC) and (EE’) are the same as in the
Neoclassical growth model, with a few constant terms depending on the
equilibrium value of z∗. At the balanced growth path the economy then
grows at the constant rate γ .
Collard and Licandro (2018) show that a policy that decreases invest-
ment distortions, by making the economy more efficient, increases
capital, output and consumption (measured in efficiency units) at the
balanced growth path, generating steady state welfare gains. Moreover,
the dynamic system has standard stability properties, meaning that the
economy monotonically converges to a unique balanced growth path.
Transitional Dynamics. Let us assume the economy was initially at
steady state with past investment distortions given by ηp > 1.16 For
simplicity, the rate of technical progress is γ = 0. Consistently, the





in the support z ∈ (z∗p,∞), as well as an initial stock
of physical capital kp; both z∗p and kp solve the steady state equilibrium
conditions.
16 These distortions may represent different forms of barriers to entry.
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Fig. 3.1 Transition dynamics: permanent decline in investment distortions (η)
(Note This figure was obtained setting σ = 1, ρ = 0.05, δ = 0.06, α = 0.3, κ = 3
and the initial investment distortion is η = 1.2. We then consider a 5% once for
all reduction in η)
Let us also assume that from t = 0 a new policy permanently reduces
investment distortions. For simplicity, let us refer to the new policy as η,
with η < ηp. The cut-off productivity jumps then to a new steady state






Interestingly, the initial stock of capital is partially destroyed because
of selection, implying that
k0 =
(





Of course, the average productivity z̄ jumps up at t = 0 making output to
increase at the initial time. Similarly to the Neoclassical growth model,
consumption at the initial time jumps down to the new saddle path
solution converging monotonically with capital to the new higher steady
state.
3.3.2 Monopolistic Competition
This section builds on a close economy of the Melitz (2003) type.
The Economy. Heterogeneous intermediary firms produce a
continuum of intermediary inputs used in the manufacture of a sole final
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good. The final good is produced by a representative competitive firm
under perfect competition; the final good is used as numeraire. Interme-
diary inputs, indeed, in line with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), are produced
under monopolistic competition. For comparability, we adopt a similar
notation as in the previous section (Fig. 3.1).
There is a mass mt of heterogeneous intermediary firms. Firms differ
in their productivity z, producing each a differentiated intermediary input
by the mean of the following linear technology
yt (z) = Az t (z),
where yt (z) and t (z) represent output and labor of a firm with produc-
tivity z, respectively; the state of technology A > 0 is assumed to be
constant.17 As in the previous sections, operative firms have productivity
z ≥ z∗t .
The sole final good is allocated to consumption ct only and it is
produced by a mass unit of identical perfectly competitive final firms by











defined on a mass mt of intermediary inputs, with constant elasticity of
substitution  > 1.
Final firms are price takers in both the final and the intermediary
markets, optimally demanding of each intermediary input the quantity
yt (z) = pt (z)−ct .
The demand elasticity of any intermediary input is equal to the elasticity of
substitution across varieties. More substitutable intermediary inputs are,
more the final firm reacts to changes in input prices. Love-for-variety, in
the sense of Dixit-Stiglitz, means that firms would like to use all available
intermediary inputs, with relative quantities depending on relative prices.
Intermediary firms have monopoly power in the production of inter-
mediary inputs. They maximize profits subject to the demand function
17 It is easy to extend the Melitz model to an environment where the aggregate state
of technology At grows at a constant exogenous rate, as assumed in the previous section.
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above, optimally setting price





Intermediary firms charge a markup 
−1 > 1 over marginal costs
wt
Az .
More productive firms set a lower price, producing and selling more. The
markup is inversely related to the demand elasticity.
An important property of the monopolistic competitive model is that
all monopolistically competitive firms charge the same markup, implying
that their relative prices are equal to their relative marginal productivities.
The direct implication is that the allocation of production factors within
a monopolistically competitive sector is efficient, since relative prices are
equal to relative marginal productivities.18 Of course, the allocation of
production factors between the monopolistic competitive sector and other
sectors of the economy may be distorted because of the markup. A recent
literature stresses the role played by the dispersion of markups on the
allocation of resources within an industry.19
Aggregating over intermediary firms, it can be shown that consump-






















where Lt represents the share of total labor allocated to production
(excluded any fixed production costs). The mass of intermediary inputs mt
shows up in the aggregate technology as an externality, usually referred in
this literature as love-for-variety. The more intermediary inputs are avail-
able for final production, the more efficient final production is. Moreover,
selection positively affects output since it raises the average productivity
of firms z̄t .
18 See Koeninger and Licandro (2006) and Epifani and Gancia (2011).
19 See Impullitti and Licandro (2018).
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The production of the consumption good requires both labor and
intermediary inputs, which mass is represented by mt . Wages are the
return to labor and profits the return to the investment required to create
an intermediary input (the entry cost). It is possible to interpret the mass
of intermediary inputs as the stock of intangible capital. In this frame-
work, the distribution of income between intangible capital and labor
critically depends on the elasticity of substitution across intermediary
inputs. An increase in substitutability reallocates income from intangible
capital to labor.
Net revenues of firm z are, indeed,









Notice that net revenues of the average firm z̄t are equal to average
net revenues πt/mt . Firms with productivity larger than the mean make
profits larger than the average profit.
Selection. Following Melitz (2003), let us assume intermediary firms
have to pay a sunk entry cost wt fe to enter, fe > 0 being the amount of
labor required to create a new intermediary input. After entry, firms draw
a productivityz from an entry distribution (z) with support in the real
line. Since new firms produce new varieties, the sunk entry cost may be
interpreted as an R&D investment; i.e. the investment required to be able
to produce the new input variety. Of course, if the technology producing
the new intermediary input is not productive enough, the firm will close
down making the value of this R&D investment to be zero ex-post.
At any time t, intermediary firms require a fixed amount of labor f ,
f > 0, to be operative, facing then a fixed production cost f wt . At the
steady state of the Melitz model, the marginal firm z∗ is defined by the
(zero-profit) exit condition
Any firm with productivity z < z∗ exits since net revenues are not large
enough to cover the fixed production costs. Notice that, for any operative
firm with z ≥ z∗, profits can then be expressed in relation to the marginal
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firm as








Any operative firm with productivity larger than z∗ makes positive profits,
equilibrium profits being proportional to the fixed production cost.
The value v(z) of a firm with productivity z at steady state is the








r + δ ,
since expected profits are discounted at r + δ, where δ > 0 is the Poisson
destruction rate of any operative firm.20
The free entry condition makes expected profits equal to the entry cost
Remember that a firm is assumed to invest in intangibles before
knowing its productivity. Under the assumption that the entry distri-





, with κ > 1 and ζ > 0, by
combining the exit (ECM) and free entry (FEM) conditions, the steady
state equilibrium cut-off becomes21
Any policy addressed to reduce the entry cost fe or the equilibrium
interest rate r makes the economy more selective.
20 Notice that the R&D entry cost, even if sunk, it has a value. We will interpret it as
a form of intangible capital, which has different value depending on the productivity of
the firm.
21 At steady state, the interest rate r = ρ is constant.
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There is a stationary allocation of labor to production and R&D
investments, such that at the stationary equilibrium the mass of new inter-
mediary firms is equal to the mass of exiting firms and the labor market
clears. At the stationary equilibrium of the Melitz model, the mass of
intermediary firms is given by
m =
(














In the Melitz model, the entry (R&D) cost depends on wages, which
raises with selection. A more selective economy faces then a larger entry
cost, which reduces the incentives to enter. This mechanism causes the
economy to converge to a stationary mass of varieties and a stationary cut-
off productivity. In Sect. 3.4, we analyze economies where both the cut-
off productivity and the mass of intermediary inputs permanently increase,
making the economy to be more innovative with growing productivity
and output.
3.3.3 Oligopolistic Competition
In the monopolistic competitive framework, since intermediary firms
share the same elasticity of substitution with each other, they all set the
same time-invariant markup. As discussed by Koeninger and Licandro
(2006), equal markups cause the monopolistic competitive allocation
to be optimal. In this section, we discuss a close economy version of
Impullitti and Licandro (2018), who develop an oligopolistic competitive
framework allowing to understand the fundamental role of competition
in shaping the relation between competition, selection and growth.22
The Economy. As in the monopolistic competitive model of
Sect. 3.3.2, let us assume a sole consumption good is produced by a
representative, perfectly competitive final firm by the mean of the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) technology with constant elasticity of
substitution  > 1. Final firms are price takers in both the final and the
intermediary markets, and optimally demand
yt (z) = pt (z)−ct ,
22 See also Peretto (1996, 2003) and Navas and Licandro (2011).
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where ct is total production, yt (z) and pt (z) are, respectively, the demand
and price of intermediary input z. As before, the final consumption good
is used as numeraire.
Following Impullitti and Licandro (2018), intermediary inputs,
indeed, instead of being produced under monopolistic competition as in
Melitz (2003), are produced under Cournot competition. There are n
firms, n > 1, producing variety z by the mean of technology
yi,t (z) = Az i,t (z),
where yi,t (z) and i,t (z) represent output and labor, respectively, of firm
i sharing productivity z with other n − 1 firms, its direct competitors;
the state of technology A > 0 is assumed to be constant. Of course,
yt (z) = ∑i yi,t (z). As in the previous sections, operative intermediary
inputs have productivity z ≥ z∗t .
The equilibrium price of the Cournot game, the same for all firms
producing z, is





where the inverse of the markup rate is θ = n−1/n , with the markup going
from 
−1 to one, as the economy moves from monopolistic competition
(n = 1) to perfect competition, when the number of firms goes to infinity.
Aggregating over intermediary firms, it can be shown that consump-




t z̄t Lt , wt = θ Am
1
−1
t z̄t and πt = (1 − θ)ct ,








where Lt represents the share of total labor allocated to production
(excluded the fixed production costs). For a given cut-off productivity
z∗, the Cournot and the monopolistic competitive economies produce the
same output. However, the share of labor is larger in the Cournot equilib-
rium, increasing with competition. An increase in competition reallocates
income from (intangible) capital to labor.
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Selection. Interestingly, if the number of competitors n is given, and
the entry decision were jointly taken by the n potential entrants, since
profits of the marginal firm and expected profits of the potential entrant
are both affected proportionally by θ , the equilibrium cut-off at steady
state is equal to z∗ in the equilibrium condition (z∗M ) of the Melitz
model. An exogenous change in the number of competitors n does not
affect selection. However, the fraction of labor allocated to production
and the mass of intermediary inputs do. At steady state,
L =
(
1 + 1 − θ
θ
(









1 − θ +












An increase in competition, measured by a raise in θ , renders the
static allocation more efficient, which moves labor toward production,
increasing L. As an implication, less labor has to be allocated to create
new varieties and to cover the fixed production costs, which implies a
reduction in the mass of varieties.
In fact, Impullitti and Licandro (2018) analyze the problem under a
very different perspective. They assume that the entry condition deter-
mines endogenously n. They also assume that there is a mass one of
potential varieties, mt being the equilibrium mass. Potential entrants face
a zero entry cost, but can only enter by producing a particular variety.
At equilibrium, then, 1 − mt varieties are introduced at any time t; from
them a fraction 1 − (z∗) is produced, the others exit instantaneously.
As a consequence, the equilibrium mass of varieties is determined by the
stationary condition
(1 − m)(1 − (z∗)) = δm.
The free entry condition, instead, determines the number of competitor
n that produce any intermediary input. Since n is determined before the
productivity z is known, all varieties have the same number of competitors
at a balanced growth path equilibrium.
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3.3.4 Physical and Intangible Capital
An alternative way to Collard and Licandro (2018) of adding capital
to the Hopenhayn model is in Hopenhayn (2014), which assumes that
technology in (3.1) is defined in a composite production factor, such as,
yt (z) = zαF(kt (z), t (z))1−α
where F (.) is a Neoclassical production function, kt (z) and t (z) are phys-
ical capital and labor employed for firm z. Hopenhayn (2014) shows that







where mt is the mass of firms, kt is physical capital per capita and, as
before, total labor is assumed to be equal to one. Notice that in this
economy there are two forms of capital: physical capital kt and intangible
capital z̄tmt . The aggregate technology shows constant returns on labor,
physical and intangible capital like in Corrado et al. (2009).
3.4 Firm Heterogeneity
in Models with Innovation
3.4.1 Romer Model
Romer (1990) is based on the monopolistic competitive model devel-
oped by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Simplifying the model in Sect. 3.3.2,
let us assume that identical intermediary firms (all with productivity z =
1) monopolistically compete in the intermediary goods market. In this
framework, a typical intermediary firm sets price and produces quantity
p(z) = 






respectively, where wt is the equilibrium wage rate and ct is aggregate
consumption;  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediary
inputs in the production of the final (consumption) good. Since interme-
diary firms are symmetric, they all set the same price and produce the same
quantity. At equilibrium, the technology producing the final consumption
good is
ct = Amνt Lt ,
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where the mass of intermediary inputs mt shows up as an externality
and Lt is the fraction of total labor allocated to the production of
intermediary goods (there are no fixed productions costs in Romer).
Aggregate technology shows the well-known love-for-variety externality:
labor productivity in the final good sector raises with the mass of
intermediary inputs mt at the rate ν = 1−1 .23
Concerning innovation, let us assume that new intermediary varieties
are produced by the mean of the R&D technology
ṁt = Bmt (1 − Lt ),
where R&D productivity B is normalized to B = ( − 1)A > 0 in order
to simplify notation. Since the total labor supply is normalized to one,
1− Lt is the fraction of it allocated to research activities. The productivity
of labor in the R&D sector is critically assumed to depend on the mass of
varieties mt .
Let us define the state of knowledge as kt = mνt . This allows us to
interpret the Romer model in line with the Arrow (1962) learning-by-
doing model. The economy learns by producing new varieties of the
intermediary input. By doing so, technology becomes more productive
in both the final good sector and the R&D sector. Combining the two
last equations, the feasibility condition becomes
k̇t = Akt − ct .
With the state of knowledge kt , the economy produces Akt , which can be
consumed or allocated to the production of new knowledge—a form of
intangible investment in the sense of Corrado et al. (2009). Notice that
the normalization used to define kt as a function of mt , including that
of B, is inconsequential since knowledge has no natural unit. Technology
in the Romer model then collapses to a one-good AK technology like in
Rebelo (1991), sharing with Rebelo (1991) the conditions for a constant
endogenous growth rate.
The optimal allocation of output Akt to consumption and savings
(adopting the form of intangible investment) is as usual governed by the
23 Benassy (1996) adopts a more general framework, arguing that the love-for-variety
externality ν may be any number between zero and infinity, independent of the elasticity
of substitution .
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Euler equation (EE). At equilibrium, the return on R&D is
rt = 1
 − 1 ALt ,
decreasing in the elasticity of substitution, but increasing in the final
good productivity parameter A and the fraction of employment allocated
to production. Notice that an increase in the degree of substitutability
between intermediary goods raises the demand elasticity, reducing
markups and profits and then decreasing the return on R&D.
Substituting the equilibrium interest rate rt in the Euler equation (EE),








which negatively depends on the elasticity substitution , since it nega-
tively affects the return on R&D.
Firm Heterogeneity. The Romer model can be combined with the
Melitz model to generate endogenous growth with firm heterogeneity,
where selection by affecting the productivity of the final good sector will
have a direct effect on the growth rate. Aggregating over intermediary
firms,
ct = Az̄t kt Lt .
By assuming that productivity B in the R&D technology also depends on
the average productivity z̄t , knowledge evolves following
k̇t = Az̄t kt (1 − Lt ),
implying that the feasibility condition becomes
k̇t = Az̄t kt − ct .
Technology is AK with the marginal product of capital depending on
selection through z̄t . The productivity gains through selection spillover
to the consumption and R&D sectors.
Since new firms draw their productivity from a time-invariant distri-
bution, the productivity cut-off is constant at a balanced growth path,
as well as the average productivity z̄. As in the Romer model, the return
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Selection makes the average productivity of capital larger, positively
affecting the stationary growth rate. Those parameters positively affecting
selection in the Melitz model, have here also a positive effect on the
growth rate.
3.4.2 Selection and Imitation
Following Luttmer (2007), selection by itself can generate endoge-
nous growth through imitation, since selection raises the productivity
of incumbents.24 How do new firms react to this raise in productivity?
Instead of drawing their productivity from a time-invariant distribution,
the initial productivity of new firms is randomly drawn from an entry
distribution that follows key moments of the incumbents equilibrium
distribution. In this sense, new entrants learn from incumbents, imitating
them, which causes productivity gains from selection to spillover inno-
vators. A similar mechanism is used by Sampson (2016) to study the
dynamic gains from trade.25
Let us follow the argument as developed by Sampson (2016), adapting
his notation to be consistent with the notation in the previous sections.
Sampson’s model belongs to the family of monopolistic competitive
models with labor as the sole production factor as developed by Melitz
(2003) and reviewed in Sect. 3.3.2. Monopolistically competitive inter-
mediary firms draw at entry a time-invariant labor productivity z from
an entry productivity distribution ̃t (z), which differently from Melitz
is assumed to be time dependent. Firms productivity is time invariant.
However, due to selection, learning spillovers cause the distribution from
which they draw their productivity follow these improvements in tech-
nology. Intermediary firms require a variable and fixed (f ) amount of
labor to produce with wt being the equilibrium wage rate.
24 See also Luttmer (2011, 2012).
25 Gabler and Licandro (1979) develop the same idea in a framework similar to the
one in the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model.
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As in Sect. 3.3.2, an intermediary firm with productivity z sets price















= f wt .
where ct/mt is total consumption per firm (reminds that final output is
fully allocated to consumption in the Melitz model).
Entry and Spillovers. Like in Romer (1990), potential entrants
undertake R&D activities to discover new varieties of intermediary inputs.
They pay the R&D (entry) cost fewt , where fe > 0 is the amount of
labor required to create a new intermediary input. R&D plays exactly the
same role as an entry cost in the Melitz model. As usual in this literature,
innovators are assumed to be protected by infinitely lived patents.
The critical assumption is the following: at any time t innovators
(the entrants), after paying the R&D (entry) cost, draw a time-invariant
productivity z = ωz̄t , where z̄t is the average productivity of incumbents
and ω is a random variable distributed ̃(ω). To fix ideas, let us assume
that ̃(ω) is Pareto with tail parameter κ > 1. The only difference with
the Melitz model is that the entry distribution t (z) = ̃(z/z̄t ), from
which innovators draw z, is time dependent. That is, it depends on the
time varying average productivity of incumbents. Innovators learn from
incumbents through this particular type of spillover.26
Let us define the firm-specific relative productivity z̃t , z̃t = zz∗t , rela-
tive to the cut-off productivity z∗t . Since the domain of z is (z∗t ,∞), the
domain of z̃ is (1,∞). In a growing economy, z∗t will be permanently
moving to the right. Since firm’s productivity is time invariant, the rela-
tive productivity of any firm will eventually converge to one on a finite
time. When the lower bound is reached, the firm exits. Firms born at
different moments in time belong to different technological cohorts, and
since new cohorts are in average more productive, firms face a finite life,
26 Imitation, since in this framework comes at a zero cost, can also be interpreted as
diffusion.
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i.e. firms are losing value over time since their technology becomes slowly
obsolete.27
Despite the fact that firms have a finite life, under the assumption that
the entry distribution ̃(ω) is Pareto, with tail parameter κ > 1, the





, for z ≥ z∗t . It is
Pareto distributed, inheriting the tail parameter κ from the entry distribu-
tion. Since at a balanced growth path selection moves cut-off productivity
z∗t to the right, the equilibrium distribution t (z) is said to be a traveling
wave.28
Combining the exit and entry conditions with the Euler equation,
Sampson (2016) shows that the steady state endogenous rate of technical
progress is
g = σ
1 + σ(κ − 1)
(
 − 1






Output per capita and consumption also grow at the rate g. An increase
in the variance of the entry distribution (a reduction in κ), which is equiv-
alent to an increase in the probability of exceptionally good innovations,
or a reduction in the R&D (entry) cost fe both make the economy more
selective. They increase the productivity of incumbent firms and through
learning affects the productivity of innovators, inducing faster growth at
steady state. An increase in the elasticity of substitution between interme-
diary inputs  makes the economy more competitive, also inducing more
selection and growth.
27 In this sense, Sampson’s model belongs to the vintage capital tradition. In Gilchrist
and Williams (2000), for example, the productivity of new firms is drawn from a lognormal
distribution, which mean has an exogenous trend. As shown by Boucekkine et al. (1997)
and Boucekkine et al. (2005), vintage models involve (periodic) medium term movements
which may be of relevance for the propagation of innovation. Bambi et al. (2014) extend
this idea to vintage models with R&D, showing that the long delay that innovation takes
to diffuse generates medium term cycles, which has to be considered when evaluating the
performance of innovation policies.
28 Even if not proved by Sampson (2016), under similar conditions as in Collard and
Licandro (2018), the equilibrium distribution will likely be a truncated Pareto with cut-




In the Schumpeterian framework, the dynamics of firms is modeled
through the fundamental concept of creative destruction, which takes two
forms: business stealing and crowding-out (or obsolescence).
In Aghion and Howitt (1992), the final consumption good ct is











where xt (z) represents the quantity of intermediary input z used in the
production of the final consumption good ct ,  > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between them, and φt (z) is the equilibrium (density) distribu-
tion. Differently from Romer (1990), the mass of varieties mt is assumed
to be time invariant and normalized to one, but the quality of goods
z is assumed to be heterogeneous. In the Schumpeterian model, R&D
activities are addressed to improve the quality of exiting varieties, which
makes φt (z) time dependent, reflecting changes in technology induced by
innovation.
Technology in the intermediary sector is assumed to be
xt (z) = At (z),
where parameter A > 0 and t (z) is labor allocated to the production of
the intermediary input z. Notice that the variable change yt (z) = zxt (z)
brings us back to the Melitz model, where yt (z) is measured in quality
adjusted units.29 Even if the Schumpeterian model is usually interpreted
as a model of product innovation (addressed to improve the quality of
intermediary goods), it can also be interpreted as a model of process
innovation (addressed to reduce production costs).
Following the analysis in the previous sections, at equilibrium
ct = Az̄t Lt ,
29 Price indexes are built with the objective of keeping quality constant, meaning that
real quantities in national accounts are measured in quality adjusted units.









is the average product quality interpreted as in Aghion and Howitt
(or average productivity as in Melitz) and Lt is labor allocated to the
production of intermediary goods.
In the Schumpeterian model, an innovation is a new technology able to
produce a better quality input, which is a perfect substitute of an already
existing intermediary input (or a cheaper version of an intermediary input
of the same quality). The particular input is randomly selected among
the unit mass of existing intermediary inputs. When a new technology
is discovered, the previous one becomes obsolete, making the previous
producer to exit.30 Creation of new technologies is then associated with
the destruction of old ones. The probability that a new version arrives
follows a Poisson process with arrival rate b for unit of labor allocated to
R&D, b > 0.31
The productivity of the new version is assumed to be equal to the
frontier, leading-edge technology ωt , which given some ω0 > 0 at time
t = 0, is assumed to follow
ω̇t
ωt
= b(1 − Lt ), (3.3)
where 1 − Lt represents the share of total labor allocated to R&D activi-
ties.32 Individual research effort spills over into the whole economy by
30 The distance in productivity between two consecutive innovations of a particular
variety depends on the time interval between them. It may be that this distance is small
enough to make the incumbent compete with the innovator. In this case, the innovation is
said to be non-drastic. To avoid the associated complications of studying market structures
with non-drastic innovations, it is assumed that the incumbent’s technology is destroyed
with the discovery of a new way of producing the same intermediary input.
31 In this literature, an innovation is a random event. Let us denote by F(T ) the
probability that this event occurs before a period of length T . A Poisson process assumes
F(T ) = 1− e−μT , μ > 0. The associated density function is f (T ) = μ e−μT , implying
that the probability that the event occurs around T = 0 is μ. The probability that the
event does not occur before T is e−μT .
32 Note that technology has a vintage structure. Innovations introduced at time t have
the frontier productivity ωt , which will be growing at equilibrium.
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moving the frontier of knowledge, mimicking a form of learning-by-
doing.
Finally, let us assume that new varieties receive infinitely lived patents,
giving to the innovator the exclusivity on the use of this technology to
produce the corresponding intermediary input.
Let us denote by at = zωt the productivity of z relative to the fron-
tier technology and by H(a), a ∈ [0, 1], the cumulative distribution of
firms across technologies. It can be easily shown that at steady state the
distribution H (a) is uniform in (0, 1) .33 It can also be shown that
z̄t = μωt with μ = 
1
1− < 1.
The average technology z̄t is at a distance μ from the frontier technology
ωt . The distance to the frontier technology is increasing in , for  > 1, with
lim→∞ μ = 1, meaning that the average distance to the technological
frontier approaches unity when intermediary inputs are close to perfect
substitutes. On the other extreme, it goes to e−1 when  goes to one.








− b(1 − L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
business-stealing
− (ρ − 1)b(1 − L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
obsolescence
.
As usual, the return to assets adds capital gains to the dividend-to-value
ratio. The remaining terms represent the negative effect that tech-
nical progress has on the patent protecting existing intermediary inputs.
The third term is the so-called business-stealing effect. It measures the
Poisson rate at which the patent will eventually die, when the associ-
ated intermediary input is substituted by a subsequent innovation. The
last term represents the obsolescence cost produced by the emergency of
cheaper (better quality) versions of other intermediary inputs, reducing
the demand for the input produced by the patent.34 As time passes, other
varieties become more and more productive, reducing the demand and
33 The distribution of firms across relative productivities is uniform because, by assump-
tion, the rate at which innovations arrive is the same as the rate at which the frontier
technology grows. Otherwise, the distribution is Pareto, as it is usually assumed in this
literature.
34 Aghion and Howitt (1992) refer to it as the crowding-out effect.
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profits of the variety we are evaluating. The obsolescence cost depends
on the velocity at which the frontier technology moves, b(1− L), and the
elasticity of substitution across varieties. When varieties become perfect
substitutes, old varieties are substituted out by new varieties fully, making
the crowding-out effect infinity.
3.4.4 Innovation and the Life Cycle of Firms
Klette and Kortum (2004) extends the Melitz model in line with the
literature on endogenous growth with the aim of describing better the
life cycle of firms. In this framework, the productivity of firms does
not depend on their own intrinsic characteristics, but it is randomly
assigned.35
Firms and Products. In the Klette and Kortum (2004) framework,
a continuum of firms produces a continuum of measure of one of inter-
mediary inputs, with each firm producing an integer number nt of them,
nt ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}. The integer number of intermediary inputs produced is
heterogeneous and endogenously determined at equilibrium.
As in the Schumpeterian model, producing one unity of any interme-
diary input requires one unit of labor; labor productivity is normalized
to one, and the same holds for all inputs. However, intermediary inputs
are heterogeneous in their quality. The quality frontier of an intermediary
input is denoted by zt .
Innovation. Technical progress in each intermediary input is repre-
sented by a quality ladder model as in Grossman and Helpman (1991).
The dynamics of the frontier technology for the different intermediary
inputs is governed by two types of innovations: innovation by incumbent
firms and innovation by potential entrants. When a discovery takes place,
it is randomly assigned to a single intermediary input moving its quality
frontier one step in the quality ladder. The gain in quality is given by a
firm-specific factor q > 1, which is specific to the firm that makes the
discovery.
The firm-specific factor q maps one-to-one to a firm-specific profit per
intermediary input π , π ∈ (0, 1), and it is the same for all intermediary
inputs produced by the same firm; π and q are positively related and
time invariant. In the following, it is assumed that firms draw π from
35 See also Acemoglu and Cao (2015).
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the continuous distribution function (π), which is equivalent to draw
factor q from a known distribution. An operative intermediary firm is then
characterized by a duple {nt , π}, with nt evolving over time.
Innovation by Incumbents. A firm that exercises intensity λ, when
undertaking R&D activities, has a Poisson rate λn of making a discovery,
where n is the number of intermediary inputs being currently produced
by the firm. This discovery allows the firm to move one step in the quality
ladder of the frontier technology of a randomly selected intermediary
input. The particular input is unknown to the firm at the time the firm




Function c(λ) is increasing and strictly convex (some other technical
assumptions s.t. c(λ) > λc′(λ) are also required). The cost function
depends on the firm-specific innovation factor q through π ; more inno-
vative firms, those with larger q, face larger innovation costs. The optimal
(interior) innovation policy requires
c′(λ) = v
(r + μ − λ)v = π̄ − c(λ),
where v represents the expected value of a product produced by a firm
of average type π̄ , r is the equilibrium interest rate and μ is the rate
of creative destruction (measuring the rate at which the firm may lose
a product line because another firm has just innovated in this particular
product line). The first condition states that the marginal cost of inno-
vation has to be equal to its marginal value. The second condition states
that the expected return on innovation has to be equal to its opportu-
nity cost. Irrespective of the firm-specific duple {n, π}, all firms optimally
chose the same innovation intensity λ, the Poison rate of innovation of a
firm with n products being λn. Indeed, more profitable firms face larger
R&D costs and have larger per product value.
Innovation by Potential Entrants. There is a mass of potential
entrants investing at the rate F , F > 0, in return for a unit Poisson rate
of entering the economy with a single product. Potential entrants, after
entering, draw a firm-specific profit π from (π). The firm-specific profit
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π and the associated innovation factor q apply to the first and any subse-
quent discovery of the firm. As in the case of incumbents, a new entrant
randomly chose an intermediary input.
Equilibrium Innovation. Notice first that at equilibrium μ = λ + η,
where η is the Poisson rate of innovation by potential entrants. Free
entry requires F = v, since in expected terms the potential entrant
covers the entry cost F with the value of the innovation. Combining the
free entry condition and the optimal innovation policy of incumbents,
the equilibrium innovation intensity of incumbents is determined by the
condition
c′(λ) = F,
and the equilibrium innovation intensity of potential entrants by
η = π̄ − c(λ)
F
− ρ,
where the interest rate r = ρ at the balanced growth path.
These two equations are fundamental to understand the incentives to
innovation in the Klette-Kortum model, and hence the potential effects
of innovation policies. An increase in the entry cost F reduces the R&D
activity of potential entrants η, but raises the incumbents’ innovation
intensity λ. An increase in average profits π̄ raises the innovation intensity
of new entrants but has no effect on incumbents. A raise in the innovation
cost of incumbents (affecting both average and marginal costs) will have
negative incentives for both incumbents and potential entrants. In this
model, innovation policy affects innovation only through these channels,
Of course, any policy that reduces the financial costs of firms, as reflected
by ρ, also promotes innovation by potential entrants.
Limit Pricing. From the point of view of the final firm, the quality
frontier version of any intermediary input is a perfect substitute of any
previous version of the same input, with all versions weighted by their
respective qualities. Under Bertrand competition, the firm producing the
frontier quality optimally charges a markup q to its marginal cost in order
to deter any competitor. Consequently, at equilibrium only the frontier
quality is produced with the last innovator charging a markup equal to its
specific factor q.
56 O. LICANDRO










where φ(z) is the equilibrium distribution of the frontier quality across
intermediary inputs. It is easy to see that the optimal demand implies
p(z)x(z) = 1. A firm with quality improvement factor q yields then the
same constant profit flow π = 1 − q−1, π ∈ (0, 1), for each intermediary
input it produces irrespective of its quality z, since p(z)x(z) = 1 for all z.
3.5 Further Contributions
This survey does not review other important dimensions of the innovation
process that may also be relevant for policy analysis, which should be
considered when designing macro models for the evaluation of innovation
policies.
First, there is a large literature analyzing the role of financial frictions
shaping market selection and innovation.36 The evaluation of policies
addressed to reduce financial frictions in order to promote innovation and
productivity growth requires a rigorous modeling of the financial sector
and the associated frictions.
Second, innovation policy needs also to be evaluated by its redistribu-
tive effects on the labor market, with regard to the correction of the
negative effects that technical progress has in the evolution of employ-
ment and wages across industries and occupations. The recent literature
on job polarization, automatization and skill obsolescence is addressed to
study the labor market effects of innovation and technical progress. Tech-
nical progress develops differently in different sectors, affecting unevenly
the dynamics of jobs and occupations. One of the most striking impli-
cations of these diverse sectorial evolutions of technology is stressed
by the literature on structural transformation.37 This literature looks
at replicating the evidence of non-balanced patterns of the three main
36 See Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Buera et al. (2011), and Midrigan and Yi Xu
(2014), among others.
37 See Duarte and Restuccia (2010), as well as Herrendorf et al. (2014) for a survey
on this literature.
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sectors of modern economies: agriculture, manufacturing and services. An
appropriate modeling of this dimension, likely in line with Kongsamut
et al. (2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008), will be of great importance in order to evaluate industrial policies
addressed to promote innovation.
The unbalanced evolution of industries is mimicked by an unbalanced
evolution of occupations (see Duernecker & Herrendorf, 2017), which
is reflected in the polarization of wages and employment observed in the
data (see Autor & Dorn, 2013). Modeling the joint evolution of tech-
nology and occupations, in line with the skill obsolescence hypothesis in
Licandro and Poschke (2017), is of fundamental importance to evaluate
the labor market effect of innovation policies.
Third, trade, although omitted in this chapter, is fundamental to
understand the impact of innovation policies. This is particularly impor-
tant for the evaluation of innovation policies in the European Union,
where policies are expected and frequently addressed to affect regions and
countries differently (See Atkeson and Burstein [2010], Aw et al. [2011],
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud [2008], and Broda and Weinstein [2006],
among others). A model of this nature is needed to evaluate the trade-off
between promoting excellence, by addressing resources toward the most
efficient regions, and regional convergence or catching-up.
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Proceedings of the JRC-IEAWorkshop 2017
Omar Licandro
4.1 Introduction
The JRC-IEA Roundtable on Macroeconomic Modelling for R&D and
Innovation was jointly organized by the DG Joint Research Centre (JRC)
of the European Commission and the International Economic Association
(IEA). The design and development of macroeconomic models addressed
to study the impact of innovation policies is critical for the European
Union, for which innovation policies are one of the highest priorities.
The Roundtable aimed to discuss, in the framework of the recent devel-
opment of the literature on economic growth and innovation, alternative
modelling strategies for innovation and medium/long-term productivity
and economic growth. The debate was organized having in mind the need
for new ideas that may help the design of economic models addressed to
evaluate the impact of innovation and related policies.
During the Roundtable, top researchers, including Philippe Aghion
(Harvard), among others, presented some key new developments in the
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field of innovation and growth. The Roundtable aimed to better under-
stand where the frontier of knowledge in the field of innovation and
growth is to, and in a second stage, figure out the key elements a
macro model designed to evaluate innovation policies should include.
In particular, Ufuk Akcigit (Chicago) presented a survey on his views
on the current academic research agenda on R&D and innovation. The
session was closed by a panel composed mainly of practitioners, and a few
academics, with the object of giving the perspective of those more directly
involved in the evaluation of innovation policies or in the development of
those models designed to evaluate these policies. A short summary of each
contribution and my reading of the debate that followed are provided in
Section 2. Section 3 discusses the proposed alternative lines of modelling
that emerged from the Roundtable. It reflects the views of the author on
a highly fruitful, sometimes controversial, debate that took place during
the Roundtable.
4.2 Macroeconomic Modelling of Innovation
This section contains some of the lessons from the papers presented at
the JRC-IEA Roundtable on Macroeconomic Modelling for R&D and
Innovation.
• Missing Growth from Creative Destruction by Philippe Aghion,
Antonin Bergeaud, Timo Boppart, Peter J. Klenow and Huiyu Li
(Aghion et al., 2019).
Statistical agencies aim to compute price indexes for represen-
tative baskets of constant quality products. However, in practice,
some products disappear being displaced by better quality ones. The
authors point out that, in these cases, statistical agencies typically
impute inflation for disappearing products from the inflation for
surviving products, when likely its inflation may be lower because
of quality improvements embodied in the substituting product. As
a result, creative destruction may result in overstated inflation and
understated growth. The authors use a simple model to relate this
missing growth to the frequency and size of various kinds of innova-
tions. Using US Census data, they assess the magnitude of missing
growth for all private non-farm businesses from 1983 to 2013. They
find: (i) missing growth from imputation is substantial, between 0.5
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and 1 percentage points per year; and (ii) almost all of the missing
growth is due to creative destruction (as opposed to new varieties).
The paper points to a key issue on evaluating the macroeconomic
impact of innovation policies: the critical problem of measuring
real output and productivity in a world where technical progress
is embodied in new, better quality versions of existing products.
The measurement strategy suggested by the authors is model-based.
However, statistical agencies are reluctant to explicitly use models
to measure price changes and strongly prefer well-designed methods
based on data collection, which depend much less on highly specific
modelling assumptions. Of course, there is no measurement without
theory. Hence, data collection and statistical methods used to aggre-
gate individual data are both based on theory. However, the theory
behind these methods is usually quite general and does not depend
on specific functional forms and parameter values.
In the same direction, Broda and Weinstein (2006) suggest a
different strategy, based on love-for-variety theories, to measure
gains associated with new products. Contrary to Aghion et al.
(2019)’ s findings reported above, Broda and Weinstein (2006)
conclude that the US missing growth from increasing the product
variety is of around 1.2 yearly percentage points for the period
1972–2001. Indeed, this estimation strongly depends on some
strong assumptions about the extent of utility gains coming from
love-for-variety.
The measurement of productivity at the firm level raises also some
important measurement problems. It is generally accepted now that
productivity at the firm level has at least two components: product
value (or demand shock) and technical efficiency (generally referred
as TFPQ) whose estimation faces some important issues. Indeed,
the propagation of productivity gains in a network, by reducing
the cost of inputs of upstream firms, calls for a third dimension of
productivity: the quality and price of production inputs.
The main lesson to retain from the Aghion et al. (2019) paper
is that a careful analysis of the way GDP growth is measured in the
data is needed to make a correct evaluation of innovation policies.
This problem has to be seriously taken into account when comparing
model simulations used to evaluate innovation policy with the data.
If gains from innovation are not in the statistics, we will never find
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them in the data and it will be difficult to find them in model’s
simulations.
• The Dynamics of Development: Innovation and Reallocation by
Francisco Buera and Roberto Fattal-Jaef (Fattal Jaef & Buera, 2015).
Buera and Fattal-Jaef study the aggregate and firm-level prop-
erties of the dynamics of economic development, by investigating
the macro and micro features of successful growth take-offs in the
data and find that, while every episode exhibits sustained growth
in TFP and investment rates, there are substantial differences in
the evolution of the firm size distribution between the experi-
ences of post-communist economies and the rest of the successful
take-offs. The pattern is that firms tend to get larger on average
during a typical acceleration, while the average size of a firm is
declining along a post-communist transition. To understand this
behaviour, the authors provide a quantitative theory of transitions
featuring endogenous innovation, entry and exit, and the disman-
tling of idiosyncratic distortions. They evaluate hypothetical reforms
in which the rate of progress in the reversal of distortions is cali-
brated to the experiences of China and Chile, to find that the
mechanisms in the model are able to capture the salient features
that they document in the data. The approach may be relevant for
economies undergoing a similar transition or catching-up.
• Fewer but Better: Sudden Stops, Firm Entry, and Financial
Selection by Sina Ates and Felipe Saffie (Ates & Saffie, 2021).
In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
firm heterogeneity and innovation, Ates and Saffie incorporate
endogenous technical change into a real business cycle small open
economy framework to study the productivity costs of sudden stops.
In this economy, productivity growth is determined by the entry
of new firms and the decision by incumbent firms to expand. New
firms are created after the implementation of business ideas, yet the
quality of ideas is heterogeneous and good ideas are scarce. Selection
of the most promising ideas gives rise to a trade-off between mass
(quantity) and composition (quality) in the entrant cohort. Chilean
plant-level data from the sudden stop triggered by the Russian
sovereign default in 1998 confirm the main mechanism of the model,
as firms born during the credit shortage are fewer, but better. The
quantitative analysis shows that four years after the crisis, 12.5% of
the output deviation from trend is due to permanent productivity
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losses. Distortions in the entry margin account for 40% of the loss,
and the remaining is due to distortions in the expansion decisions of
incumbents.
Many of the elements suggested by Ates and Saffie (2021) in their
DSGE model with heterogeneous innovative firms are of high value
for the design of macro models addressed to evaluate innovation
policy. Moreover, they also suggest a methodology that facilitates
solving this family of models. Innovation policies are expected to
have long-lasting effects that show up slowly during long tran-
sition periods. However, when evaluating the effects of policies,
institutions cannot wait until all their effects have realized. Then,
being able to characterize the transition from a balanced growth
path to another is critical for policy evaluation. When equilibrium
depends on the endogenous productivity distribution of heteroge-
neous firms and innovation makes firms’ productivity endogenous,
solving the dynamics of a general equilibrium model becomes a non-
trivial object. Having this in mind, the methodology suggested by
Ates and Saffie (2021) is consequently of first importance. Their
theory features firm heterogeneity and innovation in a way that can
be easily added to a DSGE model, to which standard algorithms may
be applied to solve for transitional dynamics. On top of that, such an
approach is likely to be useful to understand the differential effects of
innovation policies during booms and recessions, since, during the
latter, projects are likely to become more risky, thus they are being
financed by the private market less likely.
• Creative Destruction and Uncertainty by Petr Sedlacek (Sedlacek,
2020).
Sedlacek (2020) develops a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with heterogeneous innovative firms highly related to
the literature on Schumpeterian creative destruction (Aghion and
Howitt (1994), and Caballero and Mohammed (1996)) and docu-
ments how firm dynamics and firm-level uncertainty respond to
technology shocks. He argues that even if there is agreement on
the fact that uncertainty rises during recessions, it is less clear
whether uncertainty causes downturns or vice versa. He shows that
faster technology growth raises uncertainty through a growth option
channel: firms face larger productivity gains if they innovate and rela-
tively larger productivity losses if they do not. In addition, faster
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growth spurs a process of creative destruction generating a tempo-
rary downturn and rendering uncertainty countercyclical. Estimates
from structural VARs on the US data confirm the model’s predic-
tions. Growth explains 1/4 of the cyclical variation in uncertainty
on average, and up to 2/3 around the dot-com bubble.
The contribution of Sedlacek (2020)’s paper is of the same nature
as the Ates and Saffie (2021) paper and should be considered as
a cornerstone approach to modelling innovation in a framework
designed to evaluate innovation policies. The model can also be
easily embodied into a DSGE model for whose solution standard
algorithms can be used. The link between growth and business
cycles with innovation uncertainty being the driver of both long-
term growth and the business cycle, the model can be used to study
the transitional dynamics of innovation policies.
• How much Keynes and how much Schumpeter? An Estimated
Macromodel of the US Economy by Guido Cozzi, Beatrice
Pataracchia, Philipp Pfeiffer and Marco Ratto (Cozzi et al., 2017).
The macroeconomic experience of the last decade clearly shows
that long-term growth and business cycle fluctuations need to be
studied in the same framework. To analyse this issue, the authors
embed a Schumpeterian growth model into an estimated medium-
scale DSGE model. Results from a Bayesian estimation suggest that
investment risk premia are a key driver of the slump following the
Great Recession. Endogenous innovation dynamics amplify finan-
cial crises and help explain the slow recovery. Moreover, financial
conditions also account for a substantial share of R&D investment
dynamics. Cozzi et al. (2017) estimate for the US a DSGE model
with Schumpeterian (semi-endogenous) growth. They document
that the recent financial crisis seems to show a clear change in the
pattern of GDP growth. Up to 2007, the US was clearly behaving
as predicted by Neoclassical growth theory, with GDP systematically
reverting towards the same trend. By contrast, after the financial
crisis, GDP seems to have moved down to a lower trend. To match
the data, Cozzi et al. (2017) suggest a semi-endogenous growth
model that converges to the same balanced growth path, but only
after a very long transition.
• Innovation and Trade Policy in a Globalized World by Ufuk
Akcigit, Sina Ates and Giammario Impullitti (Akcigit et al., 2018).
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Akcigit et al. (2018) assess the role of import tariffs and R&D
subsidies as policy responses to foreign technological competition.
To this end, they build a dynamic general equilibrium growth
model where firm innovation shapes endogenously the dynamics
of technology, and, therefore, market leadership and trade flows
in a world with countries at different stages of development. The
model accounts for competitive pressures exerted by both entrant
and incumbent firms. Firms R&D decisions are driven by (i) the size
of the market, (ii) the effort to escape international competition,
(iii) domestic and international business stealing and (iv) technology
spillovers. This theoretical investigation finds that, in a static context,
globalization, proxied by reduced trade barriers, benefits domestic
workers, while it has an ambiguous effect on business owners. In
a dynamic context, globalization is shown to boost domestic inno-
vation through an escape-competition effect. A calibrated version
of the model reproduces the foreign technological catch-up the
US experienced during the 1970s and early 1980s. Accounting for
transitional dynamics, they show that foreign technological accel-
eration hurts US welfare in the short and medium run through
business stealing, but generates long-run benefits via higher quality
of imported goods and higher domestic innovation induced by the
escape-competition effect. The model suggests that the introduction
of the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit in 1981 proves to
be an effective policy response to foreign competition, generating
substantial welfare gains in the long run. A counterfactual exercise
shows that increasing trade barriers, as an alternative policy response,
produce gains only in the very short run, leading to large losses in
the medium and long run. Protectionist measures generate large
dynamic losses from trade, distorting the impact of openness on
innovation incentives and productivity growth. Finally, the counter-
factual exercise shows that less government intervention is needed
when trade barriers are reduced as a result of globalization.
4.3 Modelling the Macroeconomic
Effects of Innovation Policies
The JRC-IEA Roundtable between academics, policymakers and practi-
tioners was animated by a lively discussion. Some of the more general
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issues related to the modelling and impact assessment of European inno-
vation policies will be presented in subsequent sections of the book. The
remainder of this chapter will instead focus on more specific, albeit not
less important, modelling issues:
• There is a well-known debate on the nature of economic growth
in macroeconomics: Is growth exogenous, endogenous or semi-
endogenous? Yet, no agreement has been reached, with empirical and
theoretical arguments pointing in different directions. There is no
doubt that relevant variables should be part of the analysis, with
GDP and its growth rate being among the most important variables
economists would like to understand. Hence, models of endogenous
growth should be at the top of the agenda. However, the debate is
not about the nature of growth (endogenous or not), but about the
empirical pertinence of existing endogenous growth models.
• Should predictions cover the short, medium or long run? Of course,
growth is about the long term, but innovation policies need to be
regularly evaluated. In this sense, intermediary effects, those taking
place during the transition from a balanced growth path to another,
are critical for the evaluation of innovation policies.
• Since a model has to be understood as a lab for policy simulations,
the fit of the model to the data is a fundamental criterion in model
selection. In this regard, the large availability of microdata at present
permits adding more micro heterogeneity in macro models.
• Firm heterogeneity, the dynamics of firms (entry and exit) and innova-
tion. The last decade witnessed the emergence of a sizeable literature
on the dynamics of heterogeneous firms, with most contributions
assuming exogenous productivity processes. The Schumpeterian
model is a model of innovation with heterogeneous firms, governed
by entry and exit (creation and destruction). When innovation is at
centre stage, the question that emerges is: what are the main differ-
ences between the Schumpeterian model and the Hopenhayn-Melitz
model?1 A new literature developed in recent years attempts to shed
light in this respect.
• It is important to identify the trade-offs between promoting excel-
lence and/or promoting convergence, which relates to the trade-offs
1 The Hopenhayn-Melitz model refers to Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003)
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between growth and inequality. At the national/regional level,
European innovation policies may be addressed to give incentives
to the most developed regions to deepen their innovation process or
alternatively to promote the development of those regions that need
to catch-up with the frontier technology.
R&D subsidies aimed to promote innovation and growth affect
the variance of the productivity distribution across firms and regions.
A better understanding of this effect is important to improve
our comprehension of the distributive consequences of innovation
policies.
Models must be able to clearly specify why excellence and conver-
gence matter in order to quantitatively evaluate what is the right
balance between them. This issue is highly connected to the related
problem of inter-regional migration.
• It is important to analyse the differential behaviour of small, medium
and large firms. The theory of firm dynamics is a good framework
to study the dynamics of firm size.
• Should models distinguish between innovation and adoption? The
success of an innovation policy depends not only on the number
and degree of innovation of new technologies/ideas that it helps to
create, but on the extent of their diffusion through a long process
of adoption by others.
This is related to the nature of technical progress: radical innova-
tion and general-purpose technologies (GPT). Is innovation policy
aimed at diffusing existing technological paradigms or, rather, at
promoting the emergence of new ones? Should we, for example,
invest in the diffusion of IT technologies or bid on the emergence
of robotics?
• There is an important debate in the theoretical and empirical growth
literature about the nature and extent of technological spillovers, in
particular those related to trade. The impact of innovation policy
and its regional effects critically depends on these spillovers.
• Macro models must be disciplined by macro and micro data. The
decline of the endogenous growth literature in the first decade of
the twenty-first century was due to the inability for the models
belonging to this family to replicate by existing data. Its recent resur-
gence is attributable to the appropriate use of macro and microdata.
In this sense, modelling microheterogeneity is important for macro
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models in order to be able to capture the observed microeconomic
data.
• As a general modelling strategy, one needs to first identify the policy-
relevant question, second, investigate what the profession already
knows (i.e, the relevant literature) as well as look for the available
macro and microdata and, third, develop a model that is able to
answer the policymakers’ questions while fitting the data to the best
degree possible. The overarching fundamental principle underlying
this step-wise approach to modelling is that models are question and
data dependent.
• In the process of identifying a good model, the dialogue between
policy and economic analysts in policymaking institutions, on one
hand, and academia, on the other, is crucial. This helps to identify
and design the most appropriate models to answer the most relevant
questions in the policy arena at a given point in time.
• Until now, the big absent in the innovation debate, primarily on the
academic side but also on the policy debate, has been the welfare and
distributional consequences of innovation policy. Creative destruction
leads to new jobs often requiring new skills, but it also leads to job
losses with associated distributional and welfare consequences, which
may be unevenly distributed across sectors, regions and generations.
• A fundamental principle of Italian cooking is: the least ingredients,
the better. One of the key questions that emerged during the work-
shop presentations was how one can implement this principle when
modelling innovation policies aimed at very different objectives and
likely operating through very different channels. This necessitates a
thoughtful exchange between all the parties involved.
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PART II
Impact Assessment of Innovation Policies:
Models and Examples for the EuropeanUnion
CHAPTER 5
The RHOMOLO Spatial CGEModel
Martin Aarøe Christensen
5.1 Introduction
RHOMOLO is the dynamic Spatial Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) model of the European Commission. It is developed and main-
tained by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and used for policy impact
assessment and for sector-, region- and time-specific model-based support
to EU policymakers on structural reforms, growth and cohesion policies,
including R&D support programmes.
The objective of RHOMOLO is to allow for the analysis of EU policies
at the regional NUTS 2 level. Given the regional focus of RHOMOLO,
a particular attention is devoted to the explicit modelling of spatial link-
ages, interactions and spillovers between regional economies. The model
aims to account for local specificities which may affect the dynamics of
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the regional economies such as factor endowment and local geography.
In addition, European regions are very open, small economies, well inte-
grated within and across national borders. Therefore, socio-economic
developments in each region may be significantly affected by policy devel-
opments in their neighbouring regions and this dimension needs to be
taken into account when analysing policy scenarios. The socio-economic
conditions of European territories vary substantially at a sub-national
level. Figure 5.1 illustrates the divergent economic conditions across EU
regions. The figure shows the regional Gross Value Added (GVA) per
capita for regions at the NUTS 2 level for the year 2013 which is the refer-
ence year of the most recent version of RHOMOLO. The figure shows
that substantial deviation in per capital GVA can be observed across the
EU and even within the EU Member States. Across the EU a number
of metropolitan regions are characterized by per capita GVA which are
considerable higher than the EU average. For example the 8 regions with
the highest per capita value added all have per capita GVA that are more
than twice the EU average.1 Per capita GVA in Inner London is about
3.5 times the EU average and 26 times higher than in the EU region
with the lowest per capita GVA which is the Bulgarian Region Severoza-
paden. In contrast, the 25 regions with the lowest per capita value added
all have per capita GVA which is less than a third of the EU average.2
Most Member States host one or more metropolitan areas where per
capita GVA is considerable higher than the national average. The eight
regions which have the highest per capita value added relatively to their
national average, all have per capita GVA which is more than 1.6 times
their national average.3
Given the variations in socio-economic conditions across EU regions,
the economic impact of EU policies in support for R&D may also vary
substantially across regions. The RHOMOLO model has been used in
an attempt to capture deviations in regional outcomes of R&D polices.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a short
introduction to the current version of RHOMOLO with special emphasis
1 The 8 regions are: Inner London, Luxembourg, Stockholm, the Region of Brussels,
Hamburg, Groningen, Copenhagen and Île-de-France.
2 The 25 regions mentioned are located in Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.
3 The 8 regions are: Inner London, Bratislava, Bucharest, Prague, the Region of
Brussels, Hamburg, Île-de-France, Yugozapaden (incl. Sofia).
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Fig. 5.1 Gross value
added per capita across
EU regions (1000 euro)
on how R&D enters the model. It also discusses the main limitations to
the treatments of R&D in the model and highlights some requirements
which future developments of R&D modelling in RHOMOLO should
address. The last section contains a discussion of scenarios and find-
ings following the economic impact assessment exercise of the Horizon
Europe Framework Programme for Research and Innovation.
5.2 The Model
RHOMOLO is a Spatial Dynamic General Equilibrium model with new
economic geography features.4 The model contains a detailed specifica-
tion of 267 regional economies and their spatial interactions.
Each region contains 10 economic sectors: Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing; Mining, Quarrying and Utilities5; Manufacturing; Construction;
Whole and Retail Trade; Information and Communication; Financial,
Insurance and Real Estate Activities; Professional, Scientific and Technical
Activities; Public administration, Education, Health and Social Services;
Other Services. A subset of these operates under monopolistic competi-
tion. The rest of the sectors operate under perfect competition. In the
4 A detailed description of the latest available version of RHOMOLO can be found in
Lecca et al. (2018).
5 Here the term utilities refer to the sectors: Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air
Conditioning Supply, Water Supply, waste Management and Remediation Activities.
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imperfectly competitive sectors, each firm produces a given variety of the
good which is an imperfect substitute for other varieties. The variety is
produced with constant returns to scale technology. In addition, the firm
faces fixed costs FC in the form of a fixed amount of its production which
is not sold on the market. This introduces increasing returns to scale.
To survive firms, in the imperfectly competitive sectors, have to charge
positive mark-ups over marginal costs. These mark-ups are determined
by the properties of the demand curve these firms face. We assume that
there are free entry and exit of firm. Hence, given fixed costs and substi-
tutability between goods the number of firms operating within a sector in
a region are endogenously given to ensure that the zero profit condition
holds. Firms in the perfectly competitive sectors have constant returns to
scale technologies, minimize costs and are constrained to marginal costs
pricing.
In all regional production sectors, goods are produced by combining
labour and capital with domestic and imported intermediates, creating
vertical linkages between firms. The production structure is given by a
nested CES production function as shown in Fig. 5.2.
For a firm in sector i in region r, the demand for intermediate input
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where αzr,i is the calibrated share of intermediate inputs in total produc-
tion, Axr,i is a scale parameter and σ z is the elasticity of substitution. The




r,i is respectively the marginal production cost, the
composite price index for intermediate inputs and the composite price
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where Pr, j is the price of the intermediate input from sector j, rkr,i is the
return on capital, Wr,i is a composite wage index, αvr, j,i and α
y
r,i are share
parameters, and σv and σ y are the elasticities of substitution for inter-
mediate inputs and capital-labour respectively. Public capital services Kg,dr
enters the production function as an unpaid factor of production meaning
that all firms, in all sectors, enjoy the same level of public capital at no
cost. The parameter ϕr,i captures changes in total factor productivity. As
discussed below, this is a key parameter for introducing long-term impacts
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LDr,i =
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(5.8)
where Alr,i,e is a scale parameter that captures labour productivity, Wr,i,e is
the wage for labour of skills type e and σ ld is the elasticity of substitution
between labour of different skills types. The firms demand for labour of










Final goods are consumed by households, government and investors.
Each region is inhabited by a representative household which supplies
labour of three skills type (high, medium and low), consume and save.
The composite of household consumption is described by CES prefer-








where Cr is the aggregate composite consumption good, αr,i is a share
parameter and σ c is the elasticity of substitution. The associated consump-










The household saves a fixed share sr of disposable income.
Sr = srY Dr (5.12)
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The government levies taxes, purchases public consumption goods,
conducts public investments and allocates transfers to the various agents
in the economy. Public consumption, public investments and transfers in
real terms are exogenous to the model.
The RHOMOLO model incorporates imperfect competition in the
labour market which allows for unemployment. The model allows one
to switch from a wage curve assumption to a Phillips curve assumption in
wage formation.
The model contains two types of capital, sector-specific private capital
and public capital available to firm in all sectors within the region. Sector-
specific private capital is accumulated by private investors. The optimal
path of private investments I pr,i is defined as






where ν is the accelerator parameter and δ is the depreciation rate. The
investment-capital ratio is a function of the rate of return to capital and
the user cost of capital uckr allowing the capital stock to reach its desired
level in a smooth fashion over time. The user cost of capital is derived
from a no arbitrage condition and is given by
uckr = (r + δr )P IEU + P IEU + rpr (5.14)
where r is the interest rate, rp is an exogenous risk premium and P IEU is
the price index for investments at the EU level. The demand for invest-
ment I pr,i by sector i is translated into demand for investments goods
through a capital matrix
I sr, j =
∑
i
K Mr,i, j I
p
r,i (5.15)
where I sr, j is the demand for the investment good produced by sector j.
Public capital is accumulated by the government. Public capital in the
model is not treated as a pure public good but is characterized by some
degree of congestion. Hence, the public capital services available from the
public capital stock Kg,s are adjusted for congestion by aggregate produc-
tion. Therefore an increase in production reduces the effective quantity
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where γ is the congestion parameter.
Goods and services can be sold in the domestic economy or exported
to other regions. Trade between regions is associated with a set of bilat-
eral regional transportation costs. In each region aggregate demand, Xr,i ,
for the composite good from sector i is determined by the sum of
intermediate demand by all firms and all components of final demand.
In perfectly competitive sectors, the composite good i is based on an
Armington assumption and takes the form of a CES aggregate of domes-
tically produced goods and imported goods. In imperfectly competitive
sectors, the composite good i is based on a Dixit-Stiglitz specification
capturing the product differentiation at the individual firm level. Normal-
izing the number of firms in the competitive sector to 1 then the demand
by region r for sector i good from an individual firm in region r ′ under
the two assumptions can be formulated identically as
Xr ′,i,r
(1 + τ trr ′,i,r )
= αxr ′,i,r
[
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(5.18)
where Pxr ′,i,r is the price set by a firm in region r
′ (net of product taxes
τ
p
r,i and transport costs at the net rate τ
tr
r ′,i,r ) selling to region r.
Due to its high dimensionality, RHOMOLO is solved following a
recursively dynamic approach. It contains a sequence of short-run equi-
libria that are related to each other through the build-up of physical and
intangible capital stocks.




5.2.1 R&D in RHOMOLO
The objective of the RHOMOLO model is to address regional devia-
tions in policy impacts. The model is calibrated to the regional levels
of R&D investments observed in the reference year. Hence, the model
captures the large regional differences in R&D expenditures across the
EU. Figure 5.3 shows the geographical variations in regional R&D inten-
sity in the model’s reference year. The highest R&D intensities can be
observed in the Belgian region Brabant Wallon and the German regions
Braunschweig and Stuttgart. R&D intensity is, respectively, 5.6, 3.6 and
3.0 times higher than the EU average.6 The figure also reveals that devi-
ation in R&D intensity exists within EU Member States. Most Member
States contains one or several regions which are considerable more R&D
intensive relatively to the national average.
RHOMOLO captures in detail regional deviations in R&D spending
in the reference year whereas the modeling of dynamic R&D impacts are
specified in a relatively simple setup. Any changes in the R&D investment
level are introduced into the model as an exogenous shock.7 The impact
of a change in R&D expenditures enters into the model through two
6 For more perspective on regional disparities, R&D intensity in Brabant Wallon is 19
times higher than in the regions with the lowest R&D intensity, namely the Romanian
region Sud-Est and the Autonomous Spanish region of Ceuta.
7 The current version of RHOMOLO does not include any endogenous respond to
R&D spending in response to changes in economic activity. Hence, a change in say
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channels; a channel with temporary demand effects and a channel with
permanent structural effects.
First, consider the temporary demand effects. The way this is intro-
duced into the model depends on whether the R&D expenditure is
undertaken as a public R&D activity or as a R&D expenditure conducted
by the private sector. A change in public R&D spending is associated
with a change in public expenditures introduced as an exogenous public
expenditure shock. Hence, a change in public R&D expenditure affects
the demand for public final consumption goods. A change in private R&D
spending is associated with a change in private investments introduced as
a change in the risk premium faced by firms. A change in risk premium
affects the firms’ user cost of capital and hence the desired level of invest-
ments. A change in private R&D expenditure thus affects the demand for
investment goods.
Second, consider the permanent, structural effect. It is assumed that
regional R&D spending leads to an increase in the intangible knowledge
capital stock which in turn spills into an increase in TFP for all firms in the
region. In the model, the impact of R&D expenditure on TFP through
the accumulated knowledge capital stock is captured by a regional R&D







where RDexpr is R&D expenditure in region r, the subscript t0 denotes
value in the reference year. The R&D elasticity is conditional on R&D
intensity within the region. Hence, the model allows for spatial varia-
tions in the economic impact from R&D spending across EU regions.
Higher regional R&D intensity is associated with higher spillover from
R&D expenditure to TFP. The intuition is that firms in regions that
are already spending much on R&D signal their pre-existing capacity to
generate value from innovation activities. The deviation of TFP from the
reference scenario evolves according to
ϕr,t = ϕr,t0
(










public investments for transport infrastructure will not lead to an endogenous change in
regional R&D spending.
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where δrd is the depreciation rate of TFP for firms in region r.
The R&D elasticities used in RHOMOLO are based on estimates by
Kancs and Siliverstovs (2016). They estimate the relationship between
R&D investment and firm productivity growth by explicitly modelling
non-linearities in the R&D-productivity relationship. They find that the
impact of R&D investment on firm productivity is different at different
levels of R&D intensity with the relationship between R&D expenditures
and productivity growth being highly non-linear. Only after a certain
critical mass of knowledge accumulates productivity growth becomes
significantly positive. Based on the estimates by Kancs and Siliverstovs,
we assign values to the R&D elasticities for all the regions in the model.
The geographical distribution is shown in Fig. 5.4. The R&D elastici-
ties vary from 0.008 to 0.152. More than half of the EU regions have
R&D elasticities below 0.01. The assumption of the non-linear nature of
R&D impact means that regions with high R&D intensity in the reference
year also has substantial higher R&D elasticities. Therefore a policy of
R&D support would yield different returns across regions. However, the
economic impact of R&D support not only depends on the regional R&D
elasticity but also on the structural composition of the regional economy,
factor endowments and trade patterns. Given the recursive dynamics of
RHOMOLO, the parameter capturing changes in TFP for all firms in a
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5.2.2 Limitations
The way R&D impacts the economy in the current version of
RHOMOLO has limitations. Firstly, changes in R&D spending are
exogenous. Hence, firms do not endogenously decide on the optimal level
of R&D investments in the model based on expected future returns.
Secondly, R&D expenditures enter the model at a regional level with
all firms benefiting equally from an improvement in TFP. Estimates
from Kancs and Siliverstovs (2016) suggest that R&D elasticities could
vary substantially across sectors. The current specification of R&D does
not capture that policies targeting different sectors may impact TFP
differently. Furthermore, sector-specific R&D investments may result in
improvements in TFP which mainly benefit firms in the sector conducting
the R&D activity with more limited TFP impact on firms in other
sectors.8
Thirdly, the current specification does not explicitly address diffusion
of technologies across regions. In the current model setting an increase
in TFP in a region would benefit firms in neighbouring regions through
trade due to cheaper imported intermediate inputs. Furthermore, in
sectors characterized by monopoly power, a fraction of firms would real-
locate to the region experiencing TFP growth. However, TFP of firms
in neighbouring regions does not increase due to technology absorption.
This reduces the benefit of R&D investments across the EU.
Fourthly, the impact of public R&D investments and private R&D
investments is assumed to result in identical increases in TFP for firms
within a region. Ideally, one would assign different R&D elasticities to
these two types of R&D investments.
5.2.3 Addressing the Limitations for R&D Modelling
in RHOMOLO
The need for assessing the regional economic impacts of R&D policies in
RHOMOLO means that the way R&D enters into the model is contin-
uously updated and improved. Some key challenges have been identified
which the modelling of R&D in RHOMOLO should address. First, a
specification that endogenizes decisions on R&D investments by private
8 Although some multi-purpose technologies may improve TFP across all sectors.
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firms could be introduced into the model. This would allow public poli-
cies to affect R&D decisions in other regions. A challenge for such a
specification is that the model is solved by recursive dynamics. Hence,
agents current behaviour is not influenced by expectations about the
economic conditions in future periods. A possible solution could be to
introduce a specification which capture agents’ expectations based on
current or past states of the economy.
Second, to allow for sectoral differences in R&D impact one could
introduce sector-specific R&D spending into the model. Furthermore,
one could distinguish between public sector and private sector R&D
expenditure. Allowing for sector-specific R&D spending would also
allow for varying spillover effects within and across sectors. However,
introducing sector-specific R&D investments to the model significantly
increase the data requirements as one would need sectoral R&D invest-
ments at the regional level and estimated sectoral R&D’s own and cross
elasticities capturing the impact of R&D investments on TFP.
Third, a formal modelling of R&D production, which puts a higher
emphasis on high-skilled labour input and high tech intermediate inputs,
could be introduced. Currently, the cost of R&D production is defined as,
respectively, the price of the public consumption composite or the price of
the capital goods composite. A more formal treatment of R&D produc-
tion would also allow policies targeting education or improved labour
skills to impact the cost of R&D production.
Fourth, a formal modelling of the linkages through which R&D
production impacts the economy could be incorporated into the model.
This could be through a combination of the mechanism found in the
expanding variety model originally proposed by Romer (1990) and the
Schumpeterian endogenous growth model focusing on innovation-led
growth and creative destruction originally proposed by Aghion et al.
(1998) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Fifth, the model should address how technology and innovation
diffuse into other sectors and regions. Several models of diffusion have
been proposed in the literature (see e.g. Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 1997;
Grossman & Helpman, 1993). One possibility would be to add the
modelling of a costly process through which firms may adopt existing
technologies as for example proposed by Comin and Gertler (2006).
This would allow one to distinguish between the impact from policies
targeting R&D production and policies concerned with technology adop-
tion in regions. Clearly any modelling of technology diffusion and R&D
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spillovers across sectors and regions would need to rest on stylized facts
identified in empirical studies covering data at the level of firms, regions
or countries.
5.2.4 Model Summary
The spatial dynamic general equilibrium model RHOMOLO contains a
detailed specification of regional economies and their spatial interactions.
The model allows for a regional assessment of economic impacts of R&D
expenditures by the use of a relatively simple treatment of R&D. An
exogenously determined level of R&D expenditures impacts the economy
through a temporary demand channel that either raises public consump-
tion or private investments through a permanent structural channel that
leads to changes in TFP for all firms in a region. The impact of R&D
spending varies across regions as a result of variations in the composition
of input demand and regional variations in the R&D elasticity which is
assumed to rise with higher R&D intensity. However, the impact of R&D
spending also depends on regional variations in factor endowments and
trade linkages. The specification of R&D in RHOMOLO has a number
of limitations including the lack of endogenous adjustment of R&D
spending and no formal modelling of technology diffusion across regions
and sectors. These limitations could be addressed in future developments
of the model.
5.3 An Example: Simulating the Ex-Ante
Macroeconomic Impact of Horizon Europe
Macroeconomic modelling is used by the European Commission for
policy impact assessments including assessments of policies in support
to Research and Innovation (R&I). The aim of such assessments is
to assist policymakers by providing an ex-ante assessment of poten-
tial outcomes of the suggested policy proposals. This section provides
an example of how the dynamic Spatial Computable General Equilib-
rium model RHOMOLO is used to examine the economic impact of
R&I support policies. More specifically we present some of the find-
ings of the economic impact assessment accompanying the proposal for
the Horizon Europe Framework Programme. Horizon Europe is the
European Commission proposal for the EU research and Innovation
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programme for 2021–2027.9 The programme aims to support the provi-
sion of European R&I investments. Through EU-wide competition and
cooperation, the programme supports training and mobility for scientists,
creates transnational cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary collaborations
and leverages additional public and private investments. The objective is
to strengthen the scientific and technological bases of the EU and foster
its competitiveness, including for its industry. The programme seeks to
address particular R&I challenges faced by the EU and to contribute to
tackling global challenges, including the Sustainable Development Goals.
Substantial variations in industrial structures, infrastructure and socio-
economic conditions exist across the EU Member States at the national
level and even more so at the sub-national level. Likewise, R&I activi-
ties vary largely at the sub-national level with R&I activities clustering
in some areas leaving other areas with more modest R&I activities.
Reflecting such regional differences, the allocation of resources under
Horizon Europe is likely to vary across regions. Horizon Europe may
shift resources across EU regions and impact differently the various
regional economies. Furthermore, structural socio-economic differences
across EU regions may result in heterogeneous regional responses to
public R&I support. This calls for an impact assessment of the European
R&I support programme to also consider the sub-national level.
This section exemplifies the use of RHOMOLO for the ex-ante impact
evaluation of the Horizon Europe policy scenario. A discussion of its
economic impacts at both the aggregate EU level and at the regional
level is provided.
5.3.1 Scenarios and Method
Our example is taken from the economic impact assessment accompa-
nying the proposal for the Horizon Europe Framework Programme (see
Christensen, 2018; European Commission, 2018). The proposal concerns
EU support to R&I for the period 2021–2027. More specifically, we
examine the outcome of a policy scenario describing the introduction
of Horizon Europe. The budget size of the Horizon Europe scenario is
assumed to be identical to the programme it replaces (Horizon 2020) in
constant prices, minus the contribution from the UK (assumed to be 15%
9 It replaces the current Framework Programme Horizon 2020 which will expire by
the end of 2020.
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of the budget). The impact assessment thus considers total cumulative
spending of approximately 70 billion which is equivalent to 0.5% of GDP
in 2017 for the EU excluding the UK.10 In the Horizon Europe scenario,
we assume that public support to R&I generates a further rise in private
R&I spending through a direct leverage effect. In the impact assessment
we assume a direct leverage effect of 9.75% which is a weighted average
of the direct leverage effect of respectively basic research and applied
research suggested by Boitier et al. (2018). Their suggested leverage
effects take outset in a survey on research units involved in the 7th
Framework Programme and empirical estimates in the literature.
The outcome of the Horizon Europe scenario is compared to a
reference scenario without Horizon Europe. Instead, the EU Member
States spend an amount identical to their Horizon Europe contribu-
tion on public investments including national R&I support programmes.
Spending by the Member States is financed by lump sum taxes. We assume
that the regional allocation of the additional public investments follows
the regional allocation of current public investments within the Member
States. Public spending for national R&I support is assumed to follow
the same regional allocation within each Member State as of the current
EU R&I support programme (Horizon 2020). Given these assumptions,
substantial variations exist in the regional allocation of respectively public
investments and public R&I support in the reference scenario. While
public investments are spread out across regions within the Member
States, the regional allocation of public R&I support is concentrated in
R&I intensive metropolitan regions (Figs. 5.5 and 5.6). We assume that
the introduction of Horizon Europe involves a reduction in public invest-
ments and in national public support to R&I which is paid as contribution
to Horizon Europe and distributed across EU regions as public support
to R&I. The regional allocation of EU-wide support to R&I is assumed
to be identical to the regional allocation of Horizon 2020.
Given these assumptions, large regional variations in EU R&I support
can be observed. The largest recipient of accumulated public spending
10 After the impact assessment was carried out the proposed budget by the Euro-
pean Commission for Horizon Europe has been increased to 94.1 billion. In addition
to the Horizon Europe’s 2021–2027 Framework Programme the proposed European
Commission R&I support programme also includes the 2021–2025 Research and Training
programme of the European Atomic Energy Community (the Euratom Programme) with
a proposed budget of 2.4 billion and 3.5 billion allocated under the InvestEU fund.
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Fig. 5.5 Additional
public investments in





scenario (% of GDP)
for R&I support during the programme period is Île-de-France (5,900
million) followed by Oberbayern (3,600 million). Other large recip-
ients of public spending are Rhône-Alpes (2,300 million), Cataluña
(2,000 million), Lombardia (2,000 million) and Lazio (2,000 million)
as illustrated in Fig. 5.7.
Considering the regional allocation of cumulative EU spending in
support for R&I relative to the size of the regional economy also reveals
that R&I support is concentrated in metropolitan regions. In percent of
GDP in the RHOMOLO model’s base year (2013) the largest recipients
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Fig. 5.7 EU support
for R&I in Horizon
Europe scenario (million
euro)
of cumulative public spending in support to R&I over the programme
period is assumed to be the Belgian regions of Brussels (1.9% of base year
GDP) and Vlaams-Brabant (1.7% of base year GDP). This is followed by
Dresden (1.7% of base year GDP), Oberbayern (1.6% of base year GDP),
País Vasco (1.5% of base year GDP), Bucharest (1.5% of base year GDP)
and Bratislava (1.5% of base year GDP). The geographical allocation is
illustrated in Fig. 5.8.
Differences in regional allocation of respectively public investments
and public expenditures for R&I support change the net allocation of
Fig. 5.8 EU support
for R&I in Horizon
Europe scenario (% of
GDP)
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public spending across EU regions following the introduction of Horizon
Europe. With the introduction of Horizon Europe all regions experi-
ence a rise in public R&I support, however, the bulk of the increase is
concentrated in the R&I intensive regions. As a result, the net alloca-
tion of public spending received by each region varies. The R&I intensive
regions experience a net gain as the rise in public R&I support outweighs
the decline in public investments whereas the less R&I intensive regions
experience a net decline in public spending as the decline in public invest-
ments outweighs the rise in public R&I support. This is illustrated in
Fig. 5.9 which shows the net change in public spending received by each
region following the introduction of Horizon Europe. Although a region
experiences a net decline in public spending following the introduction
of Horizon Europe, it may still benefit from the EU R&I programme
through trade linkages with neighbouring regions and from improved
productivity resulting from higher R&I investments.
The reference scenario and the Horizon Europe policy scenario are
simulated on the most recent version of RHOMOLO described in Lecca
et al. (2018), with the R&D sector as described in the previous section.
R&I expenditure is modelled as private investments. Public expenditure
in support for R&I is introduced into the model as a reduction in user
cost of capital which, in turn, generates an increase in private sector
R&I investments. Hence, public spending in support to R&I generates
demand for capital goods. In addition, R&I expenditure leads to accu-
mulation of an intangible knowledge capital stock which, in turn, spills
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into an increase in TFP. The impact of R&I expenditure on TFP through
the accumulated knowledge capital stock is captured by a set of regional
spillover elasticities which are conditional on R&D intensity within the
region. Higher regional R&D intensity is associated with higher spillover
from knowledge capital to TFP. The intuition is that firms in regions that
are already spending much on R&D signal their pre-existing capacity to
generate value from innovation activities. The R&D spillover elasticities
are based on estimates by Kancs and Siliverstovs (2016). The model is
solved by recursive dynamics.
5.3.2 Economic Impact at Aggregate EU Level
We begin by considering the aggregate economic impact for the EU
excluding the UK (for simplicity we will refer to this as EU). Results
are presented as deviations from the reference scenario.
It is assumed that the EU R&I programme is financed by a reallo-
cation of public spending by each Member State from domestic public
investments and national public R&I support towards contributions to
Horizon Europe. In RHOMOLO such a shift in policy would mainly
affect the economy through two channels; a demand channel and a
productivity channel. First, consider the demand channel. Introducing
Horizon Europe leads to a rise in EU public spending for R&I support
which is partly offset by a decline in national public spending for R&I
support. The net effect is an increase in private R&I investments which
raises private demand for capital goods. Resources are being reallocated
from public investments within the regions which reduce the public
demand for capital goods. How this shift in spending strategy effects the
aggregate demand in a region depends on the combined net effects from
the decline in regional public investment and the rise in R&I investments.
Aggregate demand is also affected by the composition of inputs (material
inputs and factor inputs) used in the production of the composite capital
good demanded by respectively the private R&I investors and the govern-
ment. This would depend on the sectors from which the material inputs
are sourced, how much of these sectors’ input that is produced domes-
tically and how much that is imported, and on the share of the various
domestic production factors used in the production of the capital goods.
For example, a shift in investment demand towards capital goods with a
higher domestic input share and a higher share of factor inputs would, all
else equal, increase domestic production and household income. Second,
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consider the productivity channel. A rise in private R&I investments leads
to higher knowledge accumulation which, in turn, generates a rise in TFP.
In contrast, a lower public capital accumulation is assumed to generate a
negative productivity effect through which public capital services bring
reduced efficiency to the private production sectors in the region.
Figure 5.10 shows the change in EU GDP relative to the reference
scenario. The introduction of Horizon Europe leads to a gradual rise
in EU GDP. This is mainly determined by higher TFP growth which
outweighs the lower productivity growth caused by the reduction in
public investments. The largest deviation in EU GDP occurs in 2029
where EU GDP is 0.2% higher than the reference scenario. The long-run
GDP impact of introducing the EU R&I support programme is more
modest. Horizon Europe runs until 2027 after which it is assumed that
EU R&I support stops. In the RHOMOLO model, an efficiency gain
from the accumulated knowledge stock is assumed to depreciate. Hence,
TFP gains from R&I investments made in the past gradually die out.
Table 5.1 shows the cumulative EU GDP deviation relative to the
reference scenario. The introduction of Horizon Europe results in cumu-
lative EU GDP in 2040 to become 0.1% higher than in the reference
scenario. The increase in cumulative EU GDP in 2050 is slightly less due
to the depreciation of TFP gains.
The deviation of EU GDP relative to the reference scenario can be
decomposed into macroeconomic aggregates. This is shown in Fig. 5.11.
The introduction of the EU R&I support programme causes a temporary
Fig. 5.10 Change in EU GDP (% relative to reference scenario)
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Table 5.1 Deviation of
EU GDP (% relative to
reference scenario)
Impact of EU R&I
programme
Cumulative EU GDP deviation in
2030
0.063
Cumulative EU GDP deviation in
2040
0.071
Cumulative EU GDP deviation in
2050
0.056
Fig. 5.11 Contribution to change in EU GDP (% relative to reference scenario)
decline in public investments in the EU Member States in the period
2021–2029. Private R&I investments rise and this contributes the most
to the overall increase in EU GDP relative to the reference scenario. The
introduction of the EU R&I support programme also leads to a rise in
private household consumption and a rise in net exports. From 2030 the
rise in private household consumption contributes the most to the change
in EU GDP. Higher productivity growth results in an improvement of the
EU trade balance, private investments and consumption opportunities for
EU households.
The introduction of Horizon Europe stimulates EU medium to long
term employment. This is illustrated by Fig. 5.12 that shows the change
in EU employment relative to the reference scenario. At first the shift in
spending from public investments towards R&I support leads to a small
decline in employment as the production of public capital goods is more
labour intensive. The initial decline in EU employment peaks in 2022
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Fig. 5.12 Change in EU employment
where it is 17,000 jobs lower than in the reference scenario. However,
gradually EU employment increases as a result of higher TFP growth
which improves competitiveness. EU employment is at its highest in 2029
where employment is 97,000 jobs higher than the reference scenario.
Long-term EU employment returns to the level of the reference scenario.
Table 5.2 shows the average EU employment deviation in 1000 jobs.
Horizon Europe results in a rise in average EU employment for the period
2021–2040 of 40,000 jobs per year. The introduction of the EU R&I
support programme has a persistent impact on EU employment. For the
period 2021–2050, the rise in average EU employment is 30,000 jobs
per year.
Table 5.2 Average EU
employment deviation Impact of EU R&Iprogramme
Average EU GDP deviation
2020–2030
27.9
Average EU GDP deviation
2020–2040
40.1
Average EU GDP deviation
2020–2050
29.9
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5.3.3 Economic Impact at Regional Level
The results discussed so far have considered changes in EU aggregates.
However, RHOMOLO further allows for an assessment of the economic
impact at the regional level. The allocation of spending for R&I support
varies across regions. Furthermore, regions vary in industrial structure,
trade patterns and composition of production factors. Hence, regions
may be impacted differently by the introduction of Horizon Europe. We,
therefore, also consider the regional impact of Horizon Europe.
The regional impact on GDP and Employment from the introduction
of Horizon Europe can be examined in a box plot as shown in Fig. 5.13.
The box plot provides a display of the distribution of the regional devia-
tion in respectively cumulative GDP in 2040 and cumulative employment
in 2040. The central rectangle spans the first quartile to the third quartile
with the small horizontal line inside the rectangle showing the median.
The vertical line that extends from the top of the rectangle indicates the
maximum value of regional impact, and the vertical line that extends from
the bottom of the rectangle indicates the minimum value of regional
impact.
The introduction of the EU R&I support programme results in a rise
in cumulative EU GDP in 2040. However, as shown in the box plot,
considerable divergence exists in regional GDP impact. Less than half
of the regions experience a rise in cumulative GDP in 2040. The span
from the third quartile to the maximum value is higher than the span
from the minimum value to the first quartile. This is due to a small
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Fig. 5.14 Change in
regional GDP (% relative
to reference scenario)
number of regions which experience relatively large increases in cumu-
lative GDP. Horizon Europe causes a shift from public investments to
private R&I investments. This results in a rise in regional TFP growth
and a decline in public capital services. However, the changes in spending
are not evenly distributed across regions. Some regions experience large
increases in public expenditures in support to R&I others suffer from
decline in public investments that are allocated to the regions. The shift
in demand and productivity gains across regions lads to changes in rela-
tive prices. Therefore, as a result of the shift in spending strategy, some
regions experience a decline in GDP while other regions gain. Horizon
Europe also results in considerable regional variations in employment
impact. As illustrated in the box plot the number of regions that suffer
from a decline in employment outnumber the regions benefitting from an
improvement in employment. More specifically, Horizon Europe results
in a rise in cumulative employment in 2040 for 90 regions and a reduc-
tion in employment for 140 regions.11 As can be seen in the box plot, a
small number of regions experience relatively large increases in cumulative
employment due to the introduction of the EU R&I support programme.
Figure 5.14 shows the geographical distribution of cumulative regional
GDP deviation in 2040 following the introduction of Horizon Europe.
We observe that the rise in cumulative GDP is more prominently
in regions that are large recipient of public spending in support for
11 Excluding the UK reduces the number of EU regions in the model to 230.
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R&I. Generally, these regions would experience higher TFP growth and
improved competitiveness leading to a rise in GDP. The largest increase in
GDP is found in the Finnish region of Helsinki-Uusimaa where cumula-
tive GDP in 2040 is 1.0% higher than in the reference scenario. Other
regions that experience some of the largest increases in GDP are the
Spanish region of País Vasco (0.6%) and the German region of Dresden
(0.5%). In contrast, other regions attract less of the public R&I support
spending and suffer from the decline in public investments which results
in a decline in cumulative GDP. The largest decline in cumulative GDP
occurs in the autonomous Spanish regions Ceuta (−0.2%) and Melilla
(−0.2%). The introduction of Horizon Europe results in a rise in GDP in
97 regions and a decline in GDP in 133 regions relative to the reference
scenario.
In Fig. 5.15 we explore the relationship between the cumulative devia-
tion in public spending in support to R&I and the cumulative deviation in
GDP in 2040 for all EU regions. The figure reveals a positive relationship
between public spending in support to R&I and the change in cumula-
tive GDP. The higher the rise in public spending in support to R&I the
higher the rise in GDP. However, the change in GDP also depends on
other regional characteristics such as differences in industry structures,
the mix of factor inputs and trade patterns which affects the relative
change in competitiveness relative to main trading partners. The figure
shows that regions which experience a small increase in public support
Fig. 5.15 Relationship between the deviation of cumulative public support (EU
and national) to R&I and cumulative regional GDP deviation in 2040 (% change
from reference scenario)
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to R&I generally suffer a small decline in cumulative GDP relative to
the reference scenario. In the analysis, Horizon Europe is assumed to be
financed by Member States’ contributions taken from public investments
and national R&I programmes. Within each Member State, resources for
public investments are allocated differently than the regional allocation of
public R&I support. Hence, regions which are allocated small shares of
the public spending in support to R&I may suffer from a decline in public
spending allocated to the region. For these regions, the impact from a
decline in public investments outweighs the impact from a rise in public
spending for R&I support. In contrast, regions receiving a large share of
public support to R&I are associated with higher cumulative GDP rela-
tive to the reference scenario. For these regions, the impact from a rise in
public spending to R&I support outweighs the impact from lower public
investments.
Figure 5.16 shows the geographical distribution of the regional
changes in cumulative employment in 2040 relative to the reference
scenario. The largest rise in employment can be found in regions which
are among the largest recipients of EU spending in support to R&I and,
at the same time, also have relatively high unemployment rates, which
gives potential for employment growth.12 The largest rise in employment
12 The impact assessment is conducted on a version of RHOMOLO in which net
migration between regions is held constant and household labour supply is exogenous.
Hence, a rise in employment can only arise from a reduction in the unemployment rate.
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Fig. 5.17 Relationship between the deviation of cumulative public support (EU
and National) to R&I and cumulative regional employment deviation in 2040
(% change from reference scenario)
occurs in the Spanish region of Cataluña where cumulative employment
in 2040 is 0.3% higher than in the reference scenario. The largest decline
in cumulative employment can be found in the two autonomous Spanish
regions Ceuta (−0.1%) and Melilla (−0.1%) who suffers from the decline
in national public investments.
In Fig. 5.17 we explore the relationship between the cumulative devi-
ation in public spending in support to R&I and the cumulative deviation
in Employment in 2040 for all the EU regions. The figure reveals a posi-
tive relationship between public spending in support to R&I and the
change in cumulative employment. However, the change in employment
also depends on other regional characteristics which affect the demand
for labour such as differences in labour intensity in production, skills
composition, regional unemployment rates, industry structures and trade
patterns which affect the relative change in competitiveness relative to
main trading partners. For example, the regions benefiting from the
largest rise in public support to R&I are not the regions with the largest
rise in employment.
5.3.4 Summary
This section presents findings from the economic impact assessment
accompanying the European Commission proposal for the Horizon
Europe Framework Programme. The impact assessment compares the
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outcome of a policy scenario with Horizon Europe to a reference scenario
in which an identical amount of resources are spent by the Member
States on public investments and national R&I support programmes. The
economic impact is evaluated at the aggregate EU level and at the regional
level. Results show that the EU R&I programme contributes to GDP
growth and employment in the EU. In 2040 the cumulative EU GDP
would be 0.1% higher than in the reference scenario. The deviation of
total EU employment is at its maximum in 2029 where employment
would be 97,000 jobs higher than the reference scenario. For the period
2021–2040, EU employment would on average be 40,000 jobs per year
higher than in the reference scenario.
However, considerable regional variations in economic impact emerge.
Shifting resources from public investments and national R&I support
programmes to the EU R&I support programme mainly benefits the
most R&I intensive regions in the EU who are the large receivers of
EU spending in support to R&I. These regions experience an increase in
TFP growth and an improvement in competitiveness leading to a rise in
GDP and employment. We find that cumulative GDP in 2040 increases
up to 1.0% and cumulative employment in 2040 rises up to 0.3% rela-
tive to the reference scenario. However, the regional impact on GDP
and unemployment is unevenly distributed across EU regions. About 60%
of all regions experience a decline in cumulative GDP and employment
following the change in policy. These regions suffer from the reallocation
of public spending from public investments and national R&I support
to EU-wide R&I support. The declines in cumulative GDP in 2040
are up to 0.2% relative to the reference scenario while the declines in
cumulative employment are up to 0.1% relative to the reference scenario.
The variations in regional economic impacts are largely resulting from
assumptions concerning allocations of R&I support across regions. In
addition, regional impacts are influenced by regional variations in R&D
elasticities which in RHOMOLO are conditional on regional R&D inten-
sity, on trade linkages and on the regional economic conditions such
as the sectoral composition and labour market characteristics. Horizon
Europe aims to support the provision of European R&I investments
through EU-wide competition and cooperation programme support. In
the impact assessment, it is assumed that the R&I intensive regions are
able to attract an identical share of funds as in the previous EU R&I
support programme. A large proportion of funding is, therefore, allocated
to the most R&I intensive regions.
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Although our results show that about 60% of the regions experi-
ence a decline in GDP and employment following the implementation
of Horizon Europe, it may still be the case that these regions potentially
could benefit from the higher growth in their R&I intensive neighbouring
regions. Firstly, Member States may use public policies and fiscal trans-
fers to redistribute the higher income in R&I intensive regions across
all domestic regions. This could compensate households in the regions
suffering from the decline in public investments. Secondly, diffusion of
technologies may ensure that TFP increases in R&I intensive regions
benefits neighbouring regions. In the simulation analysis, productivity
gains from higher knowledge creation in the R&I intensive regions spills
into other regions through trade linkages. However, the model simula-
tion does not explicitly address the effects from diffusion of technologies
across regions. Hence, interregional spillovers from productivity increases
in a region may be underestimated. Thirdly, Horizon Europe is supple-
mented by other EU programmes which aim to strengthen economic and
social cohesion. Programmes such as the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund, the Cohesion fund and the European Social fund may help
address regional imbalances and promote faster dissemination and uptake
of R&I results across regions. Such synergies are not examined in the
impact assessment.
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Werner Roeger, Janos Varga, and Jan in’t Veld
6.1 Introduction
The QUEST III model is a global DSGE model from the Directorate-
General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European
Commission employed for the quantitative analysis of various types of
policies. More specifically the model has been used by DG ECFIN to
analyse reforms such as the increase of the employment of low-skilled
workers, the change in the skill composition of the labour force, fiscal
measures for increasing investment in knowledge, the removal of entry
barriers and administrative burdens in certain markets, and the effects
of financial market imperfections.1 QUEST III is a useful and robust
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tool to (i) explicitly model the reforms in terms of concrete and quan-
tifiable policy measures, such as taxes, benefits, subsidies and education
expenditures, administrative costs faced by firms (for both entrants and
incumbents) and regulatory indices; (ii) assess the impact of each policy
measure on a comprehensive set of macroeconomic indicators such as
GDP growth, employment, the composition of investment and skill
premia in the short, medium and long run; and (iii) provide insights into
the transmission mechanisms of various structural and fiscal measures.
6.2 The model
The version of QUEST III presented in this book captures both invest-
ment in tangibles and intangibles (R&D), while also disaggregating
employment into various skill categories.2 The framework adopted is the
Jones (1995, 2005) extension of the Romer (1990) model, augmented
with mark-ups for the final goods sector and entry costs for the
intermediate sector. The equations in the model are explicitly derived
from intertemporal optimisation under technological, institutional and
budgetary constraints, while the model incorporates nominal, real and
financial frictions in order to fit the data. In the model, there are
two types of households, namely liquidity and non-liquidity constrained,
a feature which has become standard in Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium modelling. Three types of labour skills, low, medium and
high, are considered that allow to conduct more detailed human capital
reforms. The model also includes a fiscal and monetary authority with the
appropriate decision rules. Importantly, the model is multi-country, with
individual country blocks interlinked via international trade and knowl-
edge spillovers.3 While Jones (1995, 2005) were theoretical, illustrative
models, QUEST III is brought to the data and calibrated on actual data
of the countries of interest.
The model economy is populated by households, final and interme-
diate goods producing firms, a research industry, a monetary and a
fiscal authority. In the final goods sector firms produce differentiated
2 This section draws heavily from the description contained in Roeger et al. (2014).
3 The model can be used in a one-country, open-economy version and it can also be
extended to more regions (e.g. Euro Area and non-Euro Area blocks of the EU, US,
Asia, major oil-exporters). Individual European Union member states can also be modelled
separately in interaction with the rest of the EU.
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goods which are imperfect substitutes for goods produced abroad. Final
good producers use a composite of intermediate goods and three types
of labour - low-, medium-, and high-skilled. Non-liquidity constrained
households buy the patents of designs produced by the R&D sector and
license them to the intermediate goods producing firms. The intermediate
sector is composed of monopolistically competitive firms which produce
intermediate products from rented capital input using the designs licensed
from the household sector. The production of new designs takes place
in research labs, employing high-skilled labour and making use of the
commonly available domestic and foreign stock of knowledge. Techno-
logical change is modelled as increasing product variety in the tradition
of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
6.2.1 Households
The household sector consists of a continuum of households h ∈ [0, 1]. A
share (1−ε) of these households are not liquidity constrained and indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1 − ε]. They have access to financial markets where they can
buy and sell domestic and foreign assets (government bonds), accumulate
physical capital which they rent out to the intermediate sector, and they
also buy the patents of designs produced by the R&D sector and license
them to the intermediate goods producing firms.4 The remaining share ε
of households is liquidity constrained and indexed by k ∈ [1 − ε, 1]. These
households cannot trade in financial and physical assets and consume their
disposable income each period. The members of both types of house-
holds offer low-, medium- and high-skilled labour services indexed by
s ∈ {L , M, H}. For each skill group, we assume that both types of
households supply differentiated labour services to unions which act as
wage setters in monopolistically competitive labour markets. The unions
pool wage income and distribute it in equal proportions among their
members. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is introduced by assuming that
households face adjustment costs for changing wages.
4 It is important to note that in a semi-endogenous model, the number of intermediate
good varieties (At ) can be interpreted in multiple ways. It corresponds to the total number
of designs (or patents) invented by the R&D sector but at the same time, it can be
interpreted as the stock of ideas or as the stock of knowledge (or intangible) capital
in the economy. Also, it can be considered as an endogenous total factor productivity
element.
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Non-liquidity constrained households
Non-liquidity constrained households maximise an intertemporal
utility function in consumption and leisure subject to a budget constraint.
These households make decisions about consumption Ci,t , labour supply
Li,t , purchases of investment good Ji,t and government bonds Bi,t , the
renting of physical capital stock Ki,t , the purchases of new patents from
the R&D sector JA,i,t , and the licensing of existing patents Ai,t , and
receives wage income Ws,t , unemployment benefits bWs,t , transfer income
from the government T Ri,t , and interest income, it , iK ,t and i A,t .5 Hence,
non-liquidity constrained households face the following Lagrangian
max{
Ci,t , Li,s,t , Bi,t , Ji,t ,







U (Ci,t ) +
∑
s∈{L ,M,H}









(1 + tC,t )PC,tCi,t + Bi,t
+ Pi,t
(
Ji,t + J (Ji,t )
)
PA,t JA,i,t





(1 − tw,s,t )Ws,t Li,s,t
+ bWs,t (1 − N PARTi,s,t − Li,s,t )
)
− (1 − tK )
(
iK ,t−1 − rpK
)
PI,t−1Ki,t−1
− tK δK PI,t−1Ki,t−1 − τK PI,t Ji,t
− (1 − tK )
(
i A,t−1 − rpA
)
PA,t−1Ai,t−1
− tK δK PA,t−1Ki,t−1 − τK PA,t JA,i,t
− T Ri,t −
∫ N
0
PR f in, j,i,td j
5 Households only make a decision about the level of employment but there is no
distinction on the part of households between unemployment and non-participation. It
is assumed that the government makes a decision on how to classify the non-working
part of the population into unemployed and non-participants. The non-participation rate
(NPART) must therefore be seen as a policy variable characterising the generosity of the
benefit system.






















− (1 − δA)Ai,t−1
)
(6.1)
where s is the index for the corresponding low- (L), medium- (M ) and
high-skilled (H ) labour type respectively (s ∈ {L , M, H}). The budget
constraints are written in real terms with prices for consumption, invest-
ment and patents (PC,t , PI,t , PA,t ) and wages (Ws,t ) divided by the
GDP deflator (Pt ). All firms of the economy are owned by non-liquidity
constrained households who share the total profit of the final and inter-
mediate sector firms,
∫ N
0 PR f in, j,i,td j and
∫ At
0 PRint,m,i,tdm, where N
and At denote the number of firms in the final and intermediate sector,
respectively. As shown by the budget constraints, all households pay wage
income taxes (tw,s,t ), consumption taxes (tC,t ) and tK capital income taxes
less tax credits (τK and τA) and depreciation allowances (tK δK and tK δA)
after their earnings on physical capital and patents. When investing into
tangible and intangible capital, households demand risk premia rpK and
rpA in order to cover the risk inherent to the return related to these assets.
The utility function is additively separable in consumption Ci,t and
leisure 1 − Li,s,t . Log-utility for consumption as well as the presence of
habit persistence is assumed.
U (Ci,t ) = (1 − habc) log(Ci,t − habcCi,t−1). (6.2)
CES preferences with common labour supply elasticity are assumed for
leisure, but a skill-specific weight ωs on leisure. This is necessary in order
to capture differences in employment levels across skill groups. Thus
preferences for leisure are given by
V (1 − Li,s,t ) = ω
1 − κ (1 − Li,s,t )
1−κ , with κ > 0 (6.3)
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For the sake of brevity, the following derivations of the optimality equa-
tions focus only on the ones related to the R&D investments made by
non-liquidity constrained households. These households buy new patents
of designs produced by the R&D sector IA,t and rent their total stock of
designs At at rental rate i A,t to intermediate goods producers in period t.
Households pay income tax at a rate tK on the period return of intangi-
bles and receive tax subsidies at rate τA.6 Hence, the first-order conditions
with respect to R&D investments are given by:
∂V0
∂Ai,t
: −λi,tψi,t + Et
(











(1 − τA) + ψi,t = 0 (6.5)
Neglecting second-order terms, it can be shown that the rental rate of
intangible capital is:
i A,t ≈ Et (1 − τA)
(
it − πA,t+1 + δA(1 + πA,t+1)
) − tK δA
1 − tK + rpA (6.6)
where 1 + πA,t+1 = PA,t+1PA,t .
Hence, households require a rate of return on intangible capital which
is equal to the nominal interest rate minus the rate of change of the value
of intangible assets and also covers the cost of economic depreciation plus
a risk premium. Governments can affect investment decisions in intangible
capital by giving tax incentives in the form of tax credits and depreciation
allowances or by lowering the tax on the return from patents.
Liquidity constrained households
Liquidity constrained households do not optimise but simply consume
their current income at each date. Real consumption of household k is
6 For a more detailed description of all the optimality conditions, the reader is again
referred to Roeger et al. (2014).
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thus determined by the net wage income plus net transfers







+ bWs,t (1 − N PARTk,s,t − Lk,s,t )
)
+ T Rk,t .
(6.7)
Wage setting
Within each skill group, a variety of labour services are supplied which
are imperfect substitutes to each other. Thus trade unions can charge
a wage mark-up 1
ηs,t
over the reservation wage.7 The reservation wage
is equal to the marginal utility of leisure divided by the corresponding
marginal utility of consumption. The relevant net real wage to which the
mark-up adjusted reservation wage is equated is the gross wage adjusted
for labour taxes, consumption taxes and unemployment benefits, which





= Ws,t (1 − tw,s,t − b)
PC,t (1 + tC,t ) for h ∈ {i, k} and s ∈ {L , M, H}.
(6.8)
Aggregation
The aggregate of any household-specific variable Xh,t in per capita




Xh,t dh = (1 − ε)Xi,t + εXk,t , (6.9)
Hence, aggregate consumption and employment is given by
Ct = (1 − ε)Ci,t + εCk,t and Lt = (1 − ε)Li,t + εLk,t . (6.10)
7 The mark-up depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between different
types of labour σs and fluctuations in the mark-up arise because of wage adjustment
costs and the fact that a fraction (1 − s f w) of workers indexes the growth rate of wages




β(s f wπwW,t+1 − (1 −
s f w)πW,t−1) − πW,t
)
.
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6.2.2 Firms
Final output producers
Since each firm j produces a variety of the domestic good which is an
imperfect substitute for the varieties produced by other firms, it acts as a
monopolistic competitor facing a demand function with a price elasticity
given by σd .8 Final output Yt is produced using At varieties of interme-
diate inputs xm,t with an elasticity of substitution 11−θ > 1. The final good
sector uses labour aggregate LY,t and intermediate goods with Cobb-











































where LL ,t , LM,t and LHY,t denote the employment of low, medium
and high-skilled in final goods production, respectively. Parameter z is
the corresponding share parameter of every skill group, χz is the corre-
sponding efficiency unit and μ is the elasticity of substitution between
different labour types. Note that high-skilled labour can be allocated to
both the final goods and the R&D sector, therefore the total number
of high-skilled workers is equal to the high-skilled employed in the final
goods and the R&D sector. The employment aggregates Lst combine











8 From this point onwards, notation is slightly simplified by removing the j subscript,
as in equilibrium production is symmetrical across all firms.
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The parameter σs > 1 determines the degree of substitutability among
different types of labour.9
The production function above is based on the product variety frame-
work proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), widely applied in the
literature of international trade and R&D diffusion.10 The underlying
structure of R&D is explicitly modelled through the semi-endogenous
framework of Jones (1995, 2005).11
The objective of the firm is to maximise profits
PRt = PtYt −
(







where px is the price of intermediate inputs, Ws,t is a wage index corre-
sponding to the CES aggregate Ls,t and Pt is the price of domestic final
goods.
Intermediate good producers
The intermediate sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms
which enter the market by licensing a design from domestic households
and by making an initial payment FCA to overcome administrative entry
barriers. Capital inputs are also rented from the household sector for a
rental rate of iK ,t . Firms which have acquired a design can transform each
unit of capital into a single unit of an intermediate input. In a symmetric
equilibrium, intermediate producers face the following inverse demand
function from final good producers









where η = 1 − 1
σd
. (6.15)
9 The productivity-enhancing effects of public infrastructure investment are accounted
in the production function where the public capital stock (KG,t ) and its elasticity (αG )
enters externally.
10 See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion et al. (1998).
11 Butler and Pakko (1998) also applied Jones (1995)’s semi-endogenous growth frame-
work to examine the effect of endogenous technological change on the properties of a
real business cycle model without skill disaggregation.
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pxm,t xm,t − iK ,t PC,t km,t − i A PA,t − FCA
)
(6.16)
subject to a linear technology which allows to transform one unit of
capital km into one unit of an intermediate good xm,t = km,t . As a standard
result of these types of models, intermediate good producers set prices as
a mark-up over marginal cost, i.e. pxm,t = iK ,tθ .
The no-arbitrage condition requires that entry into the intermediate
goods producing sector takes place until the present discounted value of
profits is equated to the fixed entry costs plus the net value of patents, or
PRint,m,t = i A,t PA,t +
(
i A,t + πA,t+1
)
FCA, ∀m. (6.17)
For an intermediate producer, entry costs consist of the licensing fee
i A,t PA,t for the design or patent which is a prerequisite of production
of innovative intermediate goods and a fixed entry cost FCA.
R & D sector
Innovation corresponds to the discovery of a new variety of producer
durables that provides an alternative way of producing the final good.
The R&D sector hires high-skilled labour LA and generates new designs
according to the following knowledge production function:
At = νA∗t−1Aφt−1LλA,t . (6.18)
International R&D spillovers are present, following Bottazzi and Peri
(2007). Parameters  and φ measure the foreign and domestic spillover
effects from the aggregate international and domestic stock of knowl-
edge, A∗t and At , respectively. Negative value for these parameters can be
interpreted as the fishing out effect, implying negative research spillovers,
while positive values refer to the standing on the shoulders of giants effect,
implying positive research spillovers. Note that φ = 1 would yield the
strong scale effect feature of fully endogenous growth models with respect
to the domestic level of knowledge. Parameter ν can be interpreted as
total factor efficiency of R&D production, while λ measures the elasticity
of R&D production to the number of researchers LA. The international
stock of knowledge grows exogenously at rate gA∗ . It is assumed that
the R&D sector is operated by a research institute which employs high-
skilled labour at their market wage rate, WH,t . It is also assumed that the
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research institute faces an adjustment cost γA for hiring new employees



















= WH,t + γA
(
WH,tL A,t − dtWH,t+1L A,t+1
)
6.2.3 Policy
On the expenditure side, it is assumed that consumptionGt , investment
IGt and transfers T Rt from the government are proportional to GDP,




bWs,t (1 − N PARTs,t − Ls,t ),
where b is the replacement rate.
The government provides subsidies SU Bt on physical capital and R&D
investments to firms in the form of tax credit and depreciation allowances
SU Bt = tK
(
δK PI,t−1Ki,t−1 + δAPA,t−1Ai,t−1
)
+ τK PI,t Ji,t + τAPA,t JA,i,t .
Government revenues RGt are made up of taxes on consumption as well
as capital and labour income. Government debt Bt evolves according to
Bt = (1 + it )Bt−1 + Gt + IGt + T Rt + BENt + SU Bt − RGt .
12 Note that, in equilibrium, high-skilled workers are paid the same wages across sectors:
WH,t = WHY,t .
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where τB captures the sensitivity of the labour tax with respect to devi-
ations from the government debt target, bT , and τDEF controls the
response of the tax to changes in the debt-to-output ratio.
Monetary policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows
for a degree of smoothness of the interest rate response to the inflation
and output gap,
it = γilagit−1 +
(
1 − γilag)(rEQ + πT AR + γin f (πC,t − πT AR) + γygap ŷt
)
(6.20)
The central bank has a constant inflation target πT AR and adjusts interest
rates whenever actual consumer price inflation πC,t deviates from the
target. It also responds to the output gap ŷt via the corresponding γin f
and γygap coefficients.13 There is also some inertia in the nominal interest
rate determined by γilag, both with respect to its past and the equilibrium
real interest rate (rEQ).14
6.2.4 Trade
In order to facilitate aggregation, it is assumed that households, the
government and the final goods sector have identical preferences across
goods used for private consumption, investment and public expenditure.
Let Zt =∈ {Ct , It ,Gt , IGt } be the demand of households, investors or
the government as defined in the previous section, then their preferences
13 The output gap is defined as deviation of capital and labour utilisation from their
long-run trends.
14 In QUEST’s III multi-country setting, members of the euro area do not conduct
independent monetary policy, and it is assumed that the European Central Bank sets the
nominal interest rate by taking into account euro area wide aggregate inflation and output
gap changes.
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where ρ is the share parameter and σim is the elasticity of substitution
between domestic (Zd,t ) and foreign produced goods (Zm,t ).
6.2.5 Calibration
Behavioural and technological parameters are calibrated so that the model
can replicate important empirical ratios such as labour productivity,
investment, consumption to GDP ratios, the wage share, the employment
rate and the R&D share, given a set of structural indicators describing
market frictions in goods and labour markets, tax wedges and skill endow-
ments. The specific approaches to calibration for each of the main parts
of the model are:
• Goods market: the calibration of mark-ups is based on the method
suggested by Roeger (1995). Concerning entry barriers, estimates
provided by the Doing Business Database are used. In particular,
entry costs are directly calibrated following the methodology devel-
oped by Djankov et al. (2002), who estimate the costs that new firms
need to incur before starting to operate.15
• Knowledge production technology: the two main sources of
empirical evidence on elasticities are Bottazzi and Peri (2007) and
Pessoa (2005). In particular, estimates from the former are used
to calibrate the knowledge elasticity parameters with respect to
domestic and foreign knowledge capital. The authors estimate the
ratios of λ/(1 − φ) and ω/(1 − φ) where λ in the QUEST model
corresponds to the wage cost share in total R&D spending.16 Pessoa
(2005) is used for obtaining the growth rate of ideas, with the
15 The authors carry out a very thorough data work to construct a measure of the
regulation of entry (expressed in GDP per capita terms) across a very large number of
countries based on costed measures of the total number of procedures and the time it
takes to complete them as well as the actual administrative costs incurred (e.g., registration
fees). For a detailed discussion, please see Djankov et al. (2002).
16 Country-specific elasticities are, however, not available.
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assumption of a 5% obsolescence rate. The Bottazzi and Peri (2007)
estimate, together with the long-run growth rate of intangible capital
and λ, pin down the knowledge elasticity parameters. Specifically, λ
is obtained from available data on the wage share of R&D labour
in total R&D spending whereas ν is directly derived from the
knowledge production function after estimating the other elasticities,
normalising the initial stock of domestic and international knowl-
edge, calibrating the growth rate of ideas and initialising the share of
research labour. Likewise, the calibration of ϕ relies on both econo-
metric estimations carried out in the literature and the theoretical
restrictions/equations of the model in equilibrium. Hence, its final
value will partly depend on the observed long-run growth rate of
population and patents as well as on the relationship between other
related parameters estimated in the literature.17
• Labour market and the skill composition of the labour force:
Estimations in Ratto et al. (2009) are used to calibrate the adjust-
ment parameters of the labour market. The labour force is disaggre-
gated into three skill-groups: low-, medium- and high-skilled labour.
High-skilled workers are defined as that segment of labour force
that can potentially be employed in the R&D sector, namely engi-
neers and natural scientists. The definition of low-skilled corresponds
to the standard classification of ISCED 0-2 education levels and
the rest of the labour force is considered as medium-skilled. Data
on skill-specific population shares, participation rates and wages are
obtained from the Labour Force Survey, SES, and the Science and
Technology databases of EUROSTAT. The elasticity of substitution
between different labour types μ is one of the major parameters
addressed in the labour economics literature. Precise values are taken
from Acemoglu and Autor (2011), who updated the seminal refer-
ence for this elasticity parameter by Katz and Murphy (1992). In the
baseline calibration, low-skilled wages are obtained from the annual
earnings of employees with low educational attainment (ISCED
0-2) irrespective of their occupation. High-skilled wages are approxi-
mated by the annual earnings of scientists and engineers with tertiary
17 For a more detailed explanation of the parameter calibration and estimation proce-
dure, see D’Auria et al. (2009). It is to be noted that at the time of writing, the elasticities
of the knowledge production function are being revisited with updated datasets.
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educational attainment employed as professionals or associate profes-
sionals in physical, mathematical, engineering, life science or health
occupations (ISCO-08 occupations 21, 22, 31, 32). Earnings data
of employees with tertiary educational attainment not working as
scientists and engineers and employees with medium educational
attainment (ISCED 3-4) irrespective of their occupation are taken
to calculate wages for medium-skilled workers in the model.
• Fiscal, monetary and trade variables: EUROSTAT data are used
for the breakdown of government spending into consumption,
investment and transfers, whereas effective tax rates on labour, capital
and consumption are used to determine government revenues. Esti-
mates of R&D tax credits are taken from Warda (2009) and OECD
(2014). Monetary policy parameters are adopted from Ratto et al.
(2009), while bilateral trade data is obtained from the EURO-
STAT/COMEXT database.
6.3 An Example: Simulating the Ex-ante
Macroeconomic Impact of Horizon Europe
QUEST III has been recently used by the European Commission to
assist policy makers with an ex-ante impact assessment of Horizon Europe
Framework Programme 2021–2027.18 This represents the continuation
of the current Framework Programme Horizon 2020 and consists of
a large set of interventions encompassing the allocation of R&D and
innovation investments with the aim of harnessing the EU scientific and
technological community increasing competitiveness, productivity and
economic welfare.
The simulations of Horizon Europe are carried out assuming a contin-
uation of Horizon 2020 budget with the same size, allocation and
in constant prices but without UK contributions.19 The cross-country
spillovers, represented by international trade and knowledge spillovers, are
based on trade statistics and elasticities taken from the relevant literature.
Moreover, it has been assumed that both EU and nationally funded R&I
have the same leverage and performance effects. In other words, EU-level
18 Horizon Europe 2021–2027 is also known as Framework Programme FP9.
19 For more details on Horizon Europe and the scenarios simulated the reader can
refer to Chapter 5.
124 W. ROEGER ET AL.
Fig. 6.1 GDP - VAT financed
coordination and optimisation of the funding across Member States is not
taken into account in the simulation results, which may underestimate the
impact of Horizon Europe.20
Based on different financing structures, two scenarios are simulated.
In the first scenario, it is assumed that the financing of Horizon Europe
relies on additionally raised Value Added Tax (VAT) revenues in the
Member States (see Fig. 6.1). Instead, the second scenario assumes that
the interventions are financed at the expense of lowering national public
investment (see Fig. 6.2). Comparing the two figures, the results high-
light the importance of the underlying financing assumptions. As VATs
are some of the least distortive taxes, financing productivity enhancing
R&D investments from these resources is unambiguously beneficial at the
EU level in the medium and long run. GDP is up by 0.25% relative to
the no-FP9 baseline towards the end of the Programme and gradually
decreasing afterwards. Note that there is a small short-run output loss
due to crowding-out effects in the beginning of the intervention period.
This is because R&D subsidies stimulate innovation by helping R&D
intensive companies to attract more high-skilled labour from traditional
production into research with higher wages. In the second scenario, the
expected GDP effects are less beneficial at the EU level. Similar to R&D
investments, public investment is also productivity enhancing, therefore,
20 This assumption is somewhat different to what has been assumed in similar impact
assessment performed by RHOMOLO and NEMESIS models that are discussed in the
other two chapters.
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Fig. 6.2 GDP - Financed through public investment cuts
this type of financing is more costly for the Member States. As expected,
changing from VAT financing to public investment cuts (e.g. roads, build-
ings), the Members States loose the potential productivity effects of these
investments and the GDP results are much lower both in the short and
long run. It also takes longer to compensate the short-run output loss;
GDP is only about 0.05% higher relative to the no-FP9 scenario by the
end of the Programming period. In both scenarios, the GDP gains grad-
ually decrease after the Programming period due to the depreciation of
tangible and intangible capital. Note that in the QUEST simulations
EU and nationally funded R&I have the same leverage and performance
effects.
The simulation obtained with QUEST III has been compared to the
ones obtained with other two models widely used by the European
Commission, RHOMOLO and NEMESIS. Nevertheless, as R&D invest-
ment decisions require a forward-looking dynamic approach, Di Comite
and D’Artis (2015) consider the QUEST-R&D model to be the most
suitable model for assessing the impact of R&D and innovation poli-
cies over time compared to the other macroeconomic models. However,
as a main caveat, it does not distinguish between research undertaken
by private or public R&I entities, and being an aggregate macroeco-
nomic model, QUEST also misses the extensive regional details present
in RHOMOLO.
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7.1 Introduction
The NEMESIS model was first used to analyse the impact of the 3%
R&D objective envisaged in the Lisbon Strategy (Brécard et al., 2004,
2006). This first study was followed by the assessment of the European
Commission’s National Action Plans related to the Barcelona Objective
(Chevallier et al., 2006).
After several other contributions revolving around EU innovation
policy strategies, the NEMESIS model has been mainly used for ex-ante
impact assessments of the European Research and Innovation Framework
Programmes (FPs). In 2005, the NEMESIS model was implemented
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for the ex-ante assessment of the 7th FP (Delanghe & Muldur, (2007;
European Commission, 2005) and thereafter for the Horizon 2020
Programme (European Commission, 2012). From 2010 to 2013, the
NEMESIS model supported the annual ex-ante assessment of the 7th
FP calls for proposals (Fougeyrollas et al., 2010, 2011; Zagamé, 2010;
Zagamé et al., 2012).
More recently, NEMESIS has been significantly improved by enlarging
the innovation mechanisms captured besides R&D investments. In
particular, investments in Information and Communication Technolo-
gies (ICT) and in intangible assets other than R&D (mainly software
and training) have been incorporated. This enhances the assessment of
R&I policies, by including some of the most up-to-date theoretical as
well as empirical findings in the field (Le Mouël et al., 2016). This new
version of NEMESIS has been used for the ex-post assessment of the 7th
FP and the interim assessment of the Horizon 2020 programme (Euro-
pean Commission, 2017b; PPMI, 2017). It has also been used to simulate
the socioeconomic and environmental impact assessment of the future
2021–2027 EU R&I Programme, Horizon Europe (Boitier et al., 2018).
The chapter is divided in two parts. The first provides a description
of the NEMESIS model with a strong focus on its innovation mecha-
nisms. The second part provides an example of the implementation of
the model, by summarising the results of the recent work carried out
with the model in the context of the impact assessment of the Horizon
Europe programme (European Commission, 2018).
7.2 The Model
The NEMESIS model differs from the rest of the models presented in
this book, in which behavioral equations are directly derived from opti-
mality condition. Being a macro-econometric model, in NEMESIS the
short to medium term dynamics are influenced by several factors that keep
the economic agents out of the optimal paths. These include adjustment
costs, sticky prices, and adaptive expectations, governed by error correc-
tion mechanisms for ensuring convergence to the long term equilibrium.
Furthermore, the capital market is not explicitly modeled in NEMESIS,
which precludes the attainment of a general equilibrium, even in the long
term. The notion of equilibrium in this type of models refers instead to a
stable state where some of the markets modelled can permanently be out
of equilibrium.
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Regarding innovation, the model features the following important
properties to analyse innovation policy:
• Heterogeneity of economic sectors in many dimensions, including:
investments in innovative assets, energy consumption, environmental
externalities, capital-labour ratios, qualification requirements.
• Sectoral dynamics and related interdependencies, including knowl-
edge spillovers that allow knowledge to be diffused across sectors
and countries.
• Long-term economic growth properties as in the seminal theoretical
formulation of the fully endogenous approach initiated by Aghion
and Howitt (1998). Under this formulation, the long-term rate of
economic growth is an increasing function of R&D intensity, and
can thus be influenced by policy.
• Distinction between process and product innovation, with dissimilar
impacts on the economy.
• Presence of intangible assets other than R&D (training and software)
and ICT assets, which allow a more realistic representation of the
innovation mechanisms, particularly in the services sectors.
In what follows, we first present the general characteristics of the
model, and then its innovation and endogenous growth properties. We
finish by presenting an application of the model to the ex-ante socio-
economic impact assessment of the future EU R&I programme: Horizon
Europe.
7.2.1 General Overview of NEMESIS
The NEMESIS model is a detailed sectoral macro-econometric model
estimated for every country of the EU.1 It distinguishes between 30
sectors operating within five-level nested-CES functions. The model
covers both the supply and demand sides of the economy, and incorpo-
rates endogenous technical change. The conversion matrices of the model
for final consumption, investment goods, intermediate consumption,
1 The model’s development has been financed by different European Framework
Programmes and has been coordinated by the ERASME team that became SEURECO.
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energy/environment and technological transfers, capture the interdepen-
dencies between production sectors (with one representative firm per
sector) and between producers and other agents in the economy, namely
households, the government and foreign countries. Every country model
includes an economic core that can be simulated in interaction with a
detailed energy/environment module. Simulation of policy effects can be
carried out for an individual country or for all countries simultaneously.
7.2.1.1 Model’s Structure
The NEMESIS model uses several datasets that are compiled, harmonized
and complemented to feed the model in a manner that fits its structure.2
Two types of equations are at play in NEMESIS: (i) the accounting
equations, reflecting the system of national accounts, and (ii), the
behavioral equations, which capture, based on both theoretical and
empirical grounds, how economic agents operate. The latter include long-
term structural equations featuring an error correction mechanism that
captures convergence towards the variables’ long term values. The key
elasticity parameters of behavioral equations are either estimated using
panel data techniques, or calibrated based on consensus values arising
from the relevant literature.
On the supply side, each sector is modeled with a representative firm
that makes decisions regarding output and the use of factors, given expec-
tations on demand and input prices. Firms produce output according
to five-level nested-CES production functions, employing the following
inputs: low-skilled labour, high-skilled labour, capital, energy and inter-
mediate consumption. In addition, firms include innovation in their
invesment decisions to improve their productivity and/or their prod-
ucts, implying that technical progress is endogenously determined in the
model. Innovation is the result of investments in three types of assets:
R&D, ICT and Other Intangibles (including software and training). The
specification of the innovation process in the model allows to account for
a large range of innovative activities, including ICT, which are consid-
ered a general purpose technology (GPT). Furthermore, while R&D
2 The data sources include National Accounts (Eurostat, 2018a), Labour Force Surveys
(Eurostat, 2018c), Annual Sectors Accounts (Eurostat, 2018b), WIOD (Timmer et al.,
2015), statistics on research and development (Eurostat, 2018d) and OECD (2017) statis-
tics on intangible investments and assets (Corrado et al., 2014) and statistics on taxation
(European Comission, 2017).
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investments are central in industrial sectors, the other types of inno-
vation assets capture more appropriately the process of innovation in
the service sectors. Finally, interdependencies between sectors and coun-
tries are captured by a collection of matrices describing the exchanges of
intermediary goods and capital goods as well as the flows of knowledge
spillovers.
Firms are monopolistically competitive, so that in the long-term mark-
ups are constant, albeit different between sectors. Wages are determined
via an augmented Phillips curve in which the growth rate of wages is a
function of the unemployment rate, labour productivity and consumption
prices. Since the model features two types of labour (low-skilled and high-
skilled), there exist two such equations for wage determination.
On the demand side, the representative household determines its
aggregate consumption as a function of its disposable income arising from
wages, capital income and social transfers. Child and old-age dependency
rates are also included to capture changes in consumption patterns caused
by changes in the structure of the population. The unemployment rate is
used, in the short term, as a proxy for the perceived degree of uncertainty
in the economy. Total aggregate household consumption is split into 27
different consumption sub-functions capturing relative prices, substitu-
tion elasticities and the specific nature of the products (e.g., durable/non
durable).
The are two type of trade flows in NEMESIS: intra-EU and trade with
the rest of the world. Exports are driven by both an income effect, which
captures demand arising from other regions, and a price effect, which
captures relative competitiveness with respect to other EU-countries and
the rest of the world. Exports are also influenced by structural competi-
tiveness due to quality-adjusted prices, on which all the demand functions
are based. For imports, the drivers are similar: the income effect is
captured by internal demand, and the price effect by the ratio between
the import price and the price of domestic producers.
7.2.1.2 Model’s Main Mechanisms
The general functioning of the model is shown in Figure 7.1.
As most macro-econometric models, which are based on national
accounting, NEMESIS is by construction governed by aggregate demand
in the short to medium term. Feedback effects, however, exist between
demand and supply conditions that finally determine prices and quality of
products. As illustrated in the next section later, the link between R&D
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Fig. 7.1 NEMESIS basic structure
investments and economic growth is based in the model on the new
endogenous growth theory, where it is possible to increase productivity
growth by increasing R&D intensity. The implication of this is that the
long term economic growth rate can be modified, bringing the model
away from its core Keynesian features and closer to the Schumpeterian
paradigm.
The starting point of the economic dynamics in NEMESIS arises from
a shock to some of the exogenous variables: demographic, world demand,
exchange and interest rates, world commodity prices (including fossil fuels
prices) and internal policy rules. The dynamics are recursive and based
on three main elements: (i) state variables (stocks), (ii) adaptive expecta-
tions and adjustment lags, and (iii) adjustment processes to each variable’s
optimal level.
There are two types of stock variables, namely physical capital and
knowledge. Regarding the former, there is a maturation lag of one year
to transform investments into operational capital. On the other hand,
knowledge is generated through investment flows in R&D, ICT and other
intangibles (OI), with maturation lags of two years for public R&D and
one year for private R&D, ICT and OI. The transformation of knowledge
into innovation is also progressive and affected by sector-specific lags.
All these delays are important for the assessment of innovation support
policies, which take about 15 years for their full impact to take place.
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The model’s dynamic can also be analyzed from the perspective of the
different levels of granularity embedded in the model. For example, in
the case of an increase in R&D expenditure, the impact mechanisms in
the model can be traced as follows:
• At sectoral level, an increase competitiveness, output and employ-
ment.
• At inter-sectoral level, an increase in transaction flows and knowledge
spillovers.
• At the aggregate level, the general equilibrium impact on variables
such as wages, consumption and savings of the previous effects, are
also captured.
Hence, there are three main layers of economic indicators: (i) macro-
economic, such as GDP and its components (final consumption, gross
fixed capital formation, exports, imports, etc.), unemployment rates, etc.;
(ii) sectoral, such as output, value added and employment per sector, and
(iii) those related to national agent accounts: government, non financial
corporations, financial corporations, households, and the external sector.
Beyond economic indicators, the NEMESIS energy-environment module
also captures results on energy supply and demand by fuel type and
technology, and on CO2 emissions.
7.2.2 Supply Block and Innovation Mechanisms
Next, to provide a clear description of the mechanisms at play in the
model when simulating innovation policy shocks, we examine the specific
sectoral production functions, followed by a detailed discussion of the
innovation flows, which are one of the inputs into these production
functions.
7.2.2.1 The Nested CES Production Function Framework
Figure 7.2 illustrates the nested nature of the production functions used.
In each sector, output (in yellow) results from the combination of four
variable inputs (in green) and two quasi-fixed inputs (in red). The vari-
able inputs are materials (M ), energy (E), lowly qualified labour (LL)
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Fig. 7.2 The nested CES production function
and highly qualified Labour (LH ) (ISCED 5 and 6).3 Quasi-fixed inputs
are physical capital stock (K ) and innovation services (A). The other
inputs (in white) are the compound inputs - or ’intermediate outputs’-
corresponding to the different levels of the nested CES function.
In the current version of the nested production function, innovation
services enter at the first level, meaning that they proportionally increase
marginal productivity of ordinary production factors, represented by the
variable X that groups together the physical capital stock, the two cate-
gories of labour, and energy and materials. The impact of innovation on
the production function is consequently Hick’s neutral as it does not
affect the balance between production factors.
This first level of the nested production function has the following
analytical expression:





−ρY + δ1+ρYX X−ρY
]− 1
ρY (7.1)
3 Low and high labour qualifications correspond to ISCED levels 1-4 and 5-6,
respectively.
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where C is a scale parameter, δA is the share parameter for A, representing
the share of innovation services in total output, δX is likewise the share
parameter for X (by definition δX = 1 − δA), and ρy is the parameter
that determines the partial elasticity of substitution between innovation
services and X , equal to σY = 11+ρY .
The functional forms of the other levels of the nested production
functions are symmetric, and thus the the definition of factor shares are
analogous.
7.2.2.2 Innovation Mechanisms
In the new version of the NEMESIS model, the flow of innovations in
the different sectors and countries, do not result any more only from
public and private R&D investments, but also from investments in ICT
and in two categories of intangible other than R&D, namely training
and software.4 As in previous vintages (Brécard et al., 2006), the model
distinguishes between product and process innovations.
The theoretical approach builds on the semi-endogenous and fully
endogenous growth theory (Ha & Howitt, 2007). This approach has
been adapted to be bridged with the concept of ICT as general purpose
technology, as proposed by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). In this
new framework, there are sources of externalities other than investments
in R&D. In particular, externalities can also arise from the interactions
between: (1) producers and users of ICT, (2) ICT users’ co-inventions,
and (3) ICT users’ investments in complementary intangible assets.
In practice, these modifications affect the model in two main ways:
(1) the modification of the innovation functions in the different sectors
(now three dimensional), and (2) the modeling of knowledge externali-
ties relative to different innovation assets. The calibration was based on
existing empirical studies on the impacts of R&D, ICT and other intan-
gibles (OI) investments on productivity and employment, at the macro,
sectoral and micro levels (see Le Mouël et al., (2016). This new version of
the model permits a more precise representation of innovation dynamics
in the service sectors. It thus enlarges considerably the range of R&I
policies whose macroeconomic impacts can be assessed with the model.
4 This new version was first used in 2017 to support the ex-post assessment of FP7
and the interim evaluation of the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (see (European
Commission, 2017b; PPMI, 2017).
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Three dimensional innovation functions
The flow of innovations in sector i in country c, Acit , is a CES combi-
nation of three sub-innovations, denoted as innovation components,
which are, in turn, investments in R&D, (ARcit ), investments in ICT,
(ATcit ), and investments in OI, (AIcit ). The algebraic expression for the
production function of innovation flows is:










where SCAci is a scale parameter, δARci , δATci and δAIci are distribu-
tion parameters and ρAci determines the elasticity of substitution between
ARcit , ATcit and AIcit , σAci = 11+ρAci .
In turn, production of the three innovation components is governed
by the following expression:
Ajcit = SCAjci · K NOW j
λ jci · jci tV Acit
ci t , (7.3)
where j = R, T, I , and SCAjci are scale parameters.
They are positive functions of a sector-country specific knowledge
stock, K NOW jcit , and of a specific knowledge absorption capability,
λ j · jci tYci t .5 This knowledge absorption capability is, with λ j > 0, a linear
positive function of the investment intensities in R&D, ICT or OI.
Knowledge stocks: The role of knowledge spillovers
Knowledge stocks, K NOW jcit , are modeled as weighted sums of the
stocks of assets (R&D, ICT, OI) across all sectors and countries.6
For all three innovation components, knowledge in sector i of country
c, K NOW Rcit , is defined as the sum of the innovation component
capital stocks SRp,s,t− from all country-sector pairs (p, s), weighted by
a coefficient of diffusion p,s→c,i . This coefficient captures the relative
5 This functional specification represents a departure from the related literature, where
the elasticity of the flow of ideas with respect to the knowledge stock is commonly
assumed to be a calibrated or estimated constant, rather than an object endogenously
determined by investment intensity.
6 The depreciation rates used come from Corrado et al. (2012). These are 0.15 for
R&D, 0.315 for ICT, 0.315 for software and 0.4 for training.
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propensity of knowledge from sector s in country p to be useful to inno-
vate in sector i in country c.7 It is also assumed that investments start
producing knowledge after a delay  (two years). In algebraic terms,
K NOW jc,i,t =
∑
p,s
p,s−c,i × Sjp,s,t−2 ∀ j ∈ R, T, I (7.4)
Public investments in R&D (PIRD) are allocated towards the different
sectors in proportion to the share of each sector in overall business R&D
expenditure.8
Process and product innovation
In NEMESIS, innovations cannot, by assumption, be exchanged on a
market. They are not an asset that can be capitalized, but rather a flow of
services that is produced according to equation 7.2 above.9 Two effects
of innovations can be distinguished in the model:
• From equation 7.1, the first level of the nested CES production
function, ’process innovations’ decrease the ex-ante use of Xcit , the
compound input for ordinary production factors per unit of output,
with an elasticity αci ;
• ’Product innovations’, on the other hand, also increase, ex-ante, the
quality of products, with an elasticity α
′
ci , but without decreasing the
use of Xcit per unit of output.
This distinction between product and process innovation is central for
at list two reasons. On the one hand, in most empirical studies, private
returns to process R&D have been shown to be higher than for product
7 Diffusion parameters are calibrated on patent citations between sectors and countries,
following the methodology developed by Verspagnen (1997). See also Belderbos and
Mohnen (2013) for more details.
8 In addition, public R&D investments are considered to be productive after a longer
lag than private R&D (2 years later).
9 Innovations are also supposed to begin producing their effects after a delay of one
year.
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R&D.10. As reported by Hall et al. (2010), there exist several explana-
tions. For instance, product innovations often involve a “start-up and
debugging phase” that reduce their returns in the short run. Addition-
ally, the measurement of product R&D effects are difficult because of
the currently poor translation of of quality improvements into changes in
price indices, which is especially true for the goods and services produced
by the public sector. On the other hand, output and employment impacts
of product and process innovations are also dissimilar. Hall (2011) shows
that the impact of product innovations on firms’ revenue growth is always
positive, while the impact of process innovations is small or even negative.
They also found similar results on the impacts of these two types of inno-
vations on employment. In particular, Peters et al. (2014) show that the
employment impacts of process and organizational innovations are smaller
than the ones of product innovations. Focusing on the distinct impacts of
innovations on employment in service industries, Damijan et al. (2014)
conclude that empirical studies generally find a positive impact of product
innovations, and a negative impact of process innovations, while no major
differences between manufacturing and services seem to emerge from the
literature.11
Algebraically, these elasticities read:








where Dt is the demand faced by the representative firm.
In addition, it is assumed that in each sector the quality of output
evolves in proportion with process innovation: α
′
ci t = mciαci t .
7.2.3 Endogenous Growth Properties
This sub-section analyzes in more detail the endogenous growth prop-
erties resulting from the innovation mechanisms of the model. For that,
10 Hall et al. (2010) quote several studies in this respect: Clark and Griliches (1984),
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), Link (1982), Terleckyj (1980), Scherer (1982, 1983),
and Hanel (1994)
11 See also Harrison et al. (2014) and Bogliacino and Pianta (2010).
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let us start by obtaining the expression for the long term growth rate
of sectoral output. By differentiating the equation for sectoral output

































are the elasticities of sectoral output with respect to innovations services,
(A), and the bundle of traditional production inputs, (X ), respectively.
The long term growth of sectoral output can therefore be decomposed
in two components:



































It follows from equation (7.11) that the endogenous growth rate of



























According to the latter, growth in TFP, which captures the slack between
the growth of output and the growth of traditional production factors,
can be explained by endogenous investments in innovation inputs and
the accompanying knowledge externalities. In practice, the TFP indexes
that are computed from national account data lump together the joint
influence of many mechanisms.
By keeping Ycit constant in equation 7.1, we can define the ’TFP
effect’ as minus the elasticity of demand of production inputs with
respect to innovations services, as follows:









This ’TFP effect’ is different from the definition given in equation 7.13
and must be interpreted as a measure of the transformation of the set of
production possibilities resulting from the growth of innovation services
over time, for a given level of output.
The second channel via which innovations services affect output
growth is linked to the increase in the demand faced by firms arising
from the gradual improvement of the characteristics of their products.
This ’Quality effect’ is defined as:
dln(Qcit )
dt




In each sector, the quality of output is assumed to evolve in time
proportionally to the ’TFP effect’ (with a coefficient mci ), so that:
α
′
ci t = mci · αci t (7.16)
In NEMESIS, these two distinct innovation effects act on the sectoral
output of firms through the price elasticity of demand, εDcit < 0. In
particular,
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1. Process innovations reduce the unit costs with an elasticity αci t ,
which leads to a proportional reduction in prices charged by firms,
implying in turn an increase in demand with elasticity −εDcit · αci t .
2. Product innovations increase demand directly, according to an
elasticity −εDcit · α
′
ci t
In equilibrium, the level of output must be equal to the level of
demand, and thus the ’endogenous’ part of output growth, which























This ’endogenous’ growth rate of sectoral output, encompasses three
combined effects that go beyond the pure TFP effect in equation 7.14:
1. A TFP effect through the elasticity αci t ;
2. A quality effect through the elasticity α
′
ci t = mci · αci t ;
3. A demand effect through the elasticity εDcit .
A further decomposistion can be made in order to investigate the
distinct contributions of the three innovation components on the long
term endogenous growth rate. To do so, we start by differentiating









, j = RD, ICT, OI (7.18)
with:






By assuming that the investment rates of innovation assets (in % of output)
at sectoral level are constant in the long term, the growth rates of inno-
vation components can be further decomposed from equation 7.3 as




= λ jci · jci t
Ycit
· dln(K NOW jcit )
dt
(7.20)






εAAjcit · λ jci ·
jci t
Ycit
· dln(K NOW jcit )
dt
, j = RD, ICT, OI
(7.21)






= −εDcit · (1 + mci ) · αci t ·
∑
j




dln(K NOW jcit )
dt
, j = RD, ICT, OI (7.22)
The implications of equation 7.22 on the properties of the growth rate in
output are:
• First, there is no endogenous growth in NEMESIS without growth
in knowledge externalities. From a theoretical perspective, this prop-
erty links the modeling of innovations in the model to the semi-
endogenous growth literature where the ultimate source of growth
is the size of the stock of R&D, which benefit from knowledge exter-
nalities. This property of the semi-endogenous growth models was
simply extended in NEMESIS to sources of externalities other than
R&D. The implication of this is that growth in the model is strongly
dependent on the assumptions made on the growth of knowledge
externalities. In the business-as-usual scenarios, it is assumed that the
investment rates of the innovation assets stay constant in the medium
to long term, and that growth in knowledge follows the growth of
economic activity in the different world regions.
• Second, the long term endogenous growth rate is an increasing,
but bounded, function of the investment rates in innovation assets,
which can be influenced by policy instruments.
• Third, from the previous two points, policies aimed at increasing
innovation, such as the EU’s R&I programmes, affect the long term
endogenous growth rate in the model through two channels:
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1. An intensity effect, by raising the ability of firms to exploit
existing knowledge
2. A knowledge effect, by which the creation of new knowledge
increases the intrinsic productivity of innovation inputs.
7.3 An Example: Simulating
the Ex-ante Impact of Horizon Europe
7.3.1 Context of the assessment
The NEMESIS model has been used for several socio-economic impact
assessments of European R&I support policies and mainly for ex-ante
studies, but also in ex-post analysis PPMI (2017) and European Commis-
sion (2017b). Recently, the model has also supported the socio-economic
and environmental impact assessments of the future EU R&I Programme:
Horizon Europe. We present here two of the four batches of policy
options assessed with the NEMESIS model.12
For the simulation of the expected impacts of the Horizon Europe
programme, the following scenarios were considered:
1. The “Continuation” scenario in which Horizon 2020, the previous
programme, continues for the next multi-annual financial framework
(2021–2027). This is compared with a scenario without EU R&I
programme after 2020.
2. And a set of alternative scenarios on the design of the future
Horizon Europe and regrouped in two scenarios called “more
impact” and “more openness”. These are compared with the
“Continuation” scenario.
Starting with the description of the methodology used for the socio-
economic impact assessment of Horizon Europe conducted with the
NEMESIS model, we proceed with the presentation of the main macro-
economic results for the “Continuation”, followed by two other scenarios
on the design options of Horizon Europe, namely “more impact” and
“more openness”.
12 The contents of this section draw primarily from Annex 5 in European Commission
(2018). For an in-depth analysis, see Boitier et al. (2018).
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7.3.2 Implementation of Horizon Europe in the Model
Before running the model, we must define two different sets of variables
or parameters. The first set of variables for the implementation of the
Horizon Europe programme in NEMESIS is related to budget alloca-
tions, not only the overall amount and its temporal allocation, but also
the decomposition between ’basic’ and ’applied’ research, as well as
geographical and sectoral allocations. The second set of important factors
for the analysis of EU R&I policy is related to the innovation mechanisms.
The original parameters have been calibrated based on the empirical liter-
ature (Le Mouël et al., 2016). In order to assess any EU R&I programme,
the key challenge is to evaluate how these parameters need to be modi-
fied when research activities are carried out at the European-wide level.
The essential parameters are: (i) the leverage or direct crowding-in effect,
giving the increase in private R&D expenditures following a one euro
subsidy, (ii), the knowledge spillovers and, (iii), the economic performance
of research. As a specific re-calibration of the knowledge spread parame-
ters for EU R&I programmes is currently unfeasible, the ones currently
present in the model are used, and for the case of different knowledge
spillovers stemming from Horizon Europe, it is assumed that part of
European-wide knowledge spillovers can be assimilated to a modification
of the economic performance parameters.
7.3.2.1 Key Assumptions Behind the Impact Assessment Exercise
As touched upon before, the key assumptions in NEMESIS for assessing
the impact of the Framework Programme are related to budget size,
budget allocation and the value of key parameters such as leverage and
economic performance. Table 7.1 shows the main assumptions behind
the “Continuation” of H2020:
In this “Continuation” scenario, the budget size and its allocation are
assumed to be the same as in Horizon 2020 in constant prices, minus
the contribution from the UK (assumed to be 15% of the budget). The
Horizon Europe programme is assumed to be financed through a reduc-
tion in national public investment. Regarding the direct leverage effect,
the assumptions used are supported by a survey on research units involved
in the 7th Framework Programme and by a body of empirical literature.
A sensitivity analysis shows that the former parameter does not signifi-
cantly drive the results produced by this impact assessment, for the values
used in this study. Economic performance in NEMESIS is calibrated
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Table 7.1 Key assumptions for the “Continuation” scenario (continuation of
Horizon 2020)
Budget Continuation of Horizon 2020 budget in
constant prices - 15 %
Budget allocation across years, countries
and sectors
Horizon 2020 allocation
Knowledge spillovers inter-sectoral and international spillovers
modelled using patent citation techniques
with no additional specificity for the
Framework Programme
Direct leverage effect Direct leverage:
– Basic research: 0
– National funding of applied R&I: 0.1
– EU funding of applied R&I: 0.15
Indirect leverage: firms keep their
investment effort constant in the long
term.
Economic performance Higher performance of EU funding
(+15%) compared to national funding
Financing Reduction in public investment
by country and sector on the basis of the available empirical literature.
Higher leverage and performance parameters for EU funding compared
to national funding reflects the EU added value of the programme.
The values for these parameters are supported by the existing quantified
evidence on publications, patents and revenues from innovation.13
In order to assess the impact of the various changes in the design
of Horizon Europe with respect to its predecessor programme, a set of
scenarios have been assessed with the NEMESIS model either enhancing
the impact of the programme, or reinforcing its openness. In each
scenario, the changes envisaged in terms of the expected higher impact
and wider openness were translated into variations of the values of certain
parameters in NEMESIS. Therefore, different cases were considered,
from low to high, by using ranges in the variation of the parameters.
These ranges rely on plausible values found in the literature, with extreme
values showing how impactful Horizon Europe can be under the most
ambitious conditions. All these scenarios have been combined in the
13 For details on the points made in this paragraph, see European Commission (2017a)
and Boitier et al. (2018).
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Table 7.2 Key departures from the assumptions in the “Continuation” scenario
Changes for more impact This assumes... Range
Higher economic
performance
Focus on R&I with higher
economic impacts andd on
breakthrough innovations









14% to 13% obsolescence
rate compared to 15% in
the baseline.
Stronger complementarities
with other innovative assets
More cross-technological
and cross-sectoral R&I
5% to 10% stronger than
in the baseline
Higher direct leverage of
private R&D
Betteraccess to finance of
innovative firms, especially
for SMEs
0.1 (baseline) to 0.15
Changes for more openness This assumes... Range
Higher complementarities




Increased leverage for Basic
research: 0.05 to 0.1
compared to 0 in the
baseline






5% to 10% stronger than
in the baseline
two “more impact” and “more openness” different scenarios. Table 7.2
summarises the changes relative to the “Continuation” scenario:
7.3.2.2 Results
The macroeconomic effects in NEMESIS shown in Fig. 7.3 can be
divided into three main phases:
1. The investment phase: this is a ’demand phase’ in which the
dynamics are induced by the change in R&D expenditures, with moderate
impacts on innovation (as innovations only appear with a lag). This phase
is hence dominated by the effect of the Keynesian multiplier embdedded
in the model.
2. The innovation phase: the arrival of innovations (process and
product) reduces the production costs of new products and/or raises the
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Fig. 7.3 GDP impacts under the “Continuation” of Horizon 2020 scenario
(deviation in % from a counterfactual scenario without Framework Programme)
Source Boitier et al. (2018)
quality of existing ones, inducing an increase in both external and internal
demands.
3. The obsolescence phase: progressively, newly achieved knowledge
declines over time due to knowledge obsolescence. In the long-term, the
economy returns back to the reference scenario.
Thus, Horizon Europe as defined in the “Continuation” scenario
could provide an increase of EU GDP up to +0.3% in 2035. This gain
of EU GDP is mainly driven by the private consumption that contributes
to half of the EU GDP deviation in 2035, while the external balance
contributes to 35%. During the innovation phase, EU GDP gains are
primarily driven by increasing market share of EU economy on global
markets, rather than by the expansion of the internal market. There-
after, productivity gains progressively spread throughout the European
economy, inducing an increase in real wages that in turn reinforces
the relative contribution of private consumption. In 2050, around two
thirds of EU GDP deviation (i.e. +0.13%) can be ascribed to private
consumption, with external balance explaining around 20% of EU GDP
gains.
To summarise, the implementation of Horizon Europe, as defined in
the “Continuation" scenario, delivers an increase of EU GDP by e 47
billion (constant euro 2014) i.e. maximum +0.3% in 2035. And the
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cumulative EU GDP gain from 2020 to 2050 in the “Continuation”
reaches e 850 billion that is to say an average EU GDP raise of e 27
billion per year.
Over the period of the Horizon Europe programme, up to a hundred
thousand jobs are expected to be directly created in R&D activities (see
Figure 7.4). During this period, while the programme has a positive
effect on jobs in the R&D sector, the decrease in national public invest-
ment that is assumed in the scenario is mechanically accompanied by a
comparable decrease in non R&D-related jobs. The positive net indirect
impact of the programme on jobs materialises starting at 2030, with the
creation of more than two hundred thousand jobs after 2035, including
more than eighty thousand highly-qualified jobs. From 2021 to 2050,
Horizon Europe could create, on average, more than one hundred thou-
sand employments per year, which correspond to jobs in the research
sector at the beginning, and then transform into high- and low-qualified
jobs with time.
Turning to the impact of the changes envisaged in the design of the
Horizon Europe programme, in the “more impact” scenario, the devi-
ation in EU GDP, in comparison with “Continuation”, could reach
up to +0.07% in 2040, with on average, from 2021 to 2050, a EU
GDP deviation of e7.3 billion per year in 2014 constant euro (see
Figure 7.5). In terms of employment, the gains are estimated at twenty
eight thousand jobs yearly (average between 2021 and 2050). In the
“more openness” scenario, the expected impact on EU GDP is lower and
Fig. 7.4 Employment impact of the “Continuation” of Horizon 2020 (devi-
ation in thousand jobs from a counterfactual scenario without Framework
Programme) Source Boitier et al. (2018)
7 THE NEMESIS MACRO-ECONOMETRIC MODEL 151
Fig. 7.5 Decomposition of total EU GDP impact into changes in the more
impact and more openness scenarios (deviation in % from the “Continuation”
scenario of Horizon 2020) Scenarios based on highest values of parameter ranges.
Source Boitier et al. (2018)
reaches a maximum of +0.03% in 2040. On average, from 2021 to 2050,
yearly EU GDP gains are about e2.7 billion whereas yearly employ-
ment gains are around nine thousand. Combining the “more impact” and
“more openness” scenarios yields EU GDP gains of up to 0.1% in the most
optimistic case, around +e12 billion per year, with an additional employ-
ment at EU level of a maximum of sixty seven thousand, in comparison
with the “Continuation” scenario.
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8.1 Policy Context
EU-level investment in Research and Innovation (R&I) focuses on
excellence through EU-wide competition and cooperation. Successive
EU Framework Programmes have aimed at supporting training and
mobility for scientists, creating transnational, cross-sectoral and multidis-
ciplinary collaborations, leveraging additional public and private invest-
ment, building the scientific evidence necessary for EU policies, and
strengthening national research and innovation systems. Over the years,
the political narrative has put more and more emphasis on ’ shaping the
future’ through R&I policy and funding, thereby lending even more
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importance to the assessment of the funding programmes’ economic
impact.
Horizon Europe is the European Commission’ s proposal for the
2021–2027 Framework Programme for EU R&I policy, succeeding
the Horizon 2020 Programme (active between 2014–2020).1 With a
proposed budget of about 100 billion euros for the period 2021–2027,
Horizon Europe is the most ambitious R&I funding programme ever.
This Programme builds on lessons learnt from previous evaluations, as
well as on feedback from experts and from other stakeholders.2 It will be
an evolution, not a revolution, focusing on a few design improvements
to further increase openness and impact. These changes in design aim
at making this Programme achieve even more impact than its predecessor
(through, i.e., the European Innovation Council and mission-orientation)
and more openness (through strengthened international cooperation, a
reinforced Open Science policy, and a new policy approach to European
Partnerships).
8.2 Macroeconomic Modelling, EU R&I
Framework Programmes and the EU Policy Cycle
Assessing the impact of the Framework Programmes is crucial for policy-
makers in order to inform their strategic decisions. There is a general
consensus (Hall et al., 2009; Di Comite & D’Artis, 2015; European
Commission, 2017c) that R&I policies are decisive in fostering produc-
tivity growth. However, putting a precise figure on the expected benefits
of large R&I programmes such as the EU Framework Programmes is
a challenging task with a lot of uncertainties, especially in an ex-ante
approach. This is rendered even more difficult by the long-term horizon
that a proper analysis of these impacts requires.
In this context, macroeconomic modelling is an essential tool to
support policymaking, since it attempts at quantifying the impact of the
Programmes and assessing policy options. Depending on when the assess-
ment takes place in the policy cycle (Figure 8.1), this can be done in
1 See European Commission (2018).
2 These notably include: (i) the interim evaluation of Horizon 2020 (European
Commission, 2017a) and, (ii) a high-level group chaired by Pascal Lamy set up by the
European Commission in order to provide advice on how to maximise the impact of the
EU’s investment in research and innovation (European Commission, 2017b).
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Fig. 8.1 The EU
policy cycle (Source




an ex-post/interim (monitoring and evaluation of a programme) or ex-
ante/design (impact assessment) fashion, with policy options examined
during impact assessments only in order to feed the preparation phase of
the Programmes.
The first ever ex-ante impact assessment of any EU policy initiative
in the field of research was the impact assessment of the 7th Frame-
work Programme (FP7) (Muldur et al., 2006; Delanghe & Muldur,
2007). This exercise relied on historical data (e.g. publications and
patents) and on simulations based on a macroeconomic model. The
NEMESIS model was used for this impact assessment, and subsequently
for the impact assessment and interim evaluation of Horizon 2020 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2012; European Commission, 2017a). Since FP7,
macroeconomic models have evolved and lessons from previous impact
assessments can help policymakers in using these models for current and
future assessments.
The latest assessment of a EU R&I Framework Programme is the
impact assessment of Horizon Europe (European Commission, 2018).
A key novelty in the approach for this assessment is the use of three
different macroeconomic models for assessing the continuation of the
Programme (’baseline’ scenario), which are the models presented in the
previous chapters: QUEST III, RHOMOLO and NEMESIS.
8.3 How much is the Continuation
of Horizon 2020 Worth?
Quantifying the impact of R&I policies at a macroeconomic level
requires modelling tools that appropriately capture how R&I trans-
lates into economic gains. By relying on three models, namely QUEST
III, RHOMOLO and NEMESIS, the impact assessment of Horizon
158 C. B. FASIL ET AL.
Europe (European Commission, 2018) was aimed at leveraging on their
respective strengths while partly counterveiling some of their limitations.
The strengths of these models rely on their specificities, and differences
between the models can help address specific needs of policymakers. Di
Comite and D’Artis (2015) consider that NEMESIS is the richest model
in terms of the types of innovation types captured and the number of
policy-sensitive elasticities when compared to other standard macroeco-
nomic models for R&D and the number of innovation policies. This
means that policymakers can easily design and evaluate a wide range of
policy options related to specific innovation types or innovation channels
when using this model. On the other hand, the forward-looking, dynamic
approach of QUEST makes the model most appropriate for assessing
the impact of R&D and innovation policies over time. This is particu-
larly important as the effects of initial investments are expected to bear
fruit only after the period covered by the Programme, which calls for
a model that can measure long-term impacts with precision. Finally, by
modelling regional economies and their spatial interactions, RHOMOLO
is the most suitable model to address questions related to the geographic
concentration of innovative activities and spatial knowledge spillovers,
which is also a crucial aspect for policymakers.
When using and interpreting the results produced by these models, it
is also essential to acknowledge their main limitations. Any model allows
only for a partial representation of reality, subject to the assumptions
made. RHOMOLO balances its detailed spatial and regional dimensions
by keeping optimisation problems static and, hence, not capturing the
inter-temporal consequences of innovation decisions. These are binding
constraints for ensuring the tractability of the model. In addition, it
does not distinguish between private and public innovation or between
different types of endogenous innovation. On the other hand, QUEST
III, not being a multisector macroeconomic model, groups all R&D
activities in a unique R&D sector without capturing the complexity and
diversity of the type of R&D investments, such as private and public
R&D activities, product and process innovation, non-R&D and disrup-
tive innovations. These elements are also not present in RHOMOLO,
albeit the latter features more extensive sectoral and geographical details.
Lastly, NEMESIS is based on empirically observed relationships among
variables as well as on adaptive expectations instead of forward-looking
ones, allowing for more degrees of freedom in behaviour than in other
models. This may generate inconsistencies with recent developments in
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macroeconomic theory. As opposed to the other two models, however,
NEMESIS incorporates private and public R&D activities, product and
process innovation, and non-R&D investments.
With these caveats in mind, Figure 8.2 shows the comparisons of the
simulated impact of Horizon Europe on the GDP trajectory discussed in
the previous chapters.
Overall, Figure 8.2 shows that NEMESIS, QUEST and RHOMOLO
present consistent results in terms of the sign and temporal pattern of the
GDP gain from the Framework Programme (compared to the discon-
tinuation of the Programme) over 2021–2050. The three models show
a strong increase in GDP especially after the period covered by the
Programme, with highest impacts predicted between 2029 and 2034.
The size of the GDP gain is highest for the simulations based on the
NEMESIS model. This can be explained by the fact that the three models
use different sets of innovation channels and elasticities.
Furthermore, the parameters and mechanisms in QUEST and
RHOMOLO do not directly take into account the higher leverage and
Fig. 8.2 GDP impact of horizon 2020 continuation (% deviation from a base-
line, no framework programme scenario) (Source European Commission (2018);
Note EU+ indicates that NEMESIS uses higher performance and leverage for
EU funding compared to national funding as a reflection of the EU added value
of the Programme. QUEST *1 assumes that financing of the Programme relies
on VAT increases. QUEST *2 assumes that financing relies on lowering public
investment)
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performance expected from EU funding of R&I compared to national
funding, which are acknowledged in NEMESIS as an illustration of
the EU added value of the Framework Programme. This can poten-
tially explain a significant part of the difference between the results
from NEMESIS and the other models. Several studies (Delanghe et al.,
2011; Vullings et al., 2014; Rosemberg et al., 2016; ECDG & Else-
vier, 2017; PPMI, 2017) provide empirical evidence that shows that EU
funding could be expected to perform ’ intrinsically’ better at EU level
compared to national level due to factors that are not directly captured
by these models, such as multidisciplinary transnational collaborations or
critical mass. However, the way this EU added value is translated in a
model, i.e. the size of the effect, is not trivial and requires caution in its
interpretation.
Another essential aspect for all models is the mode of financing of the
Framework Programme. Money spent for the Framework Programme can
come from different sources, and it is tempting but rather unrealistic and
undesirable to not model how the funds are financed. In this regard,
both RHOMOLO and NEMESIS assume that the financing of the
Programme can be reflected by lower national expenditure. The results
from QUEST highlight the difference between two funding scenarios: (i)
raising additional VAT revenues across Member States and (ii) lowering
national public investment. It is shown that VAT funding should be
unambiguously more beneficial compared to the second scenario as it
allows Member States to continue public investment in productive uses.
In short, the three models used for the impact assessment of Horizon
Europe are based on different modelling strategies, assumptions and
parameters specifications and values, which results in different quantita-
tive estimates of the economic impact of Horizon Europe. Nevertheless,
the comparison of results across different models is essential to ascertain
the consistency of a policy intervention, in this case Horizon Europe. This
comparison is also required to understand the different aspects and mech-
anisms at play within the models, which partially mirror those determining
the actual impact of Framework Programmes.
8.4 Modelling for Policymaking
Overall, past experience demonstrates the growing importance of macroe-
conomic modelling in the evaluation and impact assessment of EU R&I
policy. The need for state-of-the-art modelling approaches all along the
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policy cycle has never been as pressing today. However, the complexity
of the modelling exercise can make it challenging for policy-makers and
modelers to collaborate effectively. In this regard, modelers also have a
role to play to help policymakers understand the key aspects and assump-
tions that they need to reflect upon when using and interpreting models
and their results. For instance, while discontinuation versus continuation
scenarios can be straightforward to interpret and can inform policy-
makers on the ‘cost of non-Europe’, it can be challenging to translate
policy options regarding the design or implementation of a Programme
into assumptions in the models if there is lack of collaboration or
understanding from the different parties involved.
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CHAPTER 9
Other Innovation Policies and Alternative
Modelling Approaches
Cristiana Benedetti Fasil, Giammario Impullitti,
and Miguel Sanchez-Martinez
9.1 Introduction
This chapter contains a thorough discussion of the results of two simu-
lation exercises on the macroeconomic implications of changes in entry
barriers and R&D tax credits, assessed using the QUEST III model.1
Next we provide a brief introduction to the policy context and relevance
1 The discussion on this chapter draws from Benedetti Fasil et al. (2017) and Sanchez-
Martinez et al. (2017).
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of these two types of innovation-related issues, before proceeding to the
technical discussion of the results in the next section.
Entry barriers play a key role in business dynamism by conditioning
the flow of entry of new firms into markets and the transformation of
new ideas into marketable products. These processes lie at the core of
economic and productivity growth through the reallocation of resources
from shrinking and exiting firms to new entrants and growing firms.2,3 A
study from the European Commission covering France, Italy, Germany,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain over the 1997–2003 period, estimated that a
1% increase in the entry rate of firms would increase GDP growth by 0.6%
and employment growth by 2.67% based on data from the same period.4
Following the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, most Member States
began to reduce the costs of starting a business.5 Nevertheless, the levels
of entry barriers are still very heterogeneous across Member States and
some countries, such as Italy, Cyprus, Malta and Poland, face costs to start
a business that are, relative to income per capita, up to 70 times higher
than the best EU performers, namely Denmark, United Kingdom and
Ireland (Ciriaci, 2014, Table III.1). The OECD’s indicator on product
market regulation also provides evidence of country heterogeneity in
terms of barriers to entrepreneurship (OECD, 2015). Over time, most
countries have made considerable progress in removing entry barriers,
although this pace has slowed down since 2008. Hence, in several
Member States policymakers still have room for significant interventions
directed towards creating more dynamic and competitive industries. As a
result, policies in favour of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs),
2 Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) using a panel of 18 OECD countries between 1984
and 1998, were the first to estimate that lower entry barriers would result in a faster catch
up with the technology frontier. This is now widely established in the empirical literature.
3 Several papers assess the growth contribution of the reallocation of resources from
exiting to entering firms. For instance, Luttmer (2007) and Gabler and Licandro (2009)
estimate that this selection effect can explain between 20% and 50% of US GDP growth.
These estimates are consistent with Scarpetta et al. (2002), who find that entry and exit
contributed to between 20% and 40% of aggregate productivity growth in a panel of
OECD countries.
4 See Cincera and Galgau (2005).
5 See Ciriaci (2014, Table III.2). The World Bank definition of the costs of starting a
business comprises three main elements; the number of procedures, the number of days
and the cost as percentage of income per capita necessary to start a business. These are
the so-called red tape entry barriers
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in particular those policies that may create the right conditions for the
flourishing of the so-called High Growth Innovative Enterprises (HGIE)
are receiving greater attention. An important, related policy issue is to
understand and measure the impact of policies aimed at reducing entry
barriers.6 Both large companies and SMEs are bound to benefit from a
reduction in entry barriers. However, large companies are often better
able to cope with entry barriers than SMEs due to having access to a
larger pool of resources, including easier access to finance. Consequently,
policies aimed at a reduction of entry barriers notably support SMEs and,
in particular, young enterprises, as these are the types of firms most nega-
tively affected by entry barriers. This is a particularly important policy
issue in order to increase productivity and employment growth, as most
of the job creation by young firms is carried out by new firms entering
the market (Haltiwanger, 2013). Criscuolo et al. (2014) in a study with
18 OECD countries estimate that the share of total employment creation
due to SMEs that are less than three years old is disproportionately larger
relative to their size.
Firm size is also closely related to business dynamism. The European
Commission’s Product Market Review (European Commission, 2013)
highlights a non-linear relationship between firm size at both entry and
exit and an efficient allocation of resources between and within firms. In
particular, they find that, on average, an increase in the size of a firm
by just one employee, when entering the market, is associated with an
increase in efficiency by 1.6%. In addition, such a relation exhibits an
inverted U-shape, peaking at 10 employees at entry. This indicates that
policies geared toward increasing the average size of small start-ups give
rise to efficiency gains.
Concerning fiscal incentives to promote R&D investment, 25 Member
States currently employ some form of tax break instruments, as a means to
ultimately support economic growth and employment. Strong commit-
ment for public intervention to spur investment in R&D can be traced
back to the 2003 action plan ‘Investing in Research’, whereby the
European Commission recommended supporting private investments in
research. In particular, concerning tax measures, it recommended to
‘improve fiscal measures for research on the basis of formal evaluations,
6 At the European level, Sapir (2004) stressed that too much policy attention is paid
to incumbent firms to ensure fair competition, whereas entrants and young firms tend to
be neglected.
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mutual learning and the application of principles of good design such as
simplicity, low administrative cost and stability’ (European Commission,
2003).
Some Member States such as France were already making use of R&D
tax credits at the time of the action plan, but this recommendation was
subsequently adopted by many others, making tax credits a widely used
instrument in the EU as a way to subsidise the conduct of R&D. The
total amount of foregone tax revenue due to R&D tax breaks is estimated
at more than EUR 12 billion (OECD, 2014). In some countries, such
as Belgium and France, the total value of foregone tax revenue via tax
credits is higher than the value of government direct expenditures on
R&D subsidies.
Despite the increasing relevance of tax credits as a stimulus tool for
R&D investment in the EU, ex-ante evaluations of their potential macroe-
conomic effects are scarce. In particular, studies in the same vein as the
one presented below do not provide an investigation of the structural
factors behind the observed cross-country differences in the impact of
R&D tax credits on macroeconomic outcomes. As noted in Veugelers
(2016), ‘where the macro models are as yet underexploited and where
they would be a very useful R&D policy instrument is in assessing which
framework conditions need to be in place to improve the impact of public
R&D funding instruments, such as grants and tax credits’.
The next sections provide a summary of two exercises that focus
precisely on tackling this last point by providing insights on the struc-
tural factors of EU Member States that condition the macroeconomic
effects of policies addressed at lowering entry barriers and increasing
fiscal incentives for R&D investment, respectively. In the final section,
possible complementary refinements and extensions to these two analyses
are discussed at a technical level.
9.2 The Macroeconomic Impact
of Entry Barriers and R&D Tax Credits
This section, building on the content of Chapter 5, presents and discusses
two examples of policy shock simulations undertaken using the QUEST
III model: (i) a reduction equal to 0.1% of GDP in entry barriers for inter-
mediate firms (see Benedetti Fasil et al., 2017) and (ii) a 0.1% increase
of GDP in tax-credited R&D investment (see Sanchez-Martinez et al.,
2017).
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In this literature, and in the specific case of QUEST III, entry barriers
are treated as sunk costs paid by intermediate firms upon entry, while tax
credits impact directly on the user cost of intangible capital. Intuitively,
the general mechanism through which these policies propagates in the
model’s economy is the following: a reduction in entry barriers or an
increase in tax credits stimulate entry in the intermediate good sector and
the demand for new patents. This leads to a gradual increase in R&D
activities, resulting in the production of more patents, which can be used
to develop new product lines. On the labour market, this is accompa-
nied by a reallocation of high-skilled workers from the production to the
research sector due to increased demand for this type of workers in the
latter. If the drain of high-skilled workers from the final good sector to
the R&D sector is sufficiently large, final good-producing firms might
reduce output even if they increase hiring of low- and medium-skilled
workers. Indeed, because of the reallocation of high-skilled workers, the
initial effects on GDP can be positive or negative depending, among
other things, on the elasticity of substitution among the different types
of labour. Nevertheless, the size of these effects is small in the short
term. Substantial, positive output effects materialise in the longer term,
once R&D activities yield their fruits in the form of marketable prod-
ucts. Despite the increase in the efficiency of all factors of production in
all countries, brought about by the higher stock of ideas, employment
(at all skill levels) is higher in the new equilibrium. This is due to the
surge in aggregate demand ensuing from higher incomes for households,
which more than compensates for the labour-saving effect of the increase
in TFP.
The key equation behind the aforementioned mechanism is the free
entry condition of intermediate firms.7 That is,
PRx,t = i A,t PA,t
DEFt
+ FCA(i A,t + CA,t ) (9.1)
where FCA represents the level of entry costs, PRx,t is the profit earned
by design/firm x, PA,t is the price for licencing a patent, DEFt is the
GDP deflator, and i A,t represents the user cost of intangible capital.8
7 Free entry means that intermediate firms will enter the market and thus buy new
patents until the value of profits in a given period equals the entry costs plus the net
value of patents.
8 CAt is an auxiliary term related to the change of the price of patents over time.
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While fixed entry costs enter this equation directly, tax credits do so
indirectly via i A,t .
This equilibrium equation shows that high entry barriers or low R&D
tax credits (i.e., high cost of intangible capital) must be compensated for
by high expected profits or by a lower licencing price for the patent, or by
a combination of both, for the decision to enter the market to be econom-
ically sensible. The profits of intermediate firms are positively related to
the inverse of the mark-up charged by final good producers, ηy,t , and








= (1 − θ) px,t xt
DEFt
= (1 − θ)ηy,t (1 − α)(Yt + FCY )
At DEFt
(9.2)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate good inputs
in the final good production function, α is the fixed-cost-adjusted elas-
ticity of labour in final good technology, Yt is aggregate output from the
final good sector, FCY are fixed costs in final good production, ik,t is
the user cost of tangible capital, PC,t is the price index of final goods. As
each intermediate firm buys only one patent to produce one intermediate
product, the number of patents equates the number of intermediate firms
and represents, together with the mark-up, a measure of market compe-
tition. Hence, the more concentrated markets are, the higher the profits
for each intermediate producer.
The price of patents, determined optimally in the R&D sector, is posi-
tively related to the unit labour cost of researchers and inversely related







Substituting 9.2, 9.3 and 6.18 into 9.1, we can rewrite the latter as
follows











i A,t + CA,t
)
(9.4)
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A decrease in the user cost of intangible capital drives an initial positive
wedge between period profits and entry costs, attracting new firms into
the sector until profits are driven down to exactly match costs, so that no
more profits from arbitrage can be realised. This implies that, in countries
with relatively high capital income taxes, a reduction in the user cost of
capital alleviates the costs faced by intermediate good firms to a greater
extent than in countries with lower tax rates, fostering the creation of
new intermediate businesses and thus more purchases of patents from
households.
In fact, it can be shown that the impact of an increase in the R&D tax
credit rate on the user cost of intangible capital increases with the level of
the (tangible) capital income tax rate. This can be seen algebraically from












+ rpA,t + εrpAt (9.5)
where τA represents the R&D tax credit rate and tK is the capital income
tax rate. This equation has an intuitive interpretation, as it shows that
the user cost of capital depends, among other things, negatively on the
tax credit rate and positively on the risk premium demanded by capital
owners, rpA,t , the risk-free interest rate and the rate at which the stock of
ideas depreciates, δA. Moreover, it can be shown that a higher capital
income tax rate in a given country means that hiring either type of
capital in the economy is more expensive than in other countries. Thus,
a decline in the user cost of capital leads to a proportionally higher
demand for patent licences arising from intermediate good firms (see
Sanchez-Martinez et al., 2017).
9.2.1 Simulation Results
Before presenting delving into the simulation exercises, the reader should
be aware of a number of caveats. First, the current version of QUEST III
models innovation exclusively via the patents generated by R&D efforts.
Thus, it does not account for investments and innovations which do not
result in patents. This is a somewhat limited view of both R&D and inno-
vation. Second, for relatively long time horizons, the simulations are likely
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to underestimate the impact of R&D, because the model does not capture
disruptive innovations. Third, some countries have already made consid-
erable progress on entry barrier reductions and have very large starting
levels of R&D tax credit rates. For these Member States, further reduc-
tions of entry barriers or further increases in tax credits are likely to yield
small impacts, due to low marginal returns of continuous improvements.
Fourth, there may be a discrepancy between the estimated entry barriers
in the model and the actual entry costs faced by individual firms which
depend on size, geographical location and other country-specific char-
acteristics that the model does not account for. Finally, the version of
QUEST III model used for the simulations is a three-country model
characterising an individual Member State versus the EU27 and the rest
of the world. Thus, the effects of potential simultaneous cross-country
policies or spillovers generated by, for instance, common deregulation
policies or the effect of tax competition cannot be studied. With these
caveats in mind, as we are mainly interested in highlighting the macroe-
conomic factors impacting the effectiveness of the two R&D policies
discussed in the chapter, the cross-country comparison made below is
yields interesting insights, not least because, as pointed out in Bravo-
Biosca et al. (2013), it highlights the potential for further improvements
across countries.
Moreover, to explain the cross-country differences in the results of the
simulations it is key to understand the differences in the values of the
structural parameters that capture the deep characteristics of the economy
of each Member States. The most important structural parameters and
variables, that affect the impact and transmission of shocks to entry
barriers and tax credits, are summarised for each Member State in Table
9.1.
9.2.1.1 Reduction in Entry Barriers
The first policy scenario discussed is a reduction in the value of fixed entry
costs for intermediate firms equal to 0.1% of GDP (see Benedetti Fasil
et al., 2017).9 In each simulation, the shock is applied to the fixed costs of
a given country only; the other Member States and the rest of the world
9 Even though the original entry barrier costs are calculated in GDP per capita terms in
Djankov et al. (2008), all quantities in the model are expressed in terms of GDP (which
is the numeraire). Hence the reason for the choice of the size of the shock in GDP terms
instead of GDP per capita.
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Table 9.1 Cross-country values of selected parameters and initial steady-state
values of key variables (QUEST calibration January 2017)
FCA τ
A λ ν R&Dint L A,0 ϕ t
K
AT 0.063 0.119 0.398 0.213 0.034 0.012 0.619 0.250
BE 0.060 0.108 0.465 0.309 0.027 0.010 0.555 0.355
BG 0.054 0.126 0.645 1.282 0.009 0.004 0.386 0.235
CY 0.144 0.134 0.551 1.077 0.006 0.002 0.476 0.260
CZ 0.100 0.185 0.496 0.484 0.022 0.010 0.478 0.180
DE 0.048 0.010 0.496 0.298 0.032 0.012 0.548 0.222
DK 0.011 0.019 0.473 0.255 0.036 0.016 0.548 0.235
EE 0.022 0.139 0.482 0.416 0.016 0.007 0.542 0.081
EL 0.058 0.088 0.652 1.301 0.010 0.004 0.377 0.239
ES 0.090 0.276 0.777 1.745 0.014 0.007 0.257 0.253
FI 0.049 0.031 0.441 0.231 0.036 0.015 0.578 0.299
FR 0.019 0.232 0.526 0.404 0.026 0.010 0.497 0.469
HR 0.064 0.133 0.672 1.598 0.009 0.004 0.361 0.235
HU 0.084 0.156 0.595 0.776 0.016 0.006 0.435 0.214
IE 0.016 0.241 0.595 0.580 0.017 0.008 0.456 0.130
IT 0.153 0.049 0.777 1.752 0.015 0.007 0.257 0.370
LT 0.015 0.139 0.582 0.751 0.011 0.006 0.447 0.098
LU 0.046 0.020 0.594 0.659 0.008 0.008 0.432 0.239
LV 0.030 0.139 0.738 2.027 0.008 0.005 0.299 0.099
MT 0.179 0.135 0.773 2.091 0.009 0.006 0.265 0.235
NL 0.057 0.171 0.547 0.431 0.022 0.011 0.477 0.137
PL 0.196 0.022 0.542 0.738 0.011 0.004 0.684 0.190
PT 0.028 0.263 0.773 1.700 0.015 0.007 0.261 0.295
RO 0.041 0.126 0.879 7.658 0.004 0.002 0.164 0.235
SE 0.025 0.070 0.335 0.152 0.040 0.014 0.679 0.306
SI 0.016 0.159 0.477 0.331 0.028 0.011 0.546 0.196
SK 0.045 0.102 0.685 1.439 0.010 0.005 0.349 0.167
UK 0.013 0.166 0.495 0.363 0.019 0.010 0.527 0.357
are only indirectly affected via trade and financial links. The following
graphs show the impulse response functions (IRF) of GDP, employment
and TFP for the 28 Member States (Figs. 9.1, 9.2, 9.3).
High entry barriers preclude some intermediate good-producing firms
from entering the market. This results in a low demand for patents and a
low level of intangible capital. Hence, the marginal productivity of intan-
gible capital is higher than in an equilibrium with more patents, due to
decreasing returns. Other things equal, a shock that reduces entry barriers
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Fig. 9.1 Response of
GDP to a reduction in
fixed costs equal to 0.1%
of GDP
yields higher output effects the higher the marginal productivity of intan-
gible capital, i.e., the higher the initial level of entry barriers. A symmetric
argument, again owing to diminishing returns, holds for the share of
research labour; a lower share of labour devoted to research means that
the effect on output will be larger when entry barriers are reduced. In
both cases the output effect is amplified by higher R&D efficiency levels,
and higher elasticities of R&D with respect to researchers. Moreover,
differences in the magnitude of impacts are better understood by investi-
gating the role played by the different variables and parameters involved,
particularly the ones reported in Table 9.1.
Poland, Malta and Italy exhibit the highest entry barriers among all
countries, while also characterised by very low R&D intensity and initial
low quantity of researchers. The high marginal return on intangible
capital and researchers’ productivity results in a lower short-term reduc-
tion in GDP and in a long-term trajectory for output characterised by a
higher slope compared to, for example, Slovenia and Portugal. As another
example, the efficiency level of the Italian R&D production function,
coupled with a relatively high value of the share of researchers in total
labour, constitutes an advantage, as comparatively fewer researchers are
needed to increase the production of knowledge, thereby relaxing the
pressure on wages and sustaining a higher level of employment also in
the long run. Nevertheless, due to comparatively higher wages in Italy,
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Fig. 9.2 Response of
aggregate employment
to a reduction in fixed
costs equal to 0.1% of
GDP
Italian TFP reacts to a lesser extent than Maltese and Polish TFP, leading
to a slightly higher GDP response for Poland and Malta in the very long
run.
Denmark is characterised by the lowest level of fixed costs and the
highest share of initial research labour and R&D intensity. Given this
leadership position, a shock to fixed costs has only a marginal impact on
GDP. Total employment reacts positively upon impact, mainly due to an
increase in the share of low-and medium-skilled workers. The long-term
effect on employment is however negligible. Also, the initial high share of
R&D employment mitigates the negative impact on GDP resulting from
the reallocation of high-skilled labour from the final good sector to the
R&D sector. This also implies a comparatively moderate impact on TFP
(see Fig. 9.3).
GDP and employment in Slovenia, Finland, Belgium, France and the
Netherlands react only marginally to a shock on entry costs. Similar
trajectories are also displayed by the Czech Republic, despite its higher
entry costs. In this case, the reaction to the shock is hampered by a
comparatively higher risk premium on investment in intangibles.
Portugal and Ireland, characterised by both fairly low entry costs and
fairly low shares of research labour, display a steep long-run GDP trajec-
tory, while TFP and employment react similarly to other countries. The
effect of the positive long-run productivity effect of a reallocation of high-
skilled labour towards the research sector, which also causes the initial
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Fig. 9.3 Response of TFP to a reduction in fixed costs equal to 0.1% of GDP
drop in GDP, is hindered by a relatively high-risk premium. This slows
down TFP growth, but sustains GDP as the final sector still benefits from
a relatively higher number of skilled workers whose recruitment in the
R&D sector is partially blocked by high-risk premia.
Slovakia and Lithuania have relatively low entry barriers and very low
R&D intensity and labour dedicated to research. On the other hand, they
have a relatively high elasticity of R&D with respect to research labour
and also display a relatively strong efficiency of the R&D production
function. Consequently, the transmission of the shock is amplified and
exhibits trajectories similar to Malta and Poland, which start with much
higher entry costs. The same reasoning holds for Spain, whose economy
is characterised by fairly high entry costs, a fairly low share of researchers
and R&D intensity, but an overall efficient R&D technology.
Germany has a robust R&D sector with a high initial R&D inten-
sity and share of research labour. A reduction in fixed costs, which are
higher than the ones prevailing in Denmark, results in a positive long-
term impact on GDP, TFP and employment. This is particularly strong
after 20 years from the initial shock when the trajectories of TFP and GDP
become the steepest among all countries, owing to the more important
role played by structural factors such as the production technology.
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Romania is a particular case, with the lowest R&D intensity and share
of research labour employed in the R&D sector together with fairly low
initial entry costs. The high marginal returns to research labour, combined
with a calibration of the R&D production function that indicates an effi-
cient use of inputs, draw skilled workers from the final good sector to
the research sector. However, GDP reacts positively already in the short
run as the strong short-run increase in TFP offsets the reallocation effect.
As TFP increases, more low and medium-skilled workers are hired in the
final good sector, and total employment reacts comparatively more than
in other countries. Over time, upward pressure on wages substantially
erodes the initial gains in employment.
9.2.1.2 Increase in R&D Tax Credits
We proceed by simulating, for each Member State, the impact of a 0.1% of
GDP permanent increase in tax credits for R&D (see Sanchez-Martinez
et al., 2017).10 By analysing the differences in outcomes for individual
Member States we gain important insights into how different macroeco-
nomic contexts influence the effectiveness of R&D tax credits. Because
of structural differences, the impact of such policy differs substantially
across Member States. The following graphs show the deviations from
baseline in the path followed by GDP, employment and TFP, over both
the short-to-medium and long terms in all 28 Member States.
Inspection of Table 9.1 and the impulse response functions in Figs. 9.4,
9.5, and 9.6 reveals a number of important points. The effects of a
more generous R&D tax credit policy vary significantly across countries.
A country that deserves special attention is Germany, as it is the only
one without an initial tax credit policy in place. Germany’s path for GDP
exhibits a steep slope after 2025. This can be explained by the trajectory
for TFP, which is the ultimate precursor of income growth over the long
term. In fact, it can be seen from Figures 9.4 and 9.6 that the evolution
of GDP is a mirror image of that for TFP, and that the path for the latter
variable is steepest also for Germany. The reason why Germany is able to
reap larger benefits in the very long run compared to the rest of the EU
10 To be precise, the simulated shock consists of an increase in tax credit rates such
that, for each country, the additional R&D investment generated equals 0.1% of GDP
(i.e. in the new scenario, tax-credited R&D investment is 0.1% of GDP higher compared
to baseline).
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Fig. 9.4 Response of
GDP to an increase in





Fig. 9.5 Response of
aggregate employment
to an increase in the tax




is that it departs from the highest levels in terms of the stock of knowl-
edge and TFP among all Member States, thus being able to converge to a
higher level of overall productivity in the new equilibrium. Because of the
higher productivity and the bounded supply of all types of workers, real
wages in Germany also reach the highest level among all countries in the
long run. This deters the hiring of new workers to a greater extent than
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Fig. 9.6 Response of
TFP to an increase in





in other countries, and thus the rise observed in German employment in
the long run is somewhat in the middle of the distribution of the size
of employment effects in the sample of countries considered. Employ-
ment levels are boosted most strongly in Luxembourg, both in the short
and medium-to-long terms, owing to a combination of factors, including
relatively low increases in real wages.
France is another special country in the sample, as it exhibits the
highest value of the R&D tax credit rate. As apparent from Figure 9.4, the
initial response of GDP in France is among the most negative ones (along
with Germany’s), remaining subdued over the medium term and picking
up only towards the longer term. This response in output mainly owes to
the relatively more intense outflow of labour input from the final good
production sector to the R&D sector. The reason for this high sensitivity
of employment to the policy shock is in turn partly related to the very
high initial value for the capital income tax rate in France.
In short, the results of the simulations show that, by 2035, the coun-
tries which exhibit the largest GDP gains are Cyprus, Poland, Malta
and Romania. These countries’ R&D intensities in the initial period are
among the lowest relative to the other countries in the sample, which
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makes them experience larger changes, all else equal.11 However, this
does not invalidate the fact that countries such as Italy and Cyprus, which
depart from relatively sizeable levels of both R&D intensity and the phys-
ical capital income tax rate, rank rather high in terms of the size of GDP
impacts. This is especially true in the very long run, as the influence of the
initial value for R&D intensity fades away over time and deep parameters
gain more importance. Also, these structural factors can partly offset the
effect of the dissimilar magnitude of the tax credit shock across countries,
even after only 20 years from now. This can be seen in the particular case
of Italy. Despite departing from a middle-range value for R&D intensity,
relatively higher values of (i) the elasticity of R&D output to the number
of researchers, λ; (ii) the efficiency level of R&D, ν ; and (iii) the capital
income tax rate, yield a GDP impact in 2035 which is the fifth highest.
Therefore, we can conclude that deep parameters in the R&D produc-
tion function as well as policy parameters play a more important role for
macroeconomic outcomes in the long run. By contrast, the starting level
of variables such as R&D intensity are more important determinants over
the short to medium run. Our results and the explanations behind cross-
country differences in outcomes are thus consistent with the findings in
D’Auria et al. (2009).
9.3 Alternative Approaches to Modelling
the Impact of R&D Tax Credits and Entry Barriers
In this section, other modelling approaches aimed at addressing the
problem of providing sound structural evaluations of the macroeco-
nomic implications of policies, inducing changes in R&D tax incentives
and entry barriers in EU countries, is presented. This is an impor-
tant challenge in view of, among other issues, the sluggish productivity
performance of many European countries in the recent decades. First,
a discussion is provided on some of the specific issues arising from the
analyses presented in the last section. Based on this, a broader view on
11 Indeed, as discussed in DAuria et al. (2009), ‘...countries with low R&D inten-
sity (R&D investment as a percentage of GDP and research labour, L A) gain the most
from R&D promoting policies. This is partly due to the fact that the 0.1% of GDP
policymeasure implemented to boost the knowledge sector represents a proportionally
stronger shock for countries investing less in R&D and is proportionally smaller for the
R&D intensive countries...’.
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possible alternative and complementary lines of future research on this
topic is suggested.
Growing availability of firm-level data in the last two decades has trig-
gered a revolution in the field of international trade and is slowly changing
the macroeconomic-modelling landscape. Long-run growth models have
already started incorporating several dimensions of firm heterogeneity,
but short-run models are still lagging behind. Most existing DSGE
macroeconomic models do not embed firm heterogeneity, as the purpose
they were originally designed for does not necessitate such structure.
However, recent research shows that firm heterogeneity is particularly
relevant for analysing the macroeconomic impact of innovation poli-
cies, such as the ones exemplified in the last sections on increasing
R&D tax credits and implementing measures to reducing market entry
barriers (Acemoglu et al., 2017). For the purpose of policy evaluation
exercises, it would be quite challenging to estimate/calibrate large-scale
DSGE models with micro-data, since many EU countries still do not
have high-quality data at a fine-grain level. With the growing availability
of high-quality microdata, however, this could be a fruitful long-run
avenue for future research. As a first step, it is interesting to explore the
new potential channels brought about by new, smaller scale quantitative
models featuring firm heterogeneity.
9.3.1 The Treatment of R&D Tax Credits and Subsidies
Regarding the modelling of R&D tax credits performed in Sanchez-
Martinez et al. (2017), it is important to note that the growth engine
embedded into the representative-firm DSGE model used is that of
horizontal innovation (Romer, 1990), where growth is driven by the
introduction of new products by new firms. Innovation is conducted by
firms that were not producing before having discovered/invented and
patented the new product. Hence, by construction, in this model incum-
bent firms do not innovate. Policy to stimulate innovation then must
act on the entry margin, whereas tax credit is the appropriate policy
only for incumbent firms. The authors circumvent this problem by inter-
preting the tax credit as acting on the cost to households of purchasing
the patent resulting from innovation. The credit can then be seen as a
subsidy to the acquisition of intangible capital (patents). This is an indi-
rect way to introduce a tax subsidy in the model, which does not directly
affect the firms’ innovation decisions, but rather acts through the financial
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market affecting the user cost of (intangible) capital. It is not a priori clear
whether this modelling choice leads to an under or overestimation of the
effects of the R&D tax credits, but it makes it virtually undistinguishable
from a (physical) capital tax credit. A more direct way to model R&D tax
credits would be to use a Schumpeterian type of growth model, where
innovation is performed by incumbent firms.
Furthermore, in the Romer class of models firms underinvest in inno-
vation due to two types of dynamic inefficiencies. First, there exist
knowledge spillovers and, second, there is a form of endogenously incom-
plete markets; there is no way to purchase a machine that is not yet
produced, hence the set of Arrow-Debreu commodities is not complete,
because it is endogenous. It follows that it is always optimal to subsidise
innovation, and the model cannot accommodate cases of over-investment
that can arise from strategic competition across firms. In policy debates,
there is often no consensus on whether any type of investment should be
subsidised. A quantitative economic framework where firms can poten-
tially under or over-invest in R&D depending on their own characteristics
and on those of the sectors where they operate can address these issues,
subject to the discipline imposed by the data. Schumpeterian models
formalise the idea that firms compete vertically, so that successful inno-
vation by one firm allows it to replace another firm. This process of
creative destruction generates a negative externality in the form of over-
investment, as in its innovation decision the successful firm does not take
into account the damage inflicted to other firms. In these models then,
innovation subsidies can have a positive or negative economic impact
depending on the characteristics of the sector and the economy. This
class of models thus permits the analysis of those cases where the market
produces too much innovation.
As an example of this family of macro models featuring firm dynamics,
Akcigit et al. (2018) offer a model which belongs to the strand of research
considering smaller size models compared to large DSGEs, focusing on
a more detailed analysis of the macro and micro channels through which
innovation policies affect aggregate outcomes. These models often depart
from the representative firm framework to incorporate rich firm-level
heterogeneity which is carefully calibrated to the data, thereby exploiting
the wealth of microdata that has become available in recent decades. Some
key papers in this literature are Akcigit and Kerr (2017), Acemoglu et al.
(2017), and Akcigit et al. (2016), among others.
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In Akcigit et al. (2018), new evidence is provided using data from
the US Patent Office of stronger competition experienced by American
firms as a result of higher patenting by Japanese and European firms
in most sectors of the economy during the 1970–1981 period. These
developments, together with Reagan’s introduction of R&D subsidies at
the time motivate the construction of a dynamic model of international
technology competition, which is employed to perform a quantitative
comparative analysis of the economic effects of that innovation policy
vis-a-vis a counterfactual, protectionist policy.12
The model builds on step-by-step Schumpeterian innovation, which
allows for strategic interaction among competitors.13 International
markets are separated by transportation costs and tariff barriers. Slow
international diffusion of ideas in the form of knowledge spillovers
represents a potential engine of convergence across countries.
The model is calibrated to reproduce the convergence in patenting
experienced by the United States in the 1970s and used to evaluate both
the R&D subsidy policy introduced in 1981 and an alternative, counter-
factual, protectionist policy. The authors find that a 50% increase in US
import tariffs produces welfare gains for Americans lasting for about 20
years and losses afterwards. In the short run, trade barriers help firms
in import-competing sectors recoup profitability sheltering them from
foreign competition. This artificial protection reduces firms incentives to
innovate which, in turn, impacts negatively the country’s long-run growth
prospects. This results hold under the assumption that US trade part-
ners do not retaliate. Under retaliation, that is in the case where foreign
countries exactly match the US policy change, even the short-run gains
disappear. Figure 9.7 illustrates the results.
In Fig. 9.7 the welfare effects of the unilateral tariff and, in the second
panel, the effect of the tariff on US incumbent firms’ innovation, are
shown. The Figure plots the incumbent firms’ distribution of innovation
in the steady state across technology gaps. Positive (negative) gaps illus-
trate technology classes (sectors) where US (foreign) firms hold a leading
position in patenting. US firms accelerate their innovation efforts close
to the import cut-off, the left peak before which their products’ quality
12 This type of evaluation serves to illustrate how similar EU innovation policy
evaluations could potentially be conducted based on this family of models.
13 The global economy is dominated by large and innovative firms (Bernard et al., 2017;
Hottman et al., 2016) so that the strategic interaction between large firms is crucial.
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Fig. 9.7 Unilateral 50% increase in US trade tariffs (Akcigit et al., 2018)
is not high enough to beat foreign competitors on their own turf. The
incentive to obtain more quality improvements and conquer the domestic
market stimulates innovation. This effect is dubbed defensive innovation.
American incumbent firms accelerate innovation also before entering the
export market, the right peak. Here the incentive to go one step further
is the conquest of the foreign market and it is dubbed the expansionary
innovation effect. The increase in US tariff reduces the domestic cut-off,
thereby allowing easier survival of US firms in their own market. This is
the source of the short-run gains reported on the left panel of the Figures
for the 20 years after the policy. In an imperfectly competitive world,
tariff protection shifts profits (and in an extended version of the model
also wages) away from foreign firms (and workers) towards US firms (and
workers). The side-effect of protectionism is that US firms in the import
competing industries reduce their innovation effort, thereby reducing the
growth prospects of the US economy and leading to welfare losses in the
long run.
Figure 9.8 reports the effect of a trade war, where a 50% US tariff hike
is met by a similar hike from their commercial partners. As it can be seen
in the left panel, even the short-run gains now disappear, and protec-
tionism becomes a bad policy even for very short-sighted policymakers.
Moreover, comparing the magnitude of the effects in the scenarios with
and without retaliation, the latter are one order of magnitude larger,
ranging from about 1 to over 2% of consumption per year. The right panel
shows the economic mechanism behind this results. Retaliation affects US
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Fig. 9.8 50 per cent increase in US trade tariffs under retaliation (Akcigit et al.,
2018)
exporters, which find it harder to penetrate foreign markets. In the figure
the export cut-off moves to the right, and some US firms exit the export
market. Since American firms find it harder to compete in foreign markets,
they are discouraged in their innovation efforts, which drops substantially
for a large set of firms.
The R&D subsidy change introduced in 1981 generates welfare gains
both in the short and in the long run, as shown in Figure 9.9. Differently
from the protectionist response, R&D subsidies increase US incumbent
Fig. 9.9 US R&D subsidy increase in 1981 (Akcigit et al., 2018)
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firms’ innovation in all sectors, thereby allowing policymakers to support
national competitiveness without giving up the gains from trade. Welfare
gains increase in time after the policy change as the growth effect of inno-
vation has a stronger impact in the long run when the full potential of the
innovation stimulus is realised.
Finally, Figure 9.10 shows the optimal US R&D subsidy over different
time horizons and in a 35 years horizon at different levels of multi-
lateral openness. It follows from inspection of the Figure that longer
policy horizons imply higher optimal R&D subsidies, as a longer horizon
allows larger gains from policy-induced growth to materialise. More-
over, more openness leads to lower optimal levels of innovation subsidies.
Intuitively, a more open economy provides stronger incentives for US
firms to innovate and there is less need for the government to subsidise
innovation.
Although this model is more stylised along some dimensions than
business-cycle DSGE models, it permits a clear illustration of some key
mechanisms through which the R&D subsidy policy operates. More-
over, it highlights the importance of the interaction between innovation
policy and trade policy. The last result of the paper seems to suggest
that the more integrated EU countries are (both in terms of tariff and
non-tariff barriers) the weaker the need for a strong innovation subsidy
policy. Moreover, for trade between EU countries and their non-EU trade
partners, the results imply that any increase in trade barriers, due for
Fig. 9.10 Optimal US R&D subsidy, over different horizons and levels of
openness (Akcigit et al., 2018)
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example to tariff wars, would increase the need for stronger EU support
to innovation.
Another relevant example of the analysis of the impact of R&D tax
credits is presented in Borota et al. (2016). These authors analyse R&D
tax credit policies in the European Union via a multi-country Schumpete-
rian growth model,featuring cross-country technological heterogeneity.
In technologically more advanced countries, firms have access to frontier
production and innovation technologies, while less developed countries
lag behind the frontier but can potentially catch up through technology
diffusion and innovation. Countries may also differ in other dimensions
such as size, human capital and other policies.
The authors first analyse the growth channels in the model, where
different countries are integrated through trade and foreign direct invest-
ment, and explore the benefits and costs of R&D tax incentives. Second,
they identify and describe the optimal R&D tax subsidy from each
country’s perspective, and from the perspective of the overall European
economy. The latter identifies optimal policies under various scenarios of
policy cooperation between countries. Policymakers may use R&D tax
incentives to promote the competitiveness of national firms in the global
economy, at the expense of foreign firms. The strategic nature of this
policy leads naturally to consider possible national and supra-national
gains from cooperation. Since countries are different in this economy,
costs and benefits from competition and cooperation in innovation policy
differ across countries. A key point of the analysis is to show how
countries’ differences in size, technology and the level of economic inte-
gration within the EU, shape their incentives to set innovation policies
cooperatively.
Evidence is presented showing that Western European firms’ foreign
direct investment to the East is strongly correlated with R&D and inno-
vation by Eastern European firms. In the model this is formalised as
knowledge diffusion: when Western firms move their production to the
east some of their technology spills over locally allowing local firms to
start innovating and potentially leapfrogging Western firms. The incen-
tives for FDI are driven by lower labour costs in the East, and the
disincentives are related to technology diffusion that might allow local
firms to imitate their technology and even leapfrog them. The paper looks
at the R&D subsidy game between Western European countries, bunched
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in a single region for simplicity, and a region of Eastern European coun-
tries. Moreover, the gains from innovation policy cooperation, defined as
a unified subsidy at the European level, are also explored.
In this economy, as in the standard Schumpetarian model Aghion and
Howitt (1992), the optimal subsidy is governed by two externalities,
one leading to underinvestment and one to overinvestment in R&D.
First, once an innovation is introduced it benefits present and future
consumers because future innovators build on it, this is the standing
on the shoulder of gians type of externality, also known as the intertem-
poral spillover effect. Since innovating firms do not take these effects on
consumers into account, they tend to underinvest in innovation and the
intertemporal spillover generates a motive to subsidise R&D. Second,
when quality laggard firms successfully innovate, they drive incumbent
leaders in their product lines out of business. The innovating firm does
not take this into account and is therefore bound to overinvest in R&D.
The open economy dimensions of this model add a new key external
effect. Successful Western innovation, for example, drives Eastern firms
out of business and shifts profits towards the West, thereby increasing
domestic income and welfare. Similarly, when an Eastern firm successfully
innovates, it drives a Western firm out of business, and the related shift
of profits across countries increase national welfare. Since home R&D
firms do not take this effect into account when innovating, a bias towards
underinvestment obtains. This is the international business-stealing effect,
and pins down the strategic motive for subsidising R&D in an open
economy. Table 9.2 summarises the results focusing on the long-run
equilibrium of this economy.
The non-cooperation scenario is the one where each region sets its
subsidy to maximise its own welfare given the other region’s subsidy, and
the result is the Nash equilibrium of this game. The cooperation equilib-
rium is obtained assuming that a European level planner sets a common
Table 9.2 The effect of cooperation
sW sE WW WE WEU growth
Non-coop (sWn , s
E
n ) 0.44 0.46 9.15 6.24 15.39 1.16
Unified (suni ) 0.78 0.78 8.84 7.45 16.29 3.23
Welfare gain −0.017 0.080 0.028
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subsidy to maximise European welfare. The paper assumes that there is no
ex-post scheme available to winners to compensate the losers. Therefore,
cooperation will be implemented only when it benefits both regions.
Cooperation allows the internalisation of the international business
stealing effect, neutralising the strategic role of subsidies. Cooperation
leads to a higher level of subsidies compared to the non-cooperation
scenario in both countries. Global growth rates are higher, as well as
total European welfare. However, the West loses from cooperation and,
in the absence of a compensation scheme, it does not have incentives to
cooperate. Further simulations in the paper show that the incentives to
cooperate for the West increase when the cost of offshoring production
to the East declines. Intuitively, in a more integrated European market,
Eastern firms represent more of a threat for Western firms, as cheaper
offshoring increases technology transfer to the East thereby exposing
Western firms to more intense technological competition.
This model adds hence a new perspective to the evaluation of R&D
subsidies. Accounting for strategic innovation policy competition across
European countries provides a framework for evaluating a common EU
R&D tax policy.
9.3.2 The Treatment of Entry Barriers
As an example of an alternative approach to modelling the impact of
a reduction in entry barriers, within the same family of models with
heterogeneous firms, Impullitti and Licandro (2018) use a version of
this type of model to assess the effects of both a reduction in entry
costs and credit frictions. The model represents a two-country world with
symmetric technologies, preferences and endowments, where both coun-
tries produce exactly the same set of differentiated goods which can be
traded at an iceberg trade cost. Within a given variety, firms from both
countries compete à la Cournot for market shares. At entry, firms draw
a productivity level from a given distribution. After entry, they invest
in innovation to increase their productivity. The innovation technology
features within variety knowledge spillovers at the country level gener-
ating sustained growth under a stationary productivity distribution. In
steady state, the productivity distribution permanently moves to the right
as a travelling wave at the long-run growth rate. In what follows the anal-
ysis is restricted to the steady-state equilibrium. Notice that, as opposed
to Romer-style endogenous growth models, the growth engine in this
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model comes from innovation by incumbent firms rather than entrants.
Hence, policies affecting the cost of entry would impact growth only
indirectly, through their effect on product market competition. Hence,
all the mechanisms shown here are complementary to those present in
representative-firm DSGE models.
The model is calibrated to match some key aggregate and firm-level
facts of the US economy. These targets lay in rather standard ranges, and
so their numerical values can be deemed as relevant for large EU countries
too. The following exercises are performed: first, the effects of changing
the entry cost parameter for a sufficiently wide range of values around
the benchmark value is simulated. The effects on firm selection, markups,
innovation, growth and welfare, are shown. In order to show the role
of firm heterogeneity, the exercise is repeated, shutting down the selec-
tion channel. The second exercise is to reduce financial constraints on the
fixed operating costs. Finally, notice that only policy changes implemented
symmetrically in both countries are considered. This would be equivalent
to a coordinated EU-level policy on entry barriers and credit constraints
reductions in a EU-wide model such as QUEST III.
9.3.2.1 Reducing Entry Barriers
Figure 9.11 shows the effect of wide changes in the entry cost around
the benchmark value which is 0.1, corresponding to about 7% of GDP.
Changes in key endogenous variables in the baseline model and in a
version of the model where the selection effect is shut down are reported.
That is, changes in policy parameters that affect the survival cut-off, which
is set constant at the benchmark level, are assumed away. Hence, the
economies with and without selection have by construction the same
equilibrium at the benchmark entry cost.
The simulations show that a reduction in entry costs generates larger
pro-competitive effects in the benchmark economy than in the economy
without selection. When entry cost is reduced, the number of firms in
each product line increases more and the average markups drops more
in the baseline economy than in the economy without selection. Intu-
itively, lower entry costs induce more firms to enter the market, thereby
reducing markups. Stronger product market competition forces the less
productive, less profitable firms, out of the market, thereby generating
tougher firm selection which leads to a lower firm survival probability.
By contrast, in the model without selection firm survival is unchanged.
The pro-competitive effect leads to higher market efficiency which in
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Fig. 9.11 Entry costs, selection and growth
turn yields a higher equilibrium size of the firms. In this economy, firms
perform cost-reducing (or productivity-enhancing innovation), and the
return to innovation scales with the quantity produced by the firm.
Hence, a large firm size leads to greater innovation and faster productivity
growth. The increase in firm size is feasible because of the presence of a
homogenous good sector from which the more efficient differentiated
good sector attracts resources. In the heterogeneous firm model there is
an additional reallocation from exiting, less productive firms to surviving,
more productive firms. This reallocation leads to higher incentives to
innovate and faster productivity growth than in the model without selec-
tion. Finally, there are several channels of welfare gains in this economy.
The economy without selection features welfare improvements from a
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reduction in entry costs coming from the reduction in markups, and
the induced increase in productivity growth. The economy with selec-
tion adds additional static and dynamic gains due to the adjustments on
the extensive margin. First, selection further increases the static efficiency
of the economy; second, by stimulating innovation, it fuels an additional
surge in long-run productivity growth.
9.3.2.2 Reducing Financial Constraints
The original model does not feature credit constraints but they can be
easily introduced. In order to introduce credit constraints, it is assumed
that while variable costs can be funded internally, firms must borrow a
fraction d ∈ (0, 1) of their fixed operating costs λ upfront. In order to
cover this upfront cost, firms borrow from financial institutions pledging a
fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) as collateral.14 Higher d and lower γ indicate stronger
financial vulnerability of the firm or sector. Neither cross-sector nor cross-
firm heterogeneity along this dimension is assumed for simplicity. Because
of the imperfect ability to insure risk away, credit institutions can expect
to be repaid by firms with probability χ ∈ (0, 1), which embodies the
strength of financial institutions or their willingness to enforce credit
contracts. For simplicity, it is assumed that firms are credit constrained
only in financing the fixed cost for producing domestically.15 To embed
this credit friction, the firm’s problem of the original model must be
augmented with the following constraints:
LC : r(z̃t ) − h(z̃t ) − (1 − d)λ ≥ F(z̃t ),
PC : − dλ + χF(z̃t ) + (1 − χ)γ λ ≥ 0,
where r(z̃t ) are the revenues net of variable production costs of a firm with
productivity z̃t , h(z̃t ) is the R&D expenditure, and F(z̃) is the payment
due to the financial institution in case the contract is enforced. The
liquidity constraint (LC) states that in case of repayment firms can pay
up to their net revenues. The participation constraint (PC) implies that
the financial institution is willing to enter the contract only if the expected
14 In purchasing intermediate inputs, paying salaries to workers, and paying rents for
land use and equipment, firms often have to incur in expenses previous to production
and sales.
15 The model can be easily extended to include frictions on fixed export costs.
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returns exceed the outside option, which for simplicity is normalised to
zero.
The optimal decision of firms is to adjust their payment F to take the
investors to their participation constraint, which in equilibrium holds with
equality. Substituting this into the liquidity constraint (LC), the domestic
survival cut-off of this economy can be determined. Focusing on the
steady-state equilibrium, where z is the stationary productivity level of
firm z, the survival cut-off z∗ can be expressed as:





(d − γ ) ]λ is the effective fixed cost which includes
the cost of borrowing in imperfect financial markets. A more financially
constrained economy is one in which credit institutions are less likely to
be repaid, γ is low, and therefore offer firms contracts with high cost
of credit which imply a high effective fixed cost. Hence, the effects of
financial constraints in this economy can be analysed by focusing on the
induced changes in the fixed operating cost they produce.
In Figure 9.12, the effects of wide changes in the fixed operating cost
are simulated around the benchmark value which is 0.01 (corresponding
to about 3.9% of GDP). A reduction in the fixed operating cost is shown
to generate an anti-selection effect, that is it makes firm survival easier. In
every model with firm heterogeneity, high fixed cost serves as a discipline
devise since they make survival harder for less productive firms. Hence,
the probability of firm survival increases as fixed costs decrease. In our
model, more productive firms innovate more, and since higher survival
rates leave firms with low productivity on the market, this leads to lower
aggregate innovation and growth.
9.3.2.3 Policy Comparison
Table 9.3 reports some quantifications of the effects of the policy changes
considered above, allowing for a direct comparison of their impact on
key outcomes. First the effects of a 10% reduction in the entry cost are
computed, from its benchmark value of 0.1 to 0.09, a reduction equiva-
lent to 0.7% of GDP. Although the markup declines only by one per cent,
the selection effect is strong and reduces the probability of firm survival
at entry by 18%. The total R&D to sales ratio increases by 3% and growth
and welfare rise by about 9%. Repeating the same exercise in the model
without selection it can be seen that the effects are substantially smaller:
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Fig. 9.12 Credit constraints, selection and growth: Domestic fixed cost
Table 9.3 Effect of a 10% reduction in entry and fixed cost (percentage change)
Benchmark No selection
 entry cost  fixed cost  entry cost  fixed cost
Markup −1 0.01 −0.3 −0.7
Survival probability −18.6 11.8 0 0
R&D/sales 3 −1.2 0.6 -0.5
Growth 9.6 −11.2 2.4 −6.8
Welfare gains 9.1 −7.5 5.2 −5.6
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the growth effect is three times smaller than in the baseline model and
the welfare effect is about half of that in the baseline model.
The effect of a 10% reduction in the fixed operating cost is also
reported. In this case both models suggest non-negligible losses, but
in line with the previous policy exercise, the losses when the selection
channel is operative are substantially larger.
9.3.2.4 Extensions
Relaxing financial constraints to the fixed operating costs of producing
domestically has a negative effect on growth as it makes the economy
less selective. Different results can be obtained if the credit constraint
is on the fixed operating cost. Proceeding as above, the credit friction




(d − γ ) ]λx .
Figure 9.13 explores the effects of financial constraints on exports. A
reduction in the fixed cost of exporting, triggered by a reduction in
credit constraints, reduces the survival probability, therefore generating
more selection, more innovation and faster growth. The economic mech-
anism is straightforward. Easier access to foreign markets allow marginal,
non-exporting firms to start selling abroad, thereby boosting their sales
and increasing their incentives to innovate. The productivity improve-
ments made by these new exporters increase their competitiveness also
on their domestic market where they see their market shares increase at
the expense of the local non-exporting firms. As a consequence, the latter
find it harder to survive and the least productive of them exit.
Finally notice that firms could also be credit constrained in financing
their entry costs. The model can be easily extended to include this possi-
bility. It could be assumed that firms borrow to finance the entire entry
cost and that they face credit constraints on this activity. Financial insti-
tutions can expect to be paid the full firm profit with probability χ < 1,
or only a fraction te ∈ (0, 1) of it with probability 1− χ . Free entry in the
financial market leads to
Ez(φ(z)) = φ
χ + (1 − χ)te = φ̂
where φ̂ is the entry cost inclusive of the cost of borrowing, and Ez(φ(z))
the expected profit at entry. Higher credit constraints imply higher cost
of borrowing to finance entry and therefore higher entry costs. Policies
aimed at improving firms’ access to credit facilitate entry of new firms and,
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Fig. 9.13 Credit constraints, selection and growth: Export fixed cost
consequently, have the same impact on selection, innovation and growth
as the reductions in entry costs are explored in Figure 9.11. Easier access
to credit to finance entry leads to an economy that is more competitive,
more selective and more innovative, resulting in a faster pace of aggregate
growth and higher welfare.
9.3.2.5 Conclusion
A substantial share of the EU budget is directed at funding and bailing
out incumbent (often large) firms (Acemoglu et al., 2017; Criscuolo
et al., 2014). Recent frontier quantitative macroeconomic analysis of
industrial policy has highlighted the importance of policies promoting
selection and reallocation across firms with heterogeneous productivity
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and innovation capacity. Acemoglu et al. (2017) show that any hori-
zontal policy aimed a stimulating production and/or innovation by all
firms ultimately hinders selection and reallocation, as it facilitates survival
of inefficient and non-innovative firms. The open economy dimension
of the model that was used in the simple policy analysis above adds an
important qualification to those results. Reducing credit constraints on
non-exporting firms makes the economy less selective thereby hindering
efficiency-improving reallocations of market shares towards more produc-
tive and more innovative firms. This is in line with Acemoglu et al.’s
(2017) results. Lowering financial constraints on exporting firms, though,
has the opposite effect, generating more selection, more reallocation and
faster growth. This is a relevant guidance to avoid firm-specific or sector-
specific policies which are often open to ‘pork-barrel’ distortions. By
facilitating access to credit to exporting firms, policymakers let the market
pick the winners. The second conclusion that can be drawn from the
experiments above is that slashing financial and non-financial barriers to
entry has unambiguously positive effects on competition, selection and
growth.
Relating the results here with the findings in Benedetti Fasil et al.
(2017), a number of conclusions can be drawn: first, a reduction in
entry barriers can affect innovation and growth even in a model where
new firms are not a direct engine of growth; hence, this is a new
channel complementing the one in Romer-type models. Second, endoge-
nous markups allow entry policies to have substantial efficiency effects
on the economy. Third, models that disregard firm heterogeneity and
extensive margins of adjustment, both on the domestic and the export
market, may underestimate the effects of entry and regulation policies on
growth and welfare. Finally, financial incentives to incumbent firms have
different implications for growth depending on whether they are directed
to domestic or to exporting firms.
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Conclusions
This book provides an extensive overview of the latest theoretical
and empirical insights surrounding the macroeconomic modelling of
R&D and innovation policies. It also contains several examples of model-
based impact simulations of actual policies implemented by the EU,
with a particular focus on the European Commission’s future Framework
Programme, Horizon Europe. This last chapter provides a comprehensive
synthesis of the main conclusions concerning the latest empirical obser-
vations and macroeconomic modelling strategies discussed, and their
inter-linkages with innovation policy. The insights emerging from the
discussions on macroeconomic modelling are given higher prominence,
reflecting their correspondingly greater weight throughout the volume.
Regarding the empirical literature and its policy implications, some of
the most salient recent observations include the positive linkages between
innovation and wider societal dimensions, such as happiness and social
mobility. However, greater innovation is also associated with increasing
inequality, especially in top-income segments. Optimal policy measures
must thus take these facts into consideration. More specifically, the main
policy lessons stemming from the most recent empirical studies are:
• International competition spurs innovation by providing direct and
indirect incentives for it. Barriers to international competition are
hence prone to reduce the growth rate of technological progress.
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• Innovation policies, such as R&D subsidies, require patience on the
side of policymakers, as these only have a significant impact on the
economy in the medium-to-long run.
• Industrial policy needs to consider the effects on firm compo-
sition and factor reallocations in the economy when opting for
different policy options. Bailing out unproductive firms could slow
down factor reallocation from unproductive incumbents to more
productive entrants.
• The rate of successful inventions has been observed to be highly
correlated with the pool of inventors, which is in turn dependent
on as wide as possible access to education. Education policy should
thus focus on providing as much equal opportunities for education
as possible, thereby improving the quality of the inventor pool and
therefore overall innovation capacity.
• Innovation policy generally emphasises tax credits on the income of
firms more than on the income of inventors and researchers. One
promising policy direction is to couple corporate income tax with tax
breaks or research grants to inventors in order to offset the potential
disincentive effects of overall taxation.
• The widespread use of new technologies is at least as important
as their invention for increasing the economic impact. Hence, it
is important to develop well-functioning secondary markets for
technologies, in particular on the sale and licensing of technology.
Capturing these stylised facts in a robust modelling framework, which
also needs to capture the intricacies embedded in the plethora of innova-
tion policies that can be evaluated, has been the primary subject of this
book. In the remainder, a summary of the very rich and thorough insights
offered in this manuscript on the sound macroeconomic modelling of
innovation policies is offered.1
The overarching principle that should govern any attempt at
modelling the macroeconomic effects of innovation policy is that the
latter should act as the ultimate guide for the former. This means that
in order to evaluate different programs and policies, it is critical to start
1 The points underlined are presented in an order congruent with their ranking in terms
of their relevance for optimal model design. They are also ordered from more general to
more specific.
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from a clear description of these measures, so as to understand the chan-
nels through which they are expected to operate to achieve their goals. In
this sense, crucial for the description of these channels are the views and
priors of the policymakers involved in the design and implementation of
the programs, as well as other experts working closely with policy insti-
tutions in the design of programs and policies. The importance of this
resides in ensuring the pertinence and usefulness of the simulated effects
as an accurate representation of the actual effects on innovation, growth
and productivity, among others, that can be expected from the policies
under evaluation. In this sense, a transparent dialogue between practi-
tioners in these institutions and the academics and others responsible for
modelling is of utmost importance.
In addition, an important principle in model design is that it needs
to be question and data-dependent. Large Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium models used, for example, by central banks and other insti-
tutions have often been designed for the purpose of analysing fiscal and
monetary policies. However, the necessary elements contained in these
models might differ from the ones needed for the goal of studying
the impact of innovation policies. As an example, it is common prac-
tice among DSGE models to treat the whole economy as consisting of
a single sector. Even though this simplification may be adequate for other
types of policies, it may not be suitable to fully capture the effects of
R&D and innovation policies, where there may be a need for a more
detailed approach to modelling the sectors of production in the economy.
With these key tenets in mind, together with the basic principle
that models should be tailored to the exact outcome variables policy-
makers wish to explore, the following exhaustive list provides a set of
the main elements that a macroeconomic model designed for innovation
policy evaluation should have:
• Core model ingredients. A fundamental principle in the construc-
tion of macroeconomic models is that they should be kept as
tractable as possible, while maximising their explanatory capacity
on the specific economic issues for which they are devised. In
this regard, the basic elements any first attempt at building a
macroeconomic model should depart from are:
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– The nature of economic growth. In particular, should economic
growth be modelled as exogenous, endogenous or semi-
endogenous? Since policymakers are mainly concerned with the
impact on main economy-wide variables, such as GDP growth,
models of endogenous growth should be at the top of the
agenda, since they permit to trace the impact of a certain
policy shock on final macroeconomic outcomes. However, the
debate should not be so much about the nature of growth,
as opposed to the empirical pertinence of existing endogenous
growth models (i.e. observed stylised facts need to be replicated
by the models).
– The time dimension of the outcomes to be analysed. One of the
most common questions any macroeconomic model needs to
answer from its onset is whether it should cover the short,
medium or long run. While economic growth models are
mostly concerned with long-term effects, innovation policies
also require regular (short and medium-term) evaluation. In
this sense, intermediary effects, such as those taking place
during the transition from a balanced growth path to another,
are critical for the evaluation of innovation policies.
– Firm size as unit of analysis. Given the existence of so-called
zombie firms and leading firms, characterised by widely different
employment shares and productivity levels, it is central to
capture the changes in the size distribution of firms over time,
because policies can have an important bearing on macroeco-
nomic outcome variables by re-shaping this distribution. As
highlighted in the examples in Part II, the family of models
featuring firm dynamics provides a suitable modelling frame-
work to capture the effect of changes to firm size.
– The treatment of welfare and distributional effects. This aspect
has been traditionally absent in the innovation policy modelling
debate. Yet, the creative destruction process inherent to inno-
vation leads to new jobs often requiring new skills, as well as
to job losses with subsequent distributional and welfare conse-
quences. These may be unevenly distributed across sectors,
regions and generations. For instance, R&D subsidies aimed at
promoting investment in innovation may affect the variance of
the productivity distribution across firms and regions. A better
understanding of these types of effects is important to gauge
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the distributional consequences of innovation policies. A model
thus needs to capture these impacts.
• Capturing the heterogeneity of agents based on microdata.
In order to identify the key channels through which innovation
policy may affect growth performance, the use of models featuring
heterogeneous agents, which feed from the latest microeconomic
data available, is critical. As a general principle, a macroeconomic
model is a good laboratory for the evaluation of economic policy if
it is as close as possible to the data on those dimensions on which
the policy is supposed to operate. Indeed, since innovation policies
affect the incentives and performance of innovative firms, a macroe-
conomic model needs to capture firm dynamics and be disciplined by
microdata at the firm level. This requires the description at the firm
level of their innovation behaviour, the entry of new innovative firms
and the exit of the less innovative ones. The risk of not including this
is to miss the relevant ways through which innovation policies influ-
ence growth and welfare. By the same token, in order to evaluate the
redistributive effects of innovation policies, a model with heteroge-
neous individuals is needed, where differences in education and skills
are captured. Innovation, by creating and destroying jobs and the
value of associated skills, impacts earnings unequally. Phenomena like
the rise in the skill-premium, job polarisation and skill obsolescence
are intimately related to technical progress. Adequately accounting
for these effects calls for modelling skill and education heterogeneity.
• The role of product and process innovation. Productivity levels
vary across firms and evolve according to a complex process which
involves different dimensions and stages: the quality of the prod-
ucts offered by the firm (as perceived by consumers or by firms
using them in their production processes), the technical efficiency
of the firm’s production process (in the transformation of inputs
into output) and the quality and price of inputs used in produc-
tion. Innovation affects all these aspects of productivity. Product
innovation mainly permits the development of new, higher quality
products, whereas process innovation allows a reduction of produc-
tion costs by improving technical efficiency, adopting better quality
inputs or reducing the cost of these inputs. Different techniques have
been developed in recent years to estimate the product value of firms
and the production efficiency of the firm. An appropriate model to
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evaluate innovation policy should be able to distinguish between
these two major types of innovation in order to properly capture
the nuanced linkages between innovation and productivity growth.
• The role of basic and applied research. It is safe to state that
the current state of technological development and welfare would
have been much more limited if applied research would have been
undertaken in isolation from basic research. The close relationship
between these two types of research is essential, not least because
of their impact on the innovation process, including positive exter-
nalities stemming from collaboration between universities and the
private sector. In the particular case of the EU, its leadership crit-
ically depends on the excellence of European universities and basic
research centres. The modelling strategy has to embed these two
types of fundamental activities, the channels via which they interact
and the time delays involved. First, the different stages of the inno-
vation cycles need to be captured. Importantly, the model should
be able to accommodate the different impacts of radical innovations
and general purpose technologies. Second, the time elapsed between
basic and applied research, between first prototypes and economi-
cally profitable innovations, between first adoption and full diffusion,
needs to be captured in accordance with the empirical evidence. It
is critical to precisely identify the time delays present in any innova-
tion process until they have an actual bearing on economic growth
and the welfare of individuals. In this sense, a requirement is for
the model to deliver some intermediary indicators, such as academic
publications and citation indexes for basic research and patents, new
products or new models or versions of existing products, for applied
research. Third, diffusion and adoption of technologies across space
and time and the different forms of technological spillovers and
externalities need to be properly modelled too.
• Multiple Modules. In order to satisfy the objective of the model’s
tractability, a general model needs to be complemented by a series of
satellite, specific micro models, which reflect sectorial, occupational
and regional nuances. These micromodules should be interpreted as
blocks of the core macromodel, via which general equilibrium effects
will be able to operate. It is in these decisions concerning the model’s
structure that the principle of policymakers and experts as guides of
the shape of the model plays a crucial role; they should identify the
channels through which they expect incentives to affect innovation,
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productivity and growth, as well as other outcomes such as labour
market and income distribution effects.
• Multiple countries and regions and the role of spillovers. The
model needs to mimic the multi-country, multi-region nature of
the EU, including its trading links with the rest of the world.
The degree of disaggregation should be determined by the level
required by the specific policy under evaluation. Particularly impor-
tant for innovation policy evaluation is to adequately embed channels
through which innovations diffuse across Europe and other parts
of the world. This strategy is critical to evaluate the growth and
welfare gains from a number of important EU policies, including
the Innovation Union, The European Research Area, the Single
Market, the European Structural and Investment Funds. The former
three require chiefly that institutional differences across Member
States are properly captured, while the latter require a focus on
regional spillovers. A special case of policies is that of the Frame-
work Programme and European Structural and Investment Funds,
whose aims are apparently opposed, as the former focuses on funding
research excellence and the latter on economic convergence across
regions. Nevertheless, the redistribution of productivity gains stem-
ming from technological diffusion across European countries and
regions is bound to play a major role in smoothing the apparent
trade-off. The economic gains permitted by this diffusion process
hence need to be accounted for in the model. With regard to the
implications of the EU’s position in a globalised world, competition
and cross-country externalities play a crucial role and thus also need
to be captured. Lastly, not only does technological diffusion need to
be across regions and time, but also across the different economic
sectors, in view of the ongoing secular structural shift, mainly from
manufacturing to services.
• Ancillary elements Lastly, besides the principal ingredients outlined
above, several extensions of the model and other issues that should
be considered, from a holistic point of view, are:
– Human capital formation, skills and education. Since a
high proportion of technology is embedded in human capital,
ideally the latter should be modelled consistently. In particular,
human capital, education and the process of skill creation and
destruction should be present. It has been observed that the
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distribution of skills across the labour force is more persistent
than the distribution of required skills by firms. Understanding
these dynamics is important for policies relating to skill needs
and the future of work.
– Sources of misallocation. A good policy should identify and
be addressed to solve misallocations problems inducing an inef-
ficient allocation of resources across firms and sectors. Financial
frictions are among the main market failures inducing misal-
location. Lack of competition in goods and labour markets,
sometimes related to regulation, can also be very important.
The introduction of different types of market failures into the
modelling framework is thus also important to capture these
inefficiencies.
– Innovation and the environment. Since R&D is partially
addressed to reduce environmental challenges, an environ-
mental module could be added to the model, in particular, if
policymakers and other models’ users are concerned about the
extent to which policies contributes to resource efficiency and
sustainability.
– Measurement Issues. A macroeconomic model is as good
as the quality of the underlying data supporting it. Multiple
measurement issues still exist in relation to innovation and its
process. These issues call for an effort to coordinate official
statistical offices to improve the measurement of, for instance,
quality gains. Due to methodological difficulties, to improve
on this area, a strong commitment from policymakers with a
longer term view is necessary.
The aforementioned points are an attempt to provide a comprehen-
sive reflection on the main guidelines for appropriate macroeconomic
modelling of R&D and innovation policies, both from the academic and
policy viewpoints. Both parties agree on the fact that R&D and inno-
vation drive economic growth and prosperity. Academic research aids in
shedding light on the why and the how by using sophisticated models.
These models explain us the mechanisms through which R&D and inno-
vation policies impact GDP, employment and welfare. Policymakers, on
the other hand, define the what, by delineating policy targets (e.g.,
GDP, employment and welfare growth), by deciding on budgets, and by
designing and implementing large R&D and innovation policies. These
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policies are often cumbersome and impact simultaneously different actors,
sectors and regions. Hence, the main link between academic research and
policymaking lies in the fact that macroeconomic models, even the most
elaborate and abstract, are in need of data validation and a policy question
to answer. Policymakers need robust and reliable modelling platforms able
to guide them by quantifying the trade-offs and assessing the ex-ante and
ex-post impact of different policies interventions.
No macroeconomic model on its own is able to capture all the
complexity of these policies and their exact impact. For its very nature,
every model is a simplification of reality and hence can only partially guide
policymakers. Nevertheless, both parties, academics and policymakers, are
ultimately held accountable for the impact of such policies on economic
growth and prosperity. This book is an effort to bring the two worlds
of academic research and policy making one step closer, and to present
the reader with the conclusion that academic research and assessment of
innovation policies are two faces of the same coin.
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